Davidson v. Coit
Decision Date | 01 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 2002-CA-01570-COA.,2002-CA-01570-COA. |
Citation | 899 So.2d 904 |
Parties | April Elaine DAVIDSON, Appellant, v. Edwin Daniel COIT, Appellee. |
Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
Sandra Nicole Farrell, attorney for appellant.
Christopher A. Tabb, Brandon, attorney for appellee.
Before LEE, P.J., IRVING and GRIFFIS, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., for the Court.
¶ 1. April Elaine Davidson appeals the chancellor's judgment modifying custody. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. Edwin Daniel Coit and April Elaine Davidson were married on July 27, 1991. Two children were born during their marriage, Marilyn Elaine Coit and Kathryn Elizabeth Coit. At the time of the hearing in this matter, Marilyn was nine years old and Kathryn was seven years old. On December 30, 1997, the Chancery Court of Rankin County entered a final judgment of divorce based on irreconcilable differences. In the judgment, Coit and Davidson agreed to share joint physical and legal custody of the children. The judgment provided that the children were to live primarily with Davidson, and Coit would have visitation rights.
¶ 3. On August 14, 2001, Coit filed a motion for modification of custody. The motion asserted two grounds for modification: (1) the minor children have been exposed to Davidson's lesbian lifestyle; and (2) Davidson's live-in girlfriends and mother were raising the children. ¶ 4. After a hearing, the chancellor entered a temporary order that removed the children from Davidson's home and placed them in Coit's custody. After additional hearings, the chancellor issued his findings of facts and conclusion of law that modified the judgment of divorce and granted Coit permanent custody of the children.
¶ 5. Davidson appeals and raises the following issues: (1) the chancellor committed manifest error in granting the modification since there was no substantial change in circumstances since the original custody decree was entered; (2) the chancellor erroneously applied the Albright factors and neglected to make sufficient findings to support his decision; and (3) the chancellor placed too much weight on one individual Albright factor, specifically the moral fitness of the parents.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 6. This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his or her discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 824 So.2d 623, 625-26(¶ 8) (Miss.2002).
ANALYSIS
¶ 7. "In cases involving a request for modification of custody, the chancellor's duty is to determine if there has been a material change in the circumstances since the award of initial custody which has adversely affected the child and which, in the best interest of the child, requires a change in custody." Sanford v. Arinder, 800 So.2d 1267, 1271(¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App. 2001). As such, the non-custodial parent must pass a three-part test: "a substantial change in circumstances of the custodial parent since the original custody decree, the substantial change's adverse impact on the welfare of the child, and the necessity of the custody modification for the best interest of the child." Id. at 1272(¶ 15) (quoting Brawley v. Brawley, 734 So.2d 237, 241(¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.1999)). This Court has routinely utilized this test in the area of child custody modifications. See Sanford, 800 So.2d at 1271(¶ 15); Thompson v. Thompson, 799 So.2d 919, 922(¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2001); Brawley, 734 So.2d at 241(¶ 12). In order to clarify the type or magnitude of material changes that warrant a modification of custody, our supreme court explained that when the totality of the circumstances display a material change in the overall living conditions in which the child is found, which are likely to remain changed in the foreseeable future and such change adversely affects the child, a modification of custody is legally proper. Kavanaugh v. Carraway, 435 So.2d 697, 700 (Miss.1983).
¶ 8. In this issue, Davidson argues that Coit did not present sufficient evidence of the first part of the test — a substantial change in circumstances of the custodial parent since the original custody decree. Davidson claims that, at the time of the original divorce, both the court and Coit were aware that she was a lesbian and had a live-in girlfriend. Hence, Davidson reasons that the chancellor committed manifest error by granting the modification because a substantial change in circumstances has not occurred since the original custody decree was entered.
¶ 9. Davidson relies on the following language from Lambert v. Lambert, 872 So.2d 679, 684(¶ 21) (Miss.Ct.App.2003):
To permit a change in custody, there must first be a factual determination based on substantial evidence, presented by the petitioning party, that there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances since the divorce was granted adversely affecting the child and which ... are anticipated to be permanent or continuing such that they would warrant a change in custody. These changed circumstances must be such that they could not be anticipated at the time of the initial determination of custody and of such magnitude as to justify the drastic measure of change in custody.
(Emphasis added in Davidson's brief).
¶ 10. Indeed, Davidson's sexual preference for women was known at the time of the divorce and initial custody determination. However, Coit's motion for modification was not based on the mere assertion that Davidson was a lesbian. Instead, Coit presented evidence that indicated there was a substantial change in circumstances that has occurred since the original custody determination through the children's exposure to her lesbian sexual relationship and that the exposure has adversely affected the children.
¶ 11. Paul Davey, a qualified expert in the area of adolescent, child and family therapy, testified that since the custody award, the children have admitted to him that most of their primary care is provided by Davidson's live-in girlfriend and that they have been exposed to their mother's sexual behavior. Davey testified to the following:
¶ 12. This Court has held that the sexual relations of an unmarried custodial parent cannot be the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Baumann v. Baumann
...must explain her rationale. If a chancellor fails to articulate the reasoning behind her findings, it is reversible error. Davidson v. Coit , 899 So. 2d 904, 911 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). ¶14. We give deference to the weight that the chancellor assigns to each Albright factor. Smith v. S......
-
Sumrall v. Sumrall
...However, it is reversible error if the chancellor does not articulate the reasoning behind each finding on each Albright factor. Davidson v. Coit, 899 So.2d 904, 911(¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (citing Powell v. Ayars, 792 So.2d 240, 249(¶ 33) (Miss. ¶ 11. In this case, the chancellor discusse......
-
Weathers v. Guin
...880 ( ¶ 37). “[A] chancellor's failure to make specific findings as to each individual Albright factors is reversible error.” Davidson v. Coit, 899 So.2d 904, 911 ( ¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (citing Powell v. Ayars, 792 So.2d 240, 249 ( ¶ 18) (Miss.2001)). ¶ 18. Generally, absent a record in......
-
Weathers v. Guin
...at 880 (¶37). "[A] chancellor's failure to make specific findings as to each individual Albright factors is reversible error." Davidson v. Colt, 899 So. 2d 904, 911 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Powell v. Ayars, 792 So. 2d 240, 249 (¶18) (Miss. 2001)).¶18. Generally, absent a record i......