Davidson v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 18324

Decision Date16 March 1965
Docket NumberNo. 18324,18324
Citation245 S.C. 472,141 S.E.2d 135
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesElma DAVIDSON, Respondent, v. EASTERN FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, Columbia, for appellant.

Donald V. Richardson, Whaley & McCutchen, Columbia, Stuckey & Stuckey, Jennings & Jennings, Bishopville, for respondent.

LIONEL K. LEGGE, Acting Justice.

Stated in general terms, the issue here is as follows: Where, as the result of a collision between an uninsured motor vehicle and an automobile driven by one not its owner, a guest passenger not the spouse or relative of such driver or spouse is injured, is such passenger entitled, as an 'insured' within the intent of Sections 46-750.11, 46-750.13 and 46-750.14 of the 1962 Code of Laws, to uninsured motorist coverage under a policy of automobile liability insurance issued to such driver on his own car?

On March 18, 1962, the plaintiff Elma Davidson was a passenger in a 1952 Oldsmobile owned by James Branham and being driven by Bobby Darity, when said vehicle was struck by an automobile owned and operated by Adam Struckey, an uninsured motorist. To recover damages for bodily injuries resulting from said accident she sued Stuckey and obtained judgment by default for twenty thousand ($20,000.00) dollars, which was not paid. Branham did not have automobile liability insurance, but Darity, the driver of the Oldsmobile, had such a policy, in effect at the time of the accident, issued by Eastern Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, covering a 1955 Ford owned by him. Plaintiff brought this action against Eastern, claiming that by virtue of her judgment against Stuckey Eastern was liable to her, under the South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Law (Code, 1962, Sections 46-750.11, 46-750.13 and 46-750.14) in the amount of ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars, which was the limit of the coverage, for bodily injury to one person, under its liability policy before mentioned.

Eastern denied liability, alleging that the plaintiff was not an insured within the meaning of the statute and therefore was not within the uninsured motorist coverage of its policy.

The case was heard on an agreed statement of facts before the Honorable John Grimball, Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, from whose adverse decree Eastern has appealed.

We note from the agreed statement before mentioned that no uninsured motorist coverage endorsement was attached to Eastern's policy, although prior to the issuance of said policy Eastern had filed such an endorsement, in the form always used by it, with the South Carolina Insurance Department, and the form so filed had been approved by that Department. A copy of such form was included in the record of this appeal.

In our consideration of the issue here involved we look to the statute, not to the endorsement before mentioned. For although the Department's construction of the endorsement filed with it, as being in compliance with the statute, is entitled to most respectful consideration and should not be overruled without cogent reasons, Stephenson Finance Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 242 S.C. 98, 130 S.E.2d 72, recourse to executive construction is usually and properly restricted to cases in which the meaning of the statute is really doubtful, there being no occasion for it where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. City of Columbia, 242 S.C. 237, 130 S.E.2d 573. An uninsured motorist endorsement that contravenes the requirements of the statute is, to that extent, invalid, regardless of the Department's approval of it. Vernon v. Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841; Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. co. v. Fulton, 244 S.C. 559, 137 S.E.2d 769; Hatchett v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608.

We are not to be understood as here determining whether Eastern's endorsement as filed with the Insurance Department meets, or fails to meet, all or any of the statutory requirements. But it may not be amiss to point out that the Department, in the interest of both the insurer and the insured, should approve a form of uninsured motorist endorsement submitted by an insurer only after being satisfied, from thorough examination of it, that it is in full conformity with the statutory requirements.

The pertinent provisions of the 1962 Code read as follows:

'Section 46-750.11:

* * *

* * *

'(2) The term 'insured,' as used in § 46-750.14, * * * means the named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses, with the consent, expressed or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy applies and a guest in such...

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