Davidson v. Hough
Decision Date | 03 December 1901 |
Citation | 165 Mo. 561,65 S.W. 731 |
Parties | DAVIDSON v. HOUGH, Judge, et al. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
1. Defendants in an interpleader suit, the subject-matter of which was within the jurisdiction of the court, were summoned for the October term of the court. At the preceding June term of the court plaintiff made application for an injunction restraining defendants from prosecuting certain actions. Defendants appeared at that time, and it was then agreed to submit the cause on its merits to the court. The record of the court did not show that defendants had appeared only for the purpose of opposing the injunction prayed for, but its judgment was on the merits. Held, on an application by one of the defendants for a writ of prohibition to restrain the court from enforcing its judgment on the merits, that parol evidence was admissible to alter its record so as to show its jurisdiction by consent of the parties for a determination of the merits, the application for prohibition not being a collateral attack; and hence, as the proof showed that the court had jurisdiction of the defendants, the writ would not issue.
2. Rev. St. 1899, § 3631, declaring that "proceedings on an injunction to stay" an action shall be had in the county where the same is pending, is applicable only to suits whose main purpose is to enjoin such actions, and not to an injunction granted as incidental relief on a bill of interpleader.
3. Where, in an interpleader suit, the court decrees that the plaintiff is entitled to pay certain money into court and be discharged, and the decree recites that this has been done, and directs that the defendants interplead for the fund paid into court, and restrains such defendants from prosecuting suits against the plaintiff, such decree is a final adjudication of the action alleged in the petition; and hence the plaintiff cannot be required to give a bond as demanded by Rev. St. 1899, § 3637, providing that no injunction, unless a final judgment, shall issue unless the plaintiff furnishes a satisfactory bond.
In banc. Original application for a writ of prohibition on the petition of Mary C. Davidson against Warwick Hough, judge of the circuit court, and another. Denied.
This is an original suit for a writ to prohibit one of the judges of the St. Louis circuit court from proceeding with a cause pending therein in which it is alleged the court has exceeded its jurisdiction. The cause in which the proceeding is sought to be prohibited is an equity interpleader suit, brought by the defendant the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company as plaintiff against the plaintiff in this suit and others as defendants, alleging that as a life insurance company it had issued a policy for $5,000 on the life of one Livingston E. Davidson, who had since died, and the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the amount of insurance to whom it might be rightly due, but that a controversy had arisen between the defendants; the widow Mary C. Davidson claiming by assignment, the children claiming as beneficiaries, and the St. Louis Trust Company claiming as administrator of the estate, — each denying the others' claims, and each demanding payment of plaintiff. The prayer of the petition was the usual prayer in such case, to the effect that petitioner be allowed to discharge its debt by paying the money into court, and that the various claimants be required to come in and interplead for it. The bill of interpleader was filed June 22, 1901, returnable to the October term. Summons was served on the St. Louis Trust Company, administrator, June 25th, and on Mrs. Davidson and the other defendants June 27th. The St. Louis Trust Company is a resident of St. Louis, Mrs. Davidson of Cole county, and the children of Jackson county; and the writ was served in their respective places of residence. On June 24th, Mrs. Davidson brought suit in the Cole county circuit court against the insurance company to recover the amount of the policy, and service of summons was made that day; and on June 26th a like suit was brought in the name of the children against the insurance company in the circuit court of Jackson county, and the summons in that suit was served on that day. On July 10th, the insurance company, as plaintiff in the interpleader suit, gave notice in writing to the defendants therein that it would on July 15th apply to a judge of the circuit court of St. Louis for an injunction to restrain them, respectively, from prosecuting their suits, or instituting any other suit against it, to recover on that policy. The interpleader suit had been duly assigned to division No. 1 of the St. Louis circuit court, in which Judge Hough presided. On July 15th that division of the court was in session, it being a day of the June term. The interpleader petition was then heard on its merits, and the court announced that the case was made out, and that a decree in accordance with the prayer would be entered, but not until the insurance company had paid the money into court, as it offered in its petition to do. On a later day in the June term (July 22d) the money was paid into court, and the decree entered enjoining the defendants therein from prosecuting the suits above named, or any suit, against the insurance company on that policy, requiring them to interplead on that suit for the money in question, and discharging the plaintiff therein from further liability on that amount. The object of this proceeding is to prohibit the judge of the St. Louis court from exercising further jurisdiction in that case. In the petition in the case at bar, on which the rule to show cause was issued, it is stated that the petitioner in this case appeared in that case, pursuant to the notice that an application for a temporary injunction would be made, and for the purpose only of resisting that application, and that no general appearance was entered. This cause was submitted to this court on the petition, returns, and a stipulation in writing. In the stipulation is this: "That the facts stated in the return of the defendants herein as to matters occurring before Judge Hough on July 15, and July 22, 1901, respectively, and the statements of the judge and of counsel there made (which do not appear of record), are correctly set forth in said return; that, notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff reserves the right, and the same is accorded to her, of objecting to the competency of said matters and statements, and to their sufficiency as constituting a legal return or answer to plaintiff's petition herein." The decree of the court begins with a recital as follows: "Now at this day comes the plaintiff, by J. Hugo Grimm, its attorney, and presents to the court its petition, verified by affidavit, praying for an order authorizing it to pay into court the sum of $5,000, and to require defendants to interplead for said fund, and for an injunction against said defendants, enjoining and restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any suit or suits against the plaintiff; and thereupon appear the defendants," etc., naming each of them and the attorneys representing them, respectively. Then follows a recital to the effect that it was shown to the court that notice of the purpose to apply for an injunction was served on the defendants. That is all that the record of that court shows on the subject of appearance. In the return of the insurance company it is stated that upon that occasion "all the parties to said suit appeared by counsel, and the different counsel having made their statements to the court, all agreeing that the interpleader suit brought by the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company had been filed on June 22, 1901, the suit brought by Mary C. Davidson had been filed on June 24, 1901, and the suit brought by Guy P. Davidson and Elsie Davidson had been filed on June 26, 1901, and it being conceded that the petition set forth the facts correctly, his honor, Judge Hough, announced," etc. In that return it is also stated that no objection to the jurisdiction of the court was then made, except that that court could not enjoin the prosecution of the suit in Cole county, and that, after the court announced its conclusion to do so, it was further objected that that injunction could not be granted without requiring a bond. The return of Judge Hough is substantially the same as that of the insurance company, with the further statement that, after the parties had all been heard, the cause was submitted to the court for its determination; "all of said attorneys for said defendants not objecting to such submission, but acquiescing therein." Concerning what occurred in court July 22d, that return says: ...
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