Davidson v. Murray

• Decision Date: 26 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 92-CV-0283C.,92-CV-0283C.
• Citation: Davidson v. Murray, 371 F.Supp.2d 361 (W.D. N.Y. 2005)
• Parties: Ronald DAVIDSON, Plaintiff, v. Tim MURRAY, Walter Kelly, Charles Brunelle, John Sherlock, Robert Malloy, Thomas Monin, and the Estate of Thomas A. Coughlin, III, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

371 F.Supp.2d 361

Ronald DAVIDSON, Plaintiff, v.Tim MURRAY, Walter Kelly, Charles Brunelle, John Sherlock, Robert Malloy, Thomas Monin, and the Estate of Thomas A. Coughlin, III, Defendants.

No. 92-CV-0283C.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

May 26, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

O'Shea, Reynolds & Cummings(William A. Long, Jr., of Counsel), Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiff.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York(Darren Longo, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel), Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

CURTIN, District Judge.

In this action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffRonald Davidson claims that employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services("DOCS") subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during various periods of incarceration at the Attica Correctional Facility.¹Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure(Item 207), and plaintiff has cross-moved for summary judgment on his first cause of action (Item 224).For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion is granted, and plaintiff's cross-motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of DOCS, currently residing in the Shawangunk Correctional Facility in Wallkill, New York.He originally commenced this action pro se in April 1992, and filed an amended complaint in January 1993(Item 10) while he was an inmate at Attica.Upon assignment of counsel, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Item 145) setting forth the following five causes of action:

1.Denial of legal writing supplies and law books, in violation of his First Amendment right to petition the courts for redress and in retaliation for having filed multiple lawsuits and grievances against DOCS officials and employees (Item145, ¶¶ 10-25).

2.Denial of due process at a Tier II disciplinary hearing which took place on October 17, 1991, based on the open hostility and bias of the hearing officer (id.,¶¶ 26-32).

3.Denial of basic hygiene items and cleaning materials while housed in a cell in Attica's general population, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and in retaliation for having filed multiple lawsuits and grievances (id.,¶¶ 33-38).

4.Denial of hygiene items, cleaning materials, writing implements, and several other basic necessities while housed in Attica's Special Housing Unit ("SHU") between July 1992 and January 1993, in violation of his First Amendment rights and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (id.,¶¶ 39-41).

5.Denial of the same basic necessities while housed in Attica's SHU between January and February 1993, and use of unnecessary and excessive force during a cell transfer, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (id.,¶¶ 49-54).

Defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing the Second Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

1.Failure to allege facts sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of denial of access to the courts.

2.Failure to allege facts sufficient to establish a prima facie due process claim.

3.Failure to allege facts sufficient to establish a prima facie claim that the conditions of confinement amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

4.Failure to allege facts sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of excessive force.

5.Failure to allege facts sufficient to establish a prima facie retaliation claim.

(See generally Item 210).

Plaintiff has responded, and has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in his favor on his first cause of action for denial of access to the courts(see generally Item 225).

For the following reasons, defendants' summary judgment motion is granted, and plaintiff's cross-motion is denied.

DISCUSSION

I.Summary Judgment Standards

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted if the submissions of the parties taken together "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);seeAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986).In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court"must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor."Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A.,996 F.2d 568, 572(2d Cir.1993).

The moving party has the initial burden to establish the basis for its motion and to identify the matters it "believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986).A fact is "material" only if the fact has some effect on the outcome of the suit.Catanzaro v. Weiden,140 F.3d 91, 93(2d Cir.1998).The substantive law determines what facts are material to the outcome of the litigation.SeeAnderson,477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."Id.

Once the moving party meets its burden, the non-moving party has the burden of presenting "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).The non-moving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538(1986);see alsoChristian Dior-New York, Inc. v. Koret, Inc.,792 F.2d 34, 38(2d Cir.1986)(non-moving party must provide court with some basis to believe its "version of relevant events is not fanciful")."Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'"Matsushita,475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348(quotingFirst National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co.,391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569(1968)).

II.Access to the Courts

In his first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that in October 1991 Corrections Officer David Hodan(not a defendant in this action) refused plaintiff's oral and written requests for legal writing supplies.Plaintiff claims that he subsequently wrote to DOCS Commissioner Thomas Coughlin, Attica Superintendent Walter Kelly, and Deputy Superintendents Tim Murray, Charles Brunelle, and Albert Hall complaining about Officer Hodan's denial of his request for legal writing supplies, to no avail.He also alleges that after he was placed in "keeplock"² confinement on October 11, 1991, he made numerous requests for specific law books, but Officer Hodan refused these requests as well.He claims that he once again complained to defendants Coughlin, Kelly, Murray, and Brunelle, but no action was taken.Plaintiff alleges that these defendants are "ratifying the actions and denials of Officer Hodan ... in an effort to make Plaintiff's access to Courts and attorneys as difficult as possible"(Item 145, ¶ 23), and that this is being done in retaliation for having filed lawsuits and grievances against Attica officials in the past (id.at ¶ 24).

The United States Constitution guarantees prisoners a "meaningful right of access to the courts ..."Bounds v. Smith,430 U.S. 817, 830, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72(1977).This right encompasses the requirement that prison authorities "assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."Id. at 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491.As the Supreme Court recognized in Bounds,"[i]t is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them."Bounds,430 U.S. at 824-25, 97 S.Ct. 1491.

In Lewis v. Casey,518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606(1996), the Court redefined the scope of inmates' constitutional right of access to courts, holding that prisoners do not have "an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance...."Id. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174."In other words, prison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves, but only the means for ensuring `a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.'"Id.(quotingBounds,430 U.S. at 825, 97 S.Ct. 1491).The Court found that in order to establish a violation of the fundamental right of access to courts, an inmate must show more than a refusal to provide legal materials.Rather, the inmate must demonstrate "actual injury" by showing "that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded" due to the action or inaction of prison officials.Id. at 353, 116 S.Ct. 2174.As stated in Lewis:

Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone, and the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known.Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a complaint.

Id. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174.

Upon review of the record as a whole, including the materials submitted to the court in connection with the present summary judgment motions, it is clear that plaintiff...