Davidson v. Schneider
| Decision Date | 20 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 10 C 2101 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | THOMAS DAVIDSON, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA SCHNEIDER; CONDITIONED OCULAR ENHANCEMENT, INC.; DRIVE PERFORMANCE CORP.; FASTTRACK BASEBALL CORP., INC.; NATIONAL BASEBALL AND SOFTBALL ACADEMY, INC.; and DRIVE PERFORMANCE WHEELING, LLC d/b/a ITRAC VISION TRAINING, Defendants. |
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Thomas Davidson filed suit against defendants Patricia Schneider, Conditioned Ocular Enhancement, Inc. ("COE"), Drive Performance Corp., and Drive Performance Wheeling, LLC (collectively, "defendants") for breach of a settlement agreement among Davidson, Schneider, and COE and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.1Before the court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, summary judgment is granted in favor of defendants on all counts.
Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). To determine whether any genuine fact issue exists, the court must pierce the pleadings and assess the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits that are part of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In doing so, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). When considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must be careful to draw reasonable inferences in the correct direction. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 176 v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 293 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2002). The court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations. Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In response, the non-moving party cannot rest on pleadings alone but must designate specific material facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324; Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). If a claim or defense is factually unsupported, it should be disposed of on summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
Thomas Davidson is the owner of High Tech Vision Training, which provides ocular vision training to baseball and softball players. (Dkt. 110 at ¶ 1.) Patricia Schneider is the president of COE and Drive Performance Corp., and the sole manager of Drive Performance Wheeling, LLC (d/b/a iTrac Vision Training) (collectively, "the Schneider entities"). (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.)
Eric Maleski was an employee of one of the Schneider entities in October and November 2008.3 (Dkt. 110 at ¶ 15.) On October 12, 2008, Michelle Thiry, the director of softball operations for Arizona State University (dkt. 98, Ex. 3 ("Thiry Dep.") at 9:18-25) and a former student of Davidson's, emailed Maleski to ask about a vision training system that she had seen at a professional baseball game. (Dkt. 110 at ¶ 14; Thiry Dep. at 75:11-25; see also Dkt. 93, Ex. 3 ("Thiry Decl."), Ex. 1.) In response, Maleski called Thiry on October 17, 2008 and they spoke for almost an hour. (Thiry Decl. at ¶ 5.) During the coversation, Maleski made negative comments about Davidson. (Thiry Dep. at 38:19-39:10; Thiry Decl. at ¶¶ 5-8.) These comments included: "[I]f Thomas Davidson is doing vision training, then he or his company is infringing on ITRAC's patent."; "Thomas Davidson [is] no longer supposed or allowed to legally be engaged in performing vision training of any kind."; and Thomas Davidson's drills "don't make sense" and "do not work for improving vision training." (Id.) Thiry testified that Maleski's comments did not make her think any less of Davidson, and she never told anybody else about the conversation with Maleski. (Thiry Dep. at 44:17-44:23.)
Sometime in November 2008, Michael Hill, a hitting instructor and certified trainer in Davidson's vision training method,4 contacted Nick Sanchez, an employee of one of theSchneider entities. (Dkt. 98, Ex. 2 ("Hill Dep.") at 44:16-24); Dkt. 93, Ex. 5 ("Hill Decl.") at ¶ 6.) Sanchez referred him to Maleski to further discuss iTrac's vision training capabilities. (Id.) Later that month, Hill called Maleski and spoke to him for ten minutes. (Hill Dep. at 45:20-46:3.) Hill told Maleski that he was interested in vision training and asked about the difference between Davidson's program and the system Maleski used. (Id. at 46:20-47:1.) During the conversation, Maleski made negative comments about Davidson, including these: Getting involved with Davidson's company "could potentially be a 'bad thing,' which might cause litigation and there could be adverse legal ramifications by being a part of High Tech Vision Training's program."; "[I]f [Hill] did anything as far as vision training was concerned with Thomas Davidson and High Tech Vision Training, there was a very good chance that there would be a lawsuit."; and "[Maleski's] company was the only company allowed to perform vision training" because it owned a patent that "covered all of vision training, no matter how performed." (Hill Decl. at ¶ 8; see also Hill Dep. at 47:6-48:19.) This was the only time Hill spoke to Maleski. (Id. at 46:6-10.) Hill testified that Maleski's comments did not make him think any less of Davidson and did not affect how he did business with Davidson in any way. (Id. at 114:20-115:3.) Hill did not tell anyone else about the conversation with Maleski. (Id. at 115:20-23.)
Both parties seek summary judgment on Davidson's claim for breach of the settlement agreement. The agreement is governed by Illinois law (Settlement Agt. at ¶ 11) and is interpreted in accordance with principles of contract law. See Leavell v. Dep't of Natural Res., 923 N.E.2d 829, 841, 397 Ill. App. 3d 937, 337 Ill. Dec. 978 (2010). The elements of a breach ofcontract claim under Illinois law are "(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4) resultant injury to the plaintiff." Asset Exch. II, LLC v. First Choice Bank, 953 N.E.2d 446, 455, 2011 Ill. App. (1st) 103718, 352 Ill. Dec. 207 (2011). Neither party disputes the enforceability of the settlement agreement or Davidson's performance under the settlement agreement.
Davidson requests the court enter summary judgment for him because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the breach of the settlement agreement. Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment because Maleski's comments did not breach the settlement agreement and, even if they did, Davidson has failed to show any resultant injury.5
The settlement agreement bars Schneider and COE from "directly or indirectly, individually or in concert with others . . . mak[ing] any statement calculated or likely to have the effect of undermining, disparaging or otherwise reflecting poorly on [Davidson] . . . or in any manner detrimental to [Davidson]." (Settlement Agt. at ¶ 8.) Defendants admit that Maleski was an employee of a Schneider entity (see dkt. 81 at 2; dkt. 99 at 11) and do not argue that Maleski was not bound by the non-disparagement provision of the settlement agreement. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether Maleski's comments to Thiry and Hill were likely to undermine or reflect poorly on Davidson, or were in any manner detrimental to Davidson.
Davidson relies on Thiry and Hill's descriptions of their conversations with Maleski. Defendants do not present any evidence to dispute those descriptions. (See dkt 118 at ¶¶ 2-9; dkt. 119 at ¶¶ 16-19.) "When the facts are disputed, the parties must produce proper documentary evidence to support their contentions[.]" Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1987). If...
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