Davidson v. State
| Decision Date | 03 November 1933 |
| Docket Number | 25,897 |
| Citation | 187 N.E. 376,205 Ind. 564 |
| Parties | Davidson v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1. CRIMINAL LAW---Robbery---Possession of Stolen Property---Presumption.---Where stolen property is found in the exclusive possession of another soon after the larceny, a presumption arises that such party is the thief, in the absence of a showing that possession was innocently acquired p. 567.
2. CRIMINAL LAW---Robbery---Evidence---Stolen Property in Possession of Defendant---Admissibility---Effect of Lapse of Time.---Where stolen property was found in the possession of defendant five months after a bank robbery, the property was admissible in evidence, the lapse of time effecting the weight of the evidence but not its admissibility. p. 568.
3. CRIMINAL LAW---Robbery---Evidence---Newspaper Clippings in Possession of Defendant---Admissibility.---Newspaper clippings found in the possession of defendant containing accounts of the bank robbery for which he was charged were held admissible as tending to show knowledge and a guilty conscience. p. 568.
4. CRIMINAL LAW---Evidence---Statement of Conduct Indicating Consciousness of Guilt---Admissibility.---Any statement or conduct of a person indicating a consciousness of guilt where at the time or thereafter he is charged with or suspected of the crime, is admissible as a circumstance against him. p. 569.
5. CRIMINAL LAW---Evidence---Behavior Subsequent to Crime---Relevancy.---Evidence of circumstances, which are part of a person's behavior subsequent to a crime of which he is suspected of being connected or implicated in, is relevant if the circumstances are such as would be natural and usual, assuming the connection or implication to exist p. 569.
6. CRIMINAL LAW---Evidence---Best and Secondary---Defendant's Testimony at Former Hearing.---While official court reporter's notes of defendant's testimony at a habeas corpus hearing might be more reliable, the fact that such record exists does not render incompetent the testimony from memory of another witness who was present as being violative of the best evidence rule. p. 569.
7. CRIMINAL LAW---Evidence---Denial of Incriminating Circumstance.---Where one charged with a crime denies or gives a false account of a circumstance or suspicious fact tending to connect him with the offense, such denial may be regarded as a criminal circumstance proper to go to the jury p. 569.
8. CRIMINAL LAW---Evidence---Admissions---Admissible as Original Evidence.---Statements and declarations of accused, before or after commission of the crime, although not amounting to a confession, but from which in connection with other evidence, an inference of guilt may be drawn, are admissible as original evidence without first laying the foundation for impeachment. p. 569.
9. CRIMINAL LAW---Evidence---Rebuttal---Defendant's Movements Following Crime.---In a prosecution for bank robbery, evidence as to the time of defendant's arrival in another city after the crime was committed was held proper rebuttal evidence. p. 571.
10. CRIMINAL LAW---Trial---Order of Proof---Discretion of Trial Court.---Trial court has discretion to admit in rebuttal evidence which might properly have been admitted in chief where no injustice is done accused thereby. p. 571.
11. CRIMINAL LAW---Appeal---Instructions---Burden of Showing Prejudice.---On appeal appellant has burden of showing that instructions complained of were harmful to him. p. 572.
12. CRIMINAL LAW---Robbery---Instructions---As to Presumption of Guilt Arising From Possession of Stolen Property.---In a prosecution for bank robbery, instruction as to presumption of guilt arising from recent possession after crime of stolen property, held not erroneous as taking away from defendant the presumption of innocence; as relieving the state's burden; as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify; or as telling the jury that the defendant's failure to account for his possession of such property was indicative of guilt. p. 572.
13. CRIMINAL LAW---Instructions---As to Conflict in Testimony of Accused and Other Witnesses.---In a prosecution for bank robbery an instruction, which told the jury that they might consider the conflict in testimony of the accused and other witnesses as to the time he entered a hotel in determining what weight, if any, to give such testimony, held not erroneous as telling jury such witnesses had been impeached by the accused. p. 573.
14. CRIMINAL LAW---Appeal---Instructions---How Construed.---The language used in instructions should receive a reasonable construction and not a strained or forced one, and, where subject to different construction, that construction is preferred which will lead to an affirmance, unless it can reasonably be said that the instruction was calculated to mislead the jury. p. 573.
15. CRIMINAL LAW---Instructions---Limiting Purpose of Evidence---Defendant's Possession of Newspaper Accounts.---In a prosecution for bank robbery, an instruction that defendant's possession of newspaper clippings referring to the crime might be considered as bearing upon defendant's consciousness of guilt, together with all other evidence, in determining whether he participated in crime, held properly limited such evidence to the purpose for which it was admitted. p. 574.
16. CRIMINAL LAW---Instructions---Requests---Subject Matter Already Covered.---It is not error to refuse to give requested instructions where the subject matter thereof is adequately covered by other instructions given. p. 575.
17. CRIMINAL LAW---Appeal---Review---Weight of Evidence.---On appeal of a criminal case the Supreme Court will not weigh conflicting evidence, and if, considering that most favorable to the state, there is evidence that could reasonably be believed and would justify a finding of guilt, the verdict will not be disturbed, even though the nature of the evidence is such that another conclusion might have been equally reasonable. p. 575.
From Newton Circuit Court; George A. Williams, Judge.
H. T. Davidson was convicted of bank robbery, and he appealed.
Affirmed.
Hanley & Hanley, for appellant.
James M. Ogden, Attorney-General, and Merl M. Wall, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.
The appellant was charged with the crime of bank robbery; was tried by a jury and found guilty. The errors assigned are: (1) The court erred in overruling appellant's motion in arrest of judgment; (2) the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial.
The first assignment of error is waived by the appellant and he relies for a reversal of this cause upon specifications numbered, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 35, and 37, in his motion for a new trial.
Specification numbered (1) refers to the admission of State's exhibits two to seven inclusive, the same being interest coupons from bonds stolen from the State Bank of Rensselaer, Indiana, on September 7, 1928. The appellant was arrested in Oklahoma City in February, 1929. In the handbag of the defendant at the time of his arrest two envelopes were found which contained six interest coupons which had been taken from the Rensselaer Bank. Exhibit one, of the State, was the envelope and exhibits two to seven inclusive were the interest coupons. To the introduction of these exhibits the appellant objected. The objection was overruled. The theory of the objection to the admissibility of the exhibits was that the charge against the appellant charged him with confining and threatening to confine, kill, maim, and injure certain persons and putting such persons in fear for the purpose of stealing property from said State Bank of Rensselaer, Indiana.
The contention of the appellant can not be sustained. The affidavit charged the appellant with the intent to commit larceny by stealing bonds, money, and other valuables, and by putting certain named persons in fear for the purpose of committing larceny. Some five months after the bank robbery certain coupon interest notes were found in the possession of the appellant.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that when it is proved that property has been stolen, and the same property, recently after the larceny, is found in the exclusive possession of an other, a presumption arises that the party in whose possession such property is found is the thief, in the absence of any showing that such possession was innocently acquired. Rosenberg v. State (1922), 192 Ind. 485, 137 N.E. 53; Isenhour v. State (1901), 157 Ind. 517, 62 N.E. 40; Madden v. State (1897), 148 Ind. 183, 47 N.E. 220; Campbell v. State (1897), 150 Ind. 74, 49 N.E. 905; Johnson v. State (1897), 148 Ind. 522, 47 N.E. 926; Mason v. State (1908), 171 Ind. 78, 85 N.E. 776.
In the case of Mason v. State, supra, the following instruction was approved; "That if the jury found from the evidence to the exclusion of any reasonable doubt that the money described in the indictment was stolen and that such stolen property was found in the exclusive possession of the defendant within a short time after the larceny was perpetrated, such possession imposes on the defendant the duty and burden of explaining his possession of such money; and if he has failed to satisfactorily account as to how he came by the stolen property, this would raise a presumption of fact that the defendant stole the money and this presumption may be strong enough to justify one in finding him guilty, if all the other material averments in the indictment have been proved to be true to the exclusion of any reasonable doubt."
In the instant case five months elapsed from the time the bonds were stolen until they were found in the possession of the appellant. Does this fact prevent the evidence from being...
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