Davidson v. State

• Decision Date: 02 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 48421.,48421.
• Citation: 192 P.3d 1185
• Parties: Roderick Renard DAVIDSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

192 P.3d 1185

Roderick Renard DAVIDSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.

No. 48421.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

October 2, 2008.

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Sharon G. Dickinson, Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger, District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Sandra DiGiacomo, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

BEFORE HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and DOUGLAS, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether the district court can change a jury's verdict from not guilty to guilty for a criminal charge based on a purported clerical error after the jury has been discharged. We also address a clerical error in the judgment of conviction that precludes habitual criminal sentencing on one of the battery convictions.

Regarding the verdict, we conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the district court from changing the jury's verdict from not guilty to guilty for a criminal charge after the jury has been discharged, even if the change is only to correct a purported clerical error. Therefore, the district court in this case erred by changing the verdict for the robbery charge at issue from not guilty to guilty. Consequently, we reverse one of the robbery convictions.

Regarding the judgment and sentence for battery, we conclude that the judgment of conviction erroneously treats one of the battery convictions (count four) as a felony when the jury returned a finding of guilt for a misdemeanor on that count. As a result, the district court erred in imposing a habitual criminal sentence for that count because NRS 207.010 authorizes a habitual criminal sentencing enhancement for convictions of crimes involving fraud or intent to defraud, of petit larceny, or of a felony. We therefore remand for the district court to amend the judgment of conviction to show that count four is a misdemeanor and to impose a lawful sentence for that count.¹

FACTS

The State charged appellant Roderick Renard Davidson with two counts of burglary, two counts of robbery, two counts of grand larceny auto, and two counts of battery with substantial bodily harm. These charges stemmed from two separate criminal incidents involving two victims, Robert Garvin and Rulon Spencer.

At the end of a consolidated jury trial for the charges arising from both of these criminal incidents, the jury deliberated and reached its verdict. In reading the jury verdict in open court, the district court clerk stated that the jury found Davidson guilty of burglary, guilty of robbery with the victim being 60 years of age or older, not guilty of grand larceny auto, and guilty of battery (but without substantial bodily harm) with regard to Garvin. As to the Spencer incident, the district court clerk read that Davidson was found not guilty of robbery, guilty of battery with substantial bodily harm, not guilty of grand larceny auto, and guilty of burglary.

After reading the verdict in open court, the district court clerk asked the jurors whether her reading of the verdict was accurate. All of the jurors responded affirmatively in unison. Defense counsel requested that the jurors be polled and the jurors individually affirmed the district court clerk's reading of their verdict. Inadvertently, only 11 of the 12 jurors were polled. Upon thanking the jurors for their service, the district court asked the jurors if they had any questions. One of the jurors asked a question about a matter not pertinent to this appeal. After the district court answered the juror's question, none of the other jurors posed any other questions. Thereafter the jury was discharged.

Nearly ten minutes after discharging the jury, the district court recommenced the trial proceedings in the presence of the State, defense counsel, and 10 of the 12 jurors. Davidson was not present at this recommencement. During this proceeding, the State informed the district court that it had approached the jurors after they had been discharged and asked them why they had not found Davidson guilty of robbery for the Spencer incident. Apparently, the jurors told the prosecutors that the district court clerk had incorrectly read the verdict as to that charge. One of the jurors also informed the prosecutors that she had not been polled.

Upon the district court's recall of the trial proceedings, the discharged jury foreperson informed the district court that he had accidentally mismarked the verdict form not guilty for the Spencer robbery and that he had subsequently remarked and initialed the verdict form to reflect a guilty finding for this robbery charge. The nine other discharged jurors who were also present agreed that the verdict form had been mismarked and that they had found Davidson guilty of robbery for the Spencer incident. They further indicated that the two missing jurors had also found Davidson guilty of robbery for the Spencer incident.

After allowing the ten jurors to exit the courtroom, the district court informed the prosecutors and defense counsel that they could submit written arguments as to whether the jury verdict could be changed under the circumstances posed in this case. Thereafter, at sentencing, the district court determined that the jury verdict could be changed and that it could adjudicate Davidson guilty of robbery for the Spencer incident.

During sentencing, the district court found that Davidson had three prior felonies, whereby the district court adjudicated Davidson as a habitual criminal. The court then sentenced Davidson under the "small habitual criminal statute"² for the three convictions (burglary, robbery, and battery) related to the Garvin incident. For each of those convictions, the district court sentenced Davidson to serve 60 to 240 months in prison, with the sentences to be served concurrently. As for the three convictions related to the Spencer incident, the district court sentenced Davidson under the "large habitual criminal statute."³ For each of those convictions, the district court sentenced Davidson to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole after ten years, with the sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentences for the convictions related to the Garvin incident. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Double jeopardy claim

Davidson argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause⁴ prohibited the district court from changing the verdict for the robbery charge stemming from the Spencer incident from not guilty to guilty after the jury had been discharged. Davidson contends that questioning by the prosecution tainted the jurors. The State responds that it was not unfair to correct the purported "clerical error" in the jury verdict, relying primarily on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United States v. Stauffer.⁵

A claim that a conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause generally is subject to de novo review on appeal.⁶ The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person "shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."⁷ Similarly, under Article 1, Section 8(1) of the Nevada Constitution, "[n]o person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant from being put in fear of a conviction after having been acquitted of an offense:

The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.⁸

Consistent with this underlying idea, the district court has the authority, before accepting a verdict and before discharging a jury, to send the jury back to correct clerical errors and mistakes in their verdict,⁹ but the Double Jeopardy Clause does not allow the district court to enhance a verdict if the jury has been discharged because such action could compel the defendant to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity that he or she later could be found guilty for crimes of which he or she had been acquitted. Therefore, a correction that eventually enhances a defendant's conviction must be undertaken before the jury has been discharged.¹⁰

In Stauffer, the verdict form had reflected convictions for "drug distribution conspiracy, Hawaii extortion, and travel counts," and it reflected an acquittal on "the Nevada extortion count."¹¹ "Post-verdict interviews of several jurors, initiated by [the defendant's] counsel, determined that the jury had made a clerical error."¹² "The jury apparently became confused concerning the numbering of the counts on their copy of the superseding indictment."¹³ According to the jury, "they had intended to acquit [the defendant] on the Hawaii extortion count, and convict on the Nevada extortion count."¹⁴ The district court subsequently "solicited affidavits from the jurors," and "[a]ll the jurors attested to the clerical error."¹⁵ "At a final post-trial hearing, ... the [d]istrict [c]ourt switched the verdicts on the two extortion counts to correct the jury's mistake."¹⁶ The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court's correction of the verdict after the jury was discharged by switching it from acquittal to guilty, due to a clerical error made by the jury on the verdict form, did not violate double jeopardy.¹⁷ In reaching its decision, the court concluded that the "district court did not alter the jury's verdict itself," but rather "corrected the verdict form to reflect the jury's true...