Davidson v. State of Ga., 79-3982
| Decision Date | 01 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-3982,79-3982 |
| Citation | 622 F.2d 895 |
| Parties | G. DAVIDSON, a/k/a John Doe, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF GEORGIA et al., Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar. * |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
G. Davidson, pro se.
John E. Bumgartner, Don A. Langham, First. Asst. Atty. Gen., H. Perry Michael, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Kathryn L. Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before RONEY, VANCE and SAM D. JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff, an unsuccessful applicant for the Georgia Bar, brought this action against the State of Georgia and various state departments and officials. In his complaint he alleged the Georgia Bar Examination was unconstitutionally designed and administered and the Georgia education system failed to prepare him to pass the exam. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
Following two years of undergraduate study and receipt of an Associate in Arts degree, plaintiff entered law school in Atlanta, Georgia. Upon successful completion of the prescribed course of study and after taking a bar review course, plaintiff took and failed the February 1977 Georgia Bar Exam. He has taken and failed every Georgia Bar Exam since then.
Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against the State of Georgia and the Board of Bar Examiners alleging a number of constitutional and statutory violations. In an amended complaint, plaintiff also attempted to add as defendants the "Director of the Board of Bar Examiners," the Chairman of the State Board of Education, the Chancellor of the State Board of Regents, the Secretary of State and the Governor of Georgia. The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim, the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. They also contended that several defendants were not properly served with process. The district court subsequently granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, without considering defendants' other contentions.
Plaintiff attacks the Georgia Bar Examination itself on the following grounds: it serves no legitimate purpose and has no logical connection with an applicant's competence to practice law; it is unconstitutional because, unlike other professional examinations given by the State, there is no provision for taking and passing the examination in increments or for awarding extra points for veterans; it does not coincide with "the basic law school curriculum"; examinees are not allowed enough time to complete the examination and no special provisions are made for those who suffer from test anxiety or who lack the skills to take written tests; and other states administer their bar examinations differently.
The Supreme Court ruled in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1956), that
(a) State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar . . . .
This Court in Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.1975), held that Georgia's bar examination procedure is subject to the rational relationship test, and we found that the requirements of that test were met.
(T)he state has a legitimate and substantial interest in excluding from the practice of law those persons who do not meet its standards of minimal competence and . . . the Georgia examination, as presently constituted, tests skills and knowledge which have a "logical, apparent relationship" to those necessary to the practice of law.
517 F.2d at 1101. There is no indication that the examination has materially changed since that time, so that holding was binding on the district court and is controlling here.
As to the contentions that a different format or procedure might generate less anxiety or be more realistically indicative of an applicant's ability to practice law and that the examination is conducted differently for other professions and in other states, we noted in Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d at 1102, that
the focus of the rational relationship test is not whether the state has superior means available to accomplish its objectives, but whether the means it has chosen is a reasonable one.
Plaintiff's contention that the refusal of the examiners to review his test paper with him violates the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552, and the Due Process Clause has two answers: first, the ...
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