Davies v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BLAKE, Justice.
• Citation: Davies v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 189 Wash. 138, 63 P.2d 529 (Wash. 1937)
• Decision Date: 06 January 1937
• Docket Number: 26386.
• Parties: DAVIES v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. et al.

63 P.2d 529

189 Wash. 138

DAVIES v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. et al.

No. 26386.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 6, 1937

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; R. M. Webster, Judge.

Action by Mozella E. Davies against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and others. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and cause remanded.

Josiah Thomas and Clarence L. Gere, both of Seattle, for appellant.

Hamblen Gilbert & Brooke, of Spokane, for respondents.

BLAKE Justice.

Plaintiff brought this action to establish title in herself to an undivided one-half interest in the south half of Sec. 32, Tp 22 N., R. 44 E., W. M., in Spokane county. Demurrers to the amended complaint having been sustained, judgment of dismissal was entered, from which plaintiff appeals.

Although set up in one cause of action, the facts upon which appellant predicates her claim present different theories as to the respective quarter sections. We shall therefore, discuss separately the sufficiency of the facts to state a cause of action as to each quarter.

Appellant is the granddaughter of Mozella E. Davies, who died in June, 1887. With respect to the southeast quarter of the section, the ultimate question to be answered is whether or not this quarter was at that time the community property of Mozella E. Davies and her husband, Lewis Davies. If it appears from the facts alleged in the complaint that it was community property, the demurrer should have been overruled. If it appears from the facts alleged that it was not community property, the demurrer was properly sustained.

The essential facts upon which the question must be answered are as follows: The quarter was entered as a homestead in September, 1879, by Isaac B. Justice. In April, 1882, the Davies, with community funds purchased his relinquishment. Mr. and Mrs. Davies continuously resided on and cultivated the property until the latter's death. Thereafter, Mr. Davies, having continued to reside on the land, made final proof and received a patent from the United States. Mrs. Davies' estate was never probated. It is alleged in the complaint, however, that Mr. Davies 'recognized that his son, Clyde Davies (appellant's father), was entitled to his mother's interest in said property.' Appellant's contention is that, since Mr. and Mrs. Davies had complied with the homestead laws of the United States, and were entitled, prior to the latter's death, to patent upon making final proof, the property was community property; that the title obtained by Mr. Davies upon the issuance of patent related back to the time that final proof could have been made. This contention was made in the case of Bolton v. La Camas Water Power Co., 10 Wash. 246, 38 P. 1043, under an almost identical state of facts. The court there held that the homestead was the separate property of the surviving spouse to whom patent was issued. This case was, however, for a long time of doubtful authority, for possibly two reasons: (a) It was handed down by a divided court; (b) subsequently, in two cases ( Ahern v. Ahern, 31 Wash. 334, 71 P. 1023, 96 Am.St.Rep. 912; Cox v. Tompkinson, 39 Wash. 70, 80 P. 1005), the court held homesteads to be community property under states of facts very similar to those with which we are here confronted. But in Cunningham v. Krutz, 41 Wash. 190, 83 P. 109, 112, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 967, this court again held that a homestead was the separate property of the surviving husband to whom patent issued. This decision was based primarily upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382, 26 S.Ct. 78, 50 L.Ed. 237. That case originated in the superior court of Lincoln county, and was removed to the Circuit Court for the District of Washington, Eastern Division. The Circuit Court held that a patent issued to the widow of a homestead settler upon her making final proof in accordance with the provision of the homestead law, conveys the land to her absolutely, and no interest therein passes by inheritance to the children of her husband. McCune v. Essig, 118 F. 273. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding. McCune v. Essig, 122 F. 588. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the widow of the entryman is first entitled to complete the entry and obtain a patent, and a state law is not competent to change this provision and give the children of the entryman an interest paramount to that of the widow. With respect to the doctrine of relation, the court, 199 U.S. 382, at page 390, 26 S.Ct. 78, 80, 50 L.Ed. 237, said:

'It is admitted 'that the title to the real estate in the case at bar passed and vested according to the laws of the United States by patent.' But it is contended that a beneficial interest having been created by the state law in McCune when the title passed out of the United States by the patent, it 'instantly dropped back in time to the inception or initiation of the equitable right of William McCune, and that the laws of the state intercepted and prevented the widow from having a complete title without first complying with the probate laws of the state.' This, however, is but another way of asserting the law of the state against the law of the United States, and imposing a limitation upon the title of the widow which § 2291 of the Revised Statutes [43 U.S.C.A. § 164 note] does not impose. It may be that appellant's contention has support in some expressions in the state decisions. If, however, they may be construed as going to the extent contended for, we are unable to accept them as controlling.'

Accepting this decision of the Supreme Court in its full import, this court, in Cunningham v. Krutz, supra, said:

'The above decision is final and conclusive that the question as to what title passed to Carlson must be resolved by the laws of the United States. Without regard to the community laws of this state, it follows from the decision...