Davies v. Monona County Bd. of Ed.

• Decision Date: 08 June 1965
• Docket Number: No. 51701,51701
• Citation: 135 N.W.2d 663,257 Iowa 985
• Parties: Evan DAVIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, Donald Masters et al., Plaintiffs-Interveners-Appellants, v. MONONA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 663

135 N.W.2d 663

257 Iowa 985

Evan DAVIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, Donald Masters et al., Plaintiffs-Interveners-Appellants, v. MONONA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 51701.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 8, 1965.

John D. Beardsley, Onawa, for plaintiff-appellant.

Crary & Huff, Sioux City, for plaintiff-interveners-appellants.

Prichard & Prichard, Onawa, for defendants-appellees.

THOMPSON, Justice.

On February 2, 1964, a written agreement was signed by the Castana Community School District, hereafter known as Castana, by which it made over to the West Monona Community School District, hereafter known as Monona, 12.4 sections of land which up to that time had been a part of Castana. The two districts adjoin at the west line of Castana and the east line of Monona; and the land involved is a part of that immediately adjacent. Monona signed the agreement on April 17, 1964. This agreement is attacked by the plaintiff and the intervenors in this action, which was brought in equity asking that it be declared void and that an injunction issue restraining the defendants from putting it into effect.

The agreement was approved by the Joint Boards of Education of Monona and Harrison Counties on May 12, 1964. It was made under the provisions of Code Section 274.37, I.C.A. which we quote: 'The boundary lines of contiguous school corporations may be changed by the concurrent action of the respective boards of directors at their regular meetings in July, or at special meetings called for that purpose. Such concurrent action shall be subject to the approval of the county board or boards of education involved but such concurrent action shall stand approved if the county board or boards of education do not disapprove such concurrent action within thirty days following receipt of notice thereof. The corporation from which territory is detached shall, after the change, contain not less than four government sections of land.

'The boards in the respective districts, the boundaries of which have been changed under this section, complete in all respects, except for the passage of time prior to the effective date of the change and when all right of appeal of the change has expired, may enter into joint contracts for the construction of buildings for the benefit of the corporations whose boundaries have been changed, using funds accumulated under section 278.1, subsection seven (7), of the Code. The district in which the building is to be located may use any funds authorized in accordance with chapter 75 of the Code. Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the changed districts to expend any funds jointly which they are not entitled to expend acting individually.'

We shall for brevity refer hereafter to the appealing plaintiff and intervenors as the plaintiff. The propositions relied upon for reversal may be summarized thus: first, it is said there was another and prior proposal for reorganization pending, which deprived the districts of jurisdiction to make the agreed boundary change; second, that Chapter 275 of the code provides the exclusive means of making boundary changes such as the one proposed here; third, that section 274.37 is unconstitutional because it makes an illegal delegation of legislative power in violation of Article III, Section 1, of the Iowa constitution, I.C.A.; fourth, that a boundary change resulting in an increased tax burden on a property owner in a school district affected violates due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions; and fifth, that even if section 274.37 is constitutional the action of the boards was arbitrary, discriminatory, and an abuse of discretion.

I. We consider first the claim that a prior and pending plan of reorganization prevented the Castana and Monona boards from having jurisdiction to take any action affecting the land involved in the boundary change. On November 15, 1963, a petition had been filed with the Monona County superintendent of schools providing for a merger of the two districts into one. This petition had been approved by the boards of directors of both districts. It was, however disapproved by the Monona County board of education on December 16, 1963. Castana appealed to the state department of public instruction, which dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Monona County board of education. No appeal was taken to the district court.

It was in this situation that the agreement under attack here was made by Castana and Monona. But on March 30, 1964, a petition in certiorari was filed in the Monona district court by Evan Davies, the named plaintiff in this appeal, alleging that the decision of Monona County board of education was illegal and erroneous and that he, as a resident and taxpayer of the Castana district and a signer of the petition for merger had a right to bring the action to protect his interests. At least at the time of trial below no writ had issued and no further action had been taken.

It is on the basis of this pending certiorari action that the plaintiff asserts the Castana and Monona boards had no jurisdiction to make the boundary line change they did. He relies upon the rule laid down in State ex rel. Harberts v. Klemme Community School District, 247 Iowa 48, 72 N.W.2d 512, and in other cases. The argument is that the reorganization proposed by the merger petition and approved by the boards was still pending when the boundary change agreement was executed by Castana and Monona in 1964. It is thought that the certiorari action kept the first proceeding alive. The rule is that 'subsequent-acting school authorities can acquire no jurisdiction of an area included in a prior-pending reorganization.' This quotation is from the Klemme case, loc. cit. 247 Iowa 53, 72 N.W.2d 515. Undoubtedly the principle is sound, and we have no intention of departing from it. But it has no application here.

We do not have a case of two contesting districts attempting to gain control over the same territory. At all times Castana and Monona have been in agreement. Both boards approved the merger petition, and adhered to it until it had been disapproved by the Monona county board and that action affirmed by the state department of public instruction. Neither saw fit to take an appeal to the courts; in effect, they acquiesced in the disapproval of the merger petition. They then took a different route, and agreed upon a change in the boundary lines of the districts by which some 12.4 sections of the westerly part of Castana were transferred to Monona. At no time has there been any dispute between the two districts as to the action to be taken or the territory involved.

In Klemme we find significant language quoted with approval from Independent District of Sheldon v. Board of Supervisors, 51 Iowa 658, 660, 2 N.W. 590, 591: 'By the proceedings taken by the plaintiff it had obtained jurisdiction over the disputed territory before any steps were taken to organize Grant. The right to complete its organization as provided by law followed. It could not be ousted of its jurisdiction over the disputed territory by anything done subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings to organize the plaintiff, unless the attempted organization was abandoned, or was not completed within the time required by law.' Loc. cit. 247 Iowa 52, 72 N.W.2d 515.

This established a qualifying rule, that if an attempted reorganization is abandoned a new proceeding may be commenced, and is not invalid for want of jurisdiction. The two school boards here had clearly abandoned their first attempt by failure to appeal the decision of the county board and its approval by the state department, and by proceeding with a different plan. There is no conflict between the boards, no conflicting claims to the territory involved. The only claim of any breath of life left in the first reorganization plan is the certiorari action brought by the plaintiff. It is not sufficient to require the application of the Klemme rule. The boards have abandoned the first plan and it is no longer pending, nor would it be even if the court should eventually decide the Monona county board was without jurisdiction or acted illegally in disapproving it. It must be noted that the state department of public instruction is not a party to the certiorari proceeding, and its disapproving decision would not be affected by any ruling in that case. Nor are we cited to any authority which prevents the board of the high school district involved--in this case Monona--from changing its acceptance of the school district not operating a high school--Castana--at any time before the merger is approved by the county board. This it has in effect done by the agreement for a boundary change, which of necessity replaces the merger plan.

II. The plaintiff urges that Chapter 275 provides the only method of making boundary changes such as the one under consideration here, and that Section 274.37, supra, was not available to the two districts. Chapter 275 does in fact provide a method of changing the boundaries of two or more districts located contiguously. Code sections 275.9-275.24 inclusive. It is a different procedure than the simple process of joint agreement of the boards involved set forth in 274.37. The plaintiff relies here upon Cook v. Consolidated School District, 240 Iowa 744, 38 N.W.2d 265, and Swan Lake Consolidated School District v. Consolidated School District of Dolliver, 244 Iowa 1269, 58 N.W.2d 349. The Swan Lake case did no more than to follow the precedent set in Cook; it is to the latter case we must turn for our examination to determine whether it is controlling.

It was hled in Cook that the then Chapter 276 of the code provided an exclusive method of reorganization of consolidated school districts, and that Chapter 274 under which the defendants had proceeded was not available to them. Chapter 276 has since been repealed by the 55th General...