Daviesson v. Broomfield
| Decision Date | 09 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-03568-EMC |
| Parties | ERIC C. DAVIESSON, Plaintiff, v. RON BROOMFIELD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Eric Daviesson, a prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se action for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent filed an answer and Mr. Daviesson filed a traverse. Mr Daviesson's petition is now before the Court for review on the merits. For the reasons discussed below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
On July 3, 2013, Mr. Daviesson pled no contest to committing three counts of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, three counts of vandalism, one count of robbery, one count of possession of a sap or similar weapon, one count of making criminal threats, one count of forcibly dissuading a crime victim from reporting that crime and one count of felony reckless driving while fleeing from a police officer. Clerk's Transcript (“CT”) at 89-94. Mr. Daviesson also admitted that one of his assaults inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, that two of his assaults constituted hate crimes, that he had committed the reckless driving offense while on bail for two other offenses and that he had served a prior prison term. CT at 89-94. Pursuant to a plea agreement, on August 5, 2013, the trial court imposed a 20-year prison sentence, but suspended execution of that sentence and placed Mr. Daviesson on probation for five years. Reporter's Transcript (“RT”) at 253-54, 306-08.
On October 3, 2014, Mr. Daviesson admitted two probation violations. CT at 105, 294, 459. On April 23, 2015, the trial court executed the suspended prison sentence. RT at 569-72. On October 16, 2017, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment but remanded the case for the trial court to determine if the sentence was 19 years and 4 months or 20 years. People v. Daviesson, No. A145074, 2017 WL 4586111 at *12 (Cal.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2017). The superior court resentenced Mr. Daviesson to 19 years 4 months in prison. Petition (Docket No. 1) at 12.
On December 31, 2018, Mr. Daviesson filed a habeas petition in the Sonoma County Superior Court. Answer, Ex. E. He raised many claims including those presented in this federal petition. His claims challenged his no-contest plea, specifically the admission that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the felony assault. He argued that his plea should be set aside because the prosecutor concealed medical records showing that there was no great bodily injury to the victim and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and discover the medical records all of which resulted in his plea not being knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Docket No. 6 at 2; Answer, Ex. E at 18-24, 31-35.[1] The superior court denied the petition on June 10, 2019, with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 797 (1993), for the proposition that a habeas petitioner must raise all of his claims in one timely petition; In re Harris 5 Cal.4th 813, 825, 829 (1993), for the proposition that the court will dismiss a habeas claim that could have, but was not raised on direct appeal, or was actually raised and rejected on appeal; and In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780-81 (1998), for the proposition that the claims are untimely. Petition at 11-15. The California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court summarily denied habeas petitions raising the same claims without comment or citation. Petition at 16-36. The claims in this federal petition only relate to one of the counts for which Mr. Daviesson pled no contest: assault inflicting great bodily injury.
The California Court of Appeal summarized the relevant facts as follows for that count:
On the evening of August 21, 2012, defendant's motorcycle broke down. A nearby resident, R.Q., gave a portable telephone to defendant for him to use to summon a ride. Defendant and R.Q. got into an altercation over defendant's use of R.Q.'s telephone. Using his cellphone, R.Q. called 911. Defendant became enraged and pummeled R.Q., forcing him to the ground while calling him derogatory names. R.Q. suffered a concussion, three fractured ribs, and multiple contusions and abrasions, as a result of the altercation with defendant.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition concerns the conviction and sentence of a person convicted in Sonoma County, California, which is within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).
This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“Under the ‘contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
“Under the ‘unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 413. Id. at 411. “A federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.
The state-court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the state court, if there is a reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). When confronted with an unexplained decision from the last state court to have been presented with the issue, Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
The standard of review under AEDPA is somewhat different where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim. In such a case, a review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the state court's decision was objectively reasonable. See Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2006); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). When confronted with a state court's summary denial of a claim, a federal court should conduct “an independent review of the record” to determine whether the state court's decision was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Plascencia, 467 F.3d at 1198; Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. The federal court must still apply the deference required by Section 2254(d)(1), as noted above. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-100 (2011). “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. In conducting this type of review, the court must determine: “(1) ‘what arguments or theories supported or could have supported the state court's decision,' and (2) ‘whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of the Supreme Court.'” Cook v. Kernan, 948 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102).
A. Great Bodily Injury
All of Mr. Daviesson's claims herein challenge his plea of no contest with respect to his admission that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, R.Q. He argues that: (1) the prosecutor concealed medical records proving that there was no great bodily injury; (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and discover the medical records; (3) his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary; and (4) he is actually innocent of inflicting great bodily injury on R.Q. Petition at 6-9.
At the preliminary hearing on March 6, 2013, R.Q. testified that Mr Daviesson “pummeled” him; R.Q. was “brought to the ground” and “kicked and hit.” RT at 14. R.Q. also...
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