Davila Aleman v. Feliciano Melecio

• Decision Date: 15 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-2301 (JP).,96-2301 (JP).
• Citation: 992 F.Supp. 91
• Parties: Luis O. DAVILA ALEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Carmen FELICIANO MELECIO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 91

992 F.Supp. 91

Luis O. DAVILA ALEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Carmen FELICIANO MELECIO, et al., Defendants.

No. 96-2301 (JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

December 15, 1997.

Opinion Supplementing Decision January 22, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Roberto Busó Aboy, Hato Rey, PR, Nydia González Ortiz, Yauco, PR, for plaintiffs.

José G. Fagot Díaz, Martínez, Odell & Calabria, Hato Rey, PR, Maressa Abadía Muñoz, Méndez Méndez & Quijano Borges, San Juan, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court has before it codefendant Carmen Feliciano-Melecio's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket No. 46) and the remaining codefendants' Motion Requesting Summary Judgment (docket No. 47). Neither Plaintiff has timely responded, although coplaintiff Abrahán Díaz González has asked for an extension of time to oppose Defendants' motions (docket No. 51). However, as he already had thirty days (instead of the ten prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) his motion is hereby DENIED. The Court will proceed without benefit of Plaintiffs' input.

Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated their constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments when Plaintiffs' respective service contracts were unilaterally terminated by the Department of Health without due process and based on political grounds.¹ Plaintiffs have also brought claims under Commonwealth law, invoking the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.

The facts essential to Defendants' motions are, for the most part, not in dispute. The following facts derive from the Amended Complaint or from the factual stipulations reached at the Initial Scheduling Conference. Plaintiffs are attorneys licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Coplaintiff Luis Davila Aleman is a well-known member of Populares Unidos, known in English as the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"). In the Amended Complaint, coplaintiff Abrahán Díaz González asserts he is a believer in Independence for Puerto Rico. Except for codefendant Carmen Feliciano-Melecio, who is the Secretary of the Health Department of Puerto Rico, Defendants are all members of the Board of Medical Examiners of Puerto Rico.

On March 14, 1986, coplaintiff Dávila Alemán ("Dávila") entered into a contract with the Department of Health by which he agreed to perform services as Administrative Judge for a term of one year. The contract was extended until 1993, when a new contract was executed — Contract # 93-0041. Contract # 93-0041 was renewed annually. It was renewed for the last time in 1996, to remain in force through 1997. The twelfth clause of Contract # 93-0041 read:

This agreement can be resolved prior to its termination date, by mutual agreement between the parties or by any of the parties, by written notice by any of the parties to the other one, thirty days prior to the date of the purported termination, without any of the parties incurring in any obligation towards each other.

In 1986, Díaz González ("Díaz") entered into a contract with the Department of Health, agreeing to perform services as Legal Counsel for the Board of Medical Examiners for a term of one year. Díaz and the Department of Health extended the contract until 1995, at which time a new contract, Contract # 95-0053, was executed. Contract # 95-0053 was renewed for the last time in 1996, to remain in force through 1997. The 12th clause of Contract #95-0053 read:

This agreement can be resolved prior to its termination date, by the first party (Department of Health) by written notice to the other party (Díaz), thirty days prior to the date of the purported termination, without any of the parties incurring in any obligation towards each other.

None of the individual Defendants had the authority to dismiss either coplaintiff because none of the codefendants were parties to the contracts, which were agreements between the respective coplaintiffs and the Department of Health. On September 4, 1996, codefendant Feliciano, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health, sent each coplaintiff a written letter notifying him that his contract with the Department of Health was terminated, effective October 4, 1996. This notification was more than 30 days in advance.²

Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action asserts that each Plaintiff had acquired a property interest in his respective contract "due to the fact that they had been renewed for the last ten years ... thus creating an expectation of continuity." Although Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint does not specifically state it, the Court infers that Plaintiffs First Cause of Action is based on the assertion that Defendants' actions deprived them of their property right in the continuity of those contracts. Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action asserts that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' "freedom of expression and freedom of association under [the] First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." By this, the Court infers that Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action is one for political discrimination asserting that Defendants' actions violated Plaintiffs' right to free association protected by the First Amendment.³ Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action is essentially a restatement of the First Cause of Action — claiming that Defendants' actions stripped Plaintiffs of a property interest without due process. Plaintiffs' Sixth Cause of Action asserts violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal protection. Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action are based on Puerto Rico law.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

"[Summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

The purpose of summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for a trial." Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). To make this determination, the Court must cull the record for genuine disputes of material fact, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir.1987). "Material means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorable to the nonmovant." McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995). "A dispute is genuine if the parties' positions on the issue are supported by conflicting evidence." Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1996). If there are material factual disputes, summary judgment is inappropriate.

When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the Court may consider "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "In addition, a court may take into account any material that would be admissible or usable at trial ... [but] inadmissible evidence may not be considered." Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 8 (1st Cir.1993). Moreover, "mere allegations, or conjecture unsupported in the record, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (citing August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir.1992)); accord Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990) (court need not credit "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation") and Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 103 F.3d at 200.

III. ANALYSIS

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994). Congress enacted § 1983 to create a remedy in favor of those who are deprived of the rights, privileges, or immunities granted to them by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 1359, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). To make a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the defendants (1) were acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived them of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to them by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Defendants have admitted that they were acting under color of state law. They dispute, however, that their actions deprived Plaintiffs of any rights, privileges, or immunities.

The Plaintiffs have asserted three distinct federal causes of action — one under the due process clause, the second under the first amendment, and the third under the equal protection clause. Defendants have attacked, via their motions for summary judgment, the first two of Plaintiffs' federal claims. Defendants' motions, however, have confused and amalgamated Plaintiffs' First Amendment political discrimination claim with Plaintiffs' due process claim. The two are wholly distinct and separable. As the Court will discuss in more detail below, Plaintiffs' due process claim depends on a finding that they had a property interest in their employment. Plaintiffs' political discrimination claim, however, can succeed regardless of whether Plaintiffs had a property interest....