Davila v. Davis

• Decision Date: 26 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16–6219.,16–6219.
• Citation: 137 S.Ct. 2058,198 L.Ed.2d 603
• Parties: Erick Daniel DAVILA, Petitioner v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

137 S.Ct. 2058
198 L.Ed.2d 603

Erick Daniel DAVILA, Petitioner
v.
Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.

No. 16–6219.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 24, 2017.
Decided June 26, 2017.

Seth Kretzer, Houston TX, appointed by this Court, for petitioner.

Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, for the respondent.

Jonathan Landers, Seth Kretzer, Houston TX, appointed CJA Counsel of Record for petitioner.

William R. Peterson, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Seth Kretzer, Law Office of Seth Kretzer, Jonathan Landers, Houston, TX, for petitioner.

Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Jeffrey C. Mateer, First Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, J. Campbell Barker, Deputy Solicitor General, Heather Gebelin Hacker, Jason R. LaFond, Assistant Solicitors General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for respondent.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal habeas courts reviewing convictions from state courts will not consider claims that a state court refused to hear based on an adequate and independent state procedural ground. A state prisoner may be able to overcome this bar, however, if he can establish "cause" to excuse the procedural default and demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice from the alleged error. An attorney error does not qualify as "cause" to excuse a procedural default unless the error amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Because a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, ineffective assistance in those proceedings does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).

In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013), this Court announced a narrow exception to Coleman 's general rule. That exception treats ineffective assistance by a prisoner's state postconviction counsel as cause to overcome the default of a single claim—ineffective assistance of trial counsel—in a single context—where the State effectively requires a defendant to bring that claim in state postconviction proceedings rather

137 S.Ct. 2063

than on direct appeal. The question in this case is whether we should extend that exception to allow federal courts to consider a different kind of defaulted claim—ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We decline to do so.

I

A

On April 6, 2008, a group of family and friends gathered at Annette Stevenson's home to celebrate her granddaughter's birthday. Petitioner Erick Daniel Davila, believing he had seen a member of a rival street gang at the celebration, fired a rifle at the group while they were eating cake and ice cream. He shot and killed Annette and her 5–year–old granddaughter Queshawn, and he wounded three other children and one woman.

After the police arrested petitioner, he confessed to the killings. He stated that he "wasn't aiming at the kids or the woman," but that he was trying to kill Annette's son (and Queshawn's father) Jerry Stevenson and the other "guys on the porch." App. 38. The other "guys on the porch" were, apparently, women.

The State indicted petitioner for capital murder under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (West 2016), which makes it a capital crime to "murde[r] more than one person ... during the same criminal transaction." In response to the jury's request for clarification during deliberations, the trial court proposed instructing the jury on transferred intent. Under that doctrine, the jury could find petitioner guilty of murder if it determined that he intended to kill one person but instead killed a different person. Petitioner's counsel objected to the additional instruction, arguing that the trial judge should "wait" to submit it "until the jury indicates that they can't reach ... a resolution." App. 51. The trial court overruled the objection and submitted the instruction to the jury. The jury convicted petitioner of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced petitioner to death.

B

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. Although his appellate counsel argued that the State presented insufficient evidence to show that he acted with the requisite intent, counsel did not challenge the instruction about transferred intent. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. Davila v. State, 2011 WL 303265 (Jan. 26, 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 885, 132 S.Ct. 258, 181 L.Ed.2d 150 (2011).

Petitioner next sought habeas relief in Texas state court. His counsel did not challenge the instruction about transferred intent, nor did he challenge the failure of his appellate counsel to raise the alleged instructional error on direct appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. Ex parte Davila, 2013 WL 1655549 (Apr. 17, 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 784, 187 L.Ed.2d 597 (2013).

C

Petitioner then sought habeas relief in Federal District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As relevant here, he argued that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the jury instruction about transferred intent. Petitioner conceded that he had failed to raise his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his state habeas petition, but argued that the failure was the result of his state habeas counsel's ineffective assistance. Petitioner invoked this Court's decisions in Martinez and Trevino to argue that his state habeas attorney's ineffective assistance provided cause to excuse

137 S.Ct. 2064

the procedural default of his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

The District Court denied petitioner's § 2254 petition. It concluded that Martinez and Trevino did not supply cause to excuse the procedural default of petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because those decisions applied exclusively to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Davila v. Stephens, 2015 WL 1808689, *20 (N.D.Tex., Apr. 21, 2015). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability on the same ground. 650 Fed.Appx. 860, 867–868 (2016). Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari, asking us to reverse the Fifth Circuit on the ground that Martinez and Trevino should be extended to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We granted certiorari, 580 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 810, 196 L.Ed.2d 597 (2017), and now affirm.

II

Our decision in this case is guided by two fundamental tenets of federal review of state convictions. First, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before presenting his claim to a federal habeas court. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The exhaustion requirement is designed to avoid the "unseemly" result of a federal court "upset[ting] a state court conviction without" first according the state courts an "opportunity to ... correct a constitutional violation," Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, a federal court may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court—that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural rule. E.g., Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55, 130 S.Ct. 612, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). This is an important "corollary" to the exhaustion requirement. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 158 L.Ed.2d 659 (2004). "Just as in those cases in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address" the merits of "those claims in the first instance." Coleman, 501 U.S., at 731–732, 111 S.Ct. 2546.¹ The procedural default doctrine thus advances the same comity, finality, and federalism interests advanced by the exhaustion doctrine. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991).

A state prisoner may overcome the prohibition on reviewing procedurally defaulted claims if he can show "cause" to excuse his failure to comply with the state

137 S.Ct. 2065

procedural rule and "actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ; Coleman, supra, at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546 To establish "cause"—the element of the doctrine relevant in this case—the prisoner must "show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). A factor is external to the defense if it "cannot fairly be attributed to" the prisoner. Coleman, supra, at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546

It has long been the rule that attorney error is an objective external factor providing cause for excusing a procedural default only if that error amounted to a deprivation of the constitutional right to counsel. See Edwards v....