Davila v. State

• Decision Date: 16 June 2016
• Citation: 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 04752,34 N.Y.S.3d 508,140 A.D.3d 1415
• Parties: Delia DAVILA, also known as Delgia Davila, as Administrator of the Estate of Gloria Bonilla, Deceased, Respondent, v. STATE of New York, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

140 A.D.3d 1415
34 N.Y.S.3d 508
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 04752

Delia DAVILA, also known as Delgia Davila, as Administrator of the Estate of Gloria Bonilla, Deceased, Respondent,
v.
STATE of New York, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

June 16, 2016.

34 N.Y.S.3d 509

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Treasure of counsel), for appellant.

Foulke Law Offices, Goshen (Robert N. Isseks of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, GARRY, CLARK and MULVEY, JJ.

GARRY, J.

140 A.D.3d 1415

Appeals (1) from an order of the Court of Claims (Fitzpatrick, J.), entered July 7, 2014, which, among other things, granted claimant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and (2) from the judgment entered thereon.

On March 21, 2009, Gloria Bonilla (hereinafter decedent) suffered severe injuries in a fire, leading to her death, while residing at a home for mentally disabled individuals. The home was maintained and operated by the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (hereinafter OMRDD),¹ under the name Riverview Individualized Residential Alternative (hereinafter Riverview IRA). Claimant was appointed administrator of decedent's estate in March 2011, and promptly thereafter filed a claim seeking damages for decedent's conscious pain and suffering. Claimant moved for summary judgment and defendant cross-moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that claimant failed to sufficiently state the nature of the claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11(b). The Court of Claims denied defendant's cross motion to dismiss and granted claimant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant appeals, contending that the claim was jurisdictionally defective as the statutory requirements were not met.

Court of Claims Act § 11(b) “places five specific substantive conditions upon [defendant's] waiver of sovereign immunity by

140 A.D.3d 1416

requiring the claim to specify (1) the nature of the claim; (2) the time when it arose; (3) the place where it arose;

34 N.Y.S.3d 510

(4) the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained; and (5) the total sum claimed” (Lepkowski v. State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d 201, 207, 770 N.Y.S.2d 696, 802 N.E.2d 1094 [2003] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted] ). These statutory requirements are “strictly construed” (Kolnacki v. State of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 277, 280, 832 N.Y.S.2d 481, 864 N.E.2d 611 [2007] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). The guiding principle and “purpose of the notice of claim requirement [is] to allow [defendant] to investigate the claim and to estimate its potential liability” (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 24 N.Y.3d 275, 282, 998 N.Y.S.2d 150, 22 N.E.3d 1018 [2014] ; see Lepkowski v. State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d at 207, 770 N.Y.S.2d 696, 802 N.E.2d 1094 ). “ ‘Absolute exactness' ” is not required (Morra v. State of New York, 107 A.D.3d 1115, 1115, 967 N.Y.S.2d 169 [2013], quoting Heisler v. State of New York, 78 A.D.2d 767, 767, 433 N.Y.S.2d 646 [1980] ), but the claim must enable prompt...