Davis Cnty. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P.
Decision Date | 23 April 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 20190487,20190487 |
Citation | 463 P.3d 619 |
Parties | DAVIS COUNTY, Appellant, v. PURDUE PHARMA, L.P., et al., Appellees. |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Douglas B. Thayer, Wm. Kelly Nash, Andy V. Wright, Jordan K. Cameron, Mark R. Nelson, Jessica Griffin Anderson, David B. Nielson, Lehi; Thomas J. Burns, R. Blake Hamilton, Salt Lake City; Martin J. Phipps, Barry Deacon, Jason M. Milne, Daniel R. Griffin, Meagan Talafuse, San Antonio, Texas; Troy S. Rawlings, Neal C. Geddes, Michael D. Kendall, Farmington, for appellant
Andrew G. Deiss, John Robinson Jr., Corey D. Riley, Elisabeth M. McOmber, Erik A. Olson, Trevor C. Lang, Kamie F. Brown, Kristine M. Larsen, Geoffrey C. Haslam, Tyler V. Snow, Brent O. Hatch, Lara A. Swensen, Jess M. Krannich, Trevor J. Lee, Brent R. Baker, Jonathan D. Bletzacker, D. Matthew Moscon, Michael Menssen, Joseph R. Brubaker, Rod N. Andreason, Mark A. Nickel, Salt Lake City; Mark Bettilyon, Sandy; Charles C. Lifland, Amy Laurendeau, Los Angeles, California, for appellees
Having recused himself, Justice Himonas does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge Ryan M. Harris sat.
¶1 This is one of thousands of cases filed by state and local governments against opioid manufacturers in courts across the country. The plaintiffs in these cases assert, among other things, that manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs misled doctors and consumers about the safety of these drugs, which led to medically unnecessary prescriptions and ultimately to the abuse of opioids—the opioid epidemic. They seek to hold defendants liable for the public costs arising from the use and misuse of opioid drugs.
¶2 Fifteen of these opioid cases have been filed in the Utah courts—with one or more cases pending in each of our eight judicial districts. Various counties have filed suit in their home judicial districts. The first such case was filed by Summit County in the third district. Salt Lake and Tooele Counties also filed in that district. Davis County then filed suit in the second district, and various other counties filed in the courts in their respective home districts.
¶3 In November 2018, various manufacturer defendants filed a motion to consolidate all of the pending cases in the state in the third district. Citing Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 42, defendants asserted that the interests of judicial economy and justice would be served by consolidating all of the pending cases, at least for pretrial purposes, in the court in which the first related action was filed. The third district court granted the motion in part, consolidating the three third district cases for pretrial purposes but declining to order transfers from outside the third district. In so ruling the court concluded that the "benefits of pretrial coordination far outweigh the potential prejudice to any litigant," but declined to endorse what it viewed as an "untested interpretation of Rule 42 to consolidate matters pending in other judicial districts." Yet the court also invited judges in other districts to consider the possibility of transferring their opioid cases to the third district "as a means of facilitating pretrial coordination and achieving the benefits it offers."
¶4 One of the manufacturer defendants (Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) took the third district court up on that suggestion. It filed a motion in the second district, asking the court to transfer the Davis County action to the third district for discovery and pretrial proceedings. Davis County opposed the motion, asserting (among other things) that the district court lacked the power to transfer the case under civil rule 42 and that transfer was foreclosed under Utah Code section 78B-3-309. Because the statute speaks only of transfer for trial purposes, Davis County claimed that the statute preempted any inherent power vested in the district court. And even assuming that the statute could be viewed to endorse transfer only for discovery and pretrial purposes, Davis County contended that the conditions of the statute were not satisfied and that transfer was thus improper. Lastly, Davis County asserted that the interests of justice and judicial economy disfavored transfer for pretrial proceedings even assuming that the district court had some kind of authority (inherent or otherwise) to grant such a motion.
¶5 The second district court granted the transfer motion. It found that it lacked the power to consolidate these proceedings under civil rule 42 and held that Utah Code section 78B-3-309 did not apply, but concluded that it had the authority to transfer for pretrial proceedings under its "inherent power to manage its cases, and docket." In explaining the basis for exercising that power, the court concluded that "there are significant benefits that will result from the partial transfer of venue," including the following:
(1) Conservation of judicial resources by avoiding the need for eleven judges to manage twelve substantively similar lawsuits, in parallel, at the same time; (2) Avoidance of inconsistent legal rulings regarding the pleadings, discovery disputes—of which there are likely to be many—and potentially dispositive motions; and (3) Avoidance of unnecessarily duplicative discovery, and judicial coordination and management of the extraordinary discovery, well beyond the standard limits set by Rule 26, that is almost certainly required in a litigation of this size.
In light of these considerations the court found that "a limited transfer of venue for pretrial proceedings [would] promote the ends of justice and the efficient administration of pending cases and dockets."
¶6 Davis County filed a petition for leave to challenge the transfer on interlocutory appeal, which we granted. In challenging the transfer, Davis County first questions the authority of the district court to enter an order transferring an action for pretrial purposes only. It then contends that the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in ordering transfer here even assuming that the court has the power to grant such motions.
¶7 We affirm. First, we consider the question of the district court's authority to grant a motion to transfer for pretrial proceedings. This presents a series of questions of law, which we review de novo . See WDIS, LLC v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n , 2019 UT 45, ¶ 15, 449 P.3d 171 ( ). We hold that the district court has inherent authority to grant such a motion, which is undisturbed by Utah Code section 78B-3-309. Second, we consider Davis County's challenge to the district court's decision to exercise its authority in granting the motion to transfer. This is a question committed to the district court's discretion, which we review for an abuse of discretion. Chamblee v. Stocks , 9 Utah 2d 342, 344 P.2d 980, 981 (1959). We hold that the district court acted well within the bounds of its discretion in granting the motion to transfer the Davis County action for discovery and pretrial proceedings.
¶8 Appellees cite three possible sources of authority for the transfer of this action from the second district to the third: civil rule 42, Utah Code section 78B-3-309, and the inherent power of the court. Davis County contests all three grounds. It asserts that civil rule 42 is addressed only to the authority of a district judge to consolidate cases within a single district, contends that section 78B-3-309 speaks only to transfer to "change the place of trial," and argues that the statute occupies the field in a manner preempting any inherent judicial power.
¶9 Davis County makes some strong points. The language and structure of rule 42 seem aimed at consolidation of cases within a single district. Rule 42 authorizes a "court" to consolidate any "actions involving a common question of law or fact pending before the court" and to "make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." UTAH R. CIV. P. 42. But the rule seems to be speaking of consolidation within a district—not multi-district transfer from one district to another. This seems evident in the requirement that a consolidated case "be heard by the judge assigned to the first case" filed, or by "another judge" if assigned by the "presiding judge ... for good cause." Id. (emphasis added). The role of "presiding judge" exists only in each individual district. And that indicates that rule 42 speaks to consolidation within a single judicial district, not to transfer from one district to another.
¶10 The venue transfer statute also has limited application. It speaks of transfer to "change the place of trial" and identifies factors that seem addressed to considerations of relevance to trial—to whether "there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had" in the venue where the case was filed and whether "the convenience of witnesses ... would be promoted" by transfer. UTAH CODE § 78B-3-309.
¶11 For these reasons we decline to interpret rule 42 or Utah Code section 78B-3-309 to authorize the multi-district transfer of this action from the second district to the third district. Yet that still leaves the question whether the second district court had the inherent power to order this transfer. Because the venue transfer statute speaks only to transfer for trial purposes, Davis County asks us to interpret it to foreclose any inherent judicial power to transfer venue for pretrial purposes. Citing Hale v. Barker , 70 Utah 284, 259 P. 928, 931 (1927), Davis County asserts that the "[d]istrict courts of this state have only such authority to transfer for trial causes of action from one county to another as is granted by the [Utah] Code." See also State v. Cauble , 563 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1977) (...
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