Davis-Guider v. City of Troy

Decision Date29 March 2023
Docket Number1:17-CV-1290 (DJS)
PartiesMICHAEL DAVIS-GUIDER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF TROY, RONALD FOUNTAIN, DANIELLE COONRADT, CHARLES McDONALD, RENSSELAER COUNTY, MICHAEL SIKIRICA, and TIM COLANERI, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

APPEARANCES:

OFFICE OF BRETT H. KLEIN, PLLC Attorney for Plaintiff

PATTISON, SAMPSON, GINSBERG, & GRIFFIN, PLLC Attorney for City of Troy Defendants

BAILEY, JOHNSON, & PECK, P.C. Attorney for Rensselaer County Defendants

OF COUNSEL:

BRETT H. KLEIN, ESQ., RHIANNON I. GIFFORD, ESQ., CRYSTAL R. PECK ESQ., JOHN W. BAILEY, ESQ., WILLIAM C. FIRTH, ESQ.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

DANIEL J. STEWART, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case began on February 26, 2015 with the death of two year old “V.D.,” the daughter of Plaintiff's girlfriend. On October 2, 2015, Plaintiff was arrested in connection with the death, following his indictment by a Rensselaer County Grand Jury. Plaintiff i has long maintained his innocence and was acquitted by a jury in Rensselaer County

Court in August 2016. In 2017, Plaintiff filed this action alleging violations of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Dkt. No. 1. The operative pleading before the Court is Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 77, Third Am. Compl. As a result of the decision on a motion to dismiss filed by the County Defendants, Dkt. No. 35, the following causes of action remain in this litigation:

1) false arrest/false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted against Defendants Coonradt, Fountain, McDonald, and Sikirica,[1] Third Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 6466;

2) malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted against Defendants Coonradt, Fountain, McDonald, Colaneri, and Sikirica, id. at ¶¶ 67-76;

3) denial of the right to a fair trial under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted against Defendants Coonradt, Fountain, McDonald, Colaneri, and Sikirica, id. at ¶¶ 77-81;

4) failure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted against Defendants Coonradt, Fountain, McDonald, and Colaneri, id. at ¶¶ 82-86; 5) section 1983 conspiracy claims related to Plaintiff's false arrest, malicious prosecution, and fair trial claims, id. at ¶¶ 87-90;[2]

6) Monell municipal liability claims against the City of Troy and County of Rensselaer, id. at ¶¶ 91-113; and

7) a state law claim for malicious prosecution against all Defendants, id. at ¶¶ 114-124.

The parties proceeded through discovery and presently pending are Motions for Summary Judgment on behalf of Defendants Sikirica and Rensselaer County, Dkt. No. 115, and Defendants City of Troy, Colaneri, Coonradt, Fountain, and McDonald. Dkt. No. 116.[3] Plaintiff opposes the Motions. Dkt. Nos. 121-125. Defendants filed replies. Dkt. Nos. 129-130. The Court heard oral arguments on the Motions in December 2022 and now grants each Motion for the reasons set forth below.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In February 2015, Plaintiff was living in Troy, New York with his girlfriend Rebecca Parker and Ms. Parker's two and a half year old daughter, V.D. Dkt. No. 115-4 at pp. 22-23 & 33. On the morning of February 26, 2015, after Ms. Parker went to work,! Plaintiff was home alone with V.D. Dkt. No. 123-1 at pp. 56-67. At some point around 7:00 that morning, Plaintiff helped V.D. go to the bathroom and put her back to sleep. Id. at pp. 56-57. Plaintiff also fell asleep. Id. at p. 59. Later that morning or in the early afternoon, Plaintiff discovered V.D. unresponsive in her bed. Id. at p. 60; Dkt. No. 1154 at p. 54. When she did not respond to his calls, he attempted CPR. Dkt. No. 123-1 at p. 61. Unable to find a working phone in his apartment, Plaintiff went across the street to call 911. Id. at p. 66-67. Emergency personnel arrived at Plaintiff's apartment as did officials from the Troy Police Department. Dkt. No. 115-4 at p. 72. V.D. was transported i to St. Mary's Hospital and was in cardiac arrest when she arrived at the hospital. Dkt. No. 116-3 at p. 20. V.D. was pronounced dead soon after the ambulance arrived at the hospital. Id.

Troy Police officials began an investigation into the circumstances of V.D.'s death, which included interviewing Plaintiff on February 26 and on several subsequent occasions. See Dkt. No. 116-1 at ¶¶ 6, 34, 38, & 70. On February 27, 2015, Dr. Sikirica conducted an autopsy on V.D. Dkt. No. 115-9 at p. 25. The investigation into V.D.'s death continued for several months without an arrest. Dr. Sikirica issued a final autopsy report on August 14, 2015. Dkt. No. 123-28. The report concluded that there was [n]o evidence of significant natural disease,” but found “multiple lacerations of the liver with right rib fractures due to blunt force trauma.” Id. at p. 11.

Defendants Fountain and Sikirica testified before a Rensselaer County Grand Jury investigating V.D.'s death. Dkt. No. 123-9. The Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Plaintiff with two counts of manslaughter and endangering the welfare of a child. Dkt. No. 115-18. Plaintiff was acquitted following a jury trial. Third Am. Compl. at ¶ 45.

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions i on file, together with [ ] affidavits, if any,” that there is no genuine issue of material fact. F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that the moving party claims will demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and cannot rest merely on allegations or denials of the facts submitted by the movant. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations or denials are ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary! judgment when the moving party has set out a documentary case.”); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). [T]he trial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Malicious Prosecution

“To state a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim a plaintiff ‘must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.' Cornelio v. Connecticut, 32 F.4th 160, 178 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2010)). In New York, that substantive showing requires Plaintiff to prove (1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding and (4) actual malice.” Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Smith-Hunter v. Harvey, 95 N.Y.2d 191, 195 (2000)). No party contests that Plaintiff, given his acquittal, satisfies the favorable termination element. Defendants do, however, maintain that summary judgment is appropriate as to the remaining elements.

1. Initiation of the Criminal Prosecution

Defendants Coonradt and Colaneri seek summary judgment on the ground that they did not initiate Plaintiff's prosecution. Dkt. No. 116-9 at pp. 8-10.

“To initiate a prosecution, a defendant must do more than report the crime or give testimony. He must ‘play[ ] an active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act.' Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d at 163 (quoting Rohman v. New York City Transit Authority, 215 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in the original). “Initiation in this context is a term of art.” Sotak v. Bertoni, 501 F.Supp.3d 59, 83 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (internal quotation and citation omitted). By that, courts look not to whether a party had any role in events leading to the prosecution, but whether a party had an active or significant role in bringing it about. Tretola v. Cnty. of Nassau, 14 F.Supp.3d 58, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Mitchell v. Victoria Home, 434 F.Supp.2d 219, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

a. Defendant Coonradt

The undisputed record establishes that Coonradt played a limited role in the investigation of V.D.'s death. The only substantive factual dispute between the parties about her role is whether a particular statement attributed to Plaintiff and recorded by Coonradt in her police report was false. Coonradt was the first police officer on the scene. Dkt. No. 116-2 at ¶ 4. She filed a report recounting that Plaintiff told her that he had gone! to wake up V.D. at “1100 and she wouldn't wake up. When I told Michael it was 1:30, he didn't seem to understand and said ...

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