Davis-Payne v. Galie
| Decision Date | 11 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-CV-6363(MAT),09-CV-6363(MAT) |
| Parties | CHANIKKA DAVIS-PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. JOHN GALIE, THOMAS FOURNIER, THEODORE WEED, JOHN FASO, JOSEPH GIANQUINTO, NIAGARA FALLS POLICE DEPARTMENT, DOROTHY JONES, COUNTY CRIME TASK FORCE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
This action was instituted by pro se plaintiff Channika Davis-Payne ("Plaintiff") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by entering another person's apartment without a warrant in order to arrest her on March 6, 2007, in the City of Niagara Falls. Presently pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("F.R.C.P."). One motion is on behalf of the State of New York ("the State"), New York State Police Investigator Dorothy Jones ("Inv. Jones"), and New York State Assistant Attorney General Robert Lee ("AAG Lee") (hereinafter, collectively, "the State Defendants"). The State Defendants also move, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(a). The second motion to dismiss is on behalf of the Niagara Falls Police Department ("the NFPD"), John Galie, Thomas Fournier, Theodore Weed, JohnFaso, and Joseph Gianquinto (collectively, "the Police Defendants").
On March 6, 2007 Plaintiff was arrested at a residence which was not her own as a result of her February 21, 2007 sale of a controlled substance to an undercover New York State Police Investigator, Dorothy Jones. Plaintiff was charged with two felonies. These charges were dismissed as part of a plea bargain entered into by Plaintiff on an unrelated matter that was prosecuted by the New York State Attorney General's Organized Crime Task Force. Plaintiff then instituted this § 1983 action, alleging various constitutional violations in connection with the March 6, 2007 arrest and other incidents.
By Decision and Order (Dkt. #55) dated October 16, 2012, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's original Complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part. See Payne v. Galie, et al., No. 12-4743-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2014) (Dkt. #66). The Second Circuit vacated this Court's dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff's warrantless entry claim based on the March 6, 2007 arrest, and sua sponte granted Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint to plead facts showing she had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the apartment where the arrest took place. Id., pp. 3-4. The Second Circuit affirmed theCourt's dismissal of Plaintiff's other claims. Thus, the only claim remaining for consideration on remand is the alleged violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights based on the Niagara Falls Police officers' warrantless entry into another person's apartment to effectuate her arrest.
After Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt #67), the State Defendants moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment (Dkt #69). Plaintiff did not file any papers in opposition to the State Defendants' motion. The NFPD and the Police Defendants moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim (Dkt #68). Plaintiff did not file any papers in opposition to the NFPD's and the Police Defendants' motion. For the reasons discussed below, the State Defendants' motion is granted in its entirety. The NFPD's and the Police Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of complaints based upon the plaintiff's failure "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). In order "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss under [Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In assessing a claim's plausibility, the district court must "assume [the] veracity" of all well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950, and draw every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990). However, the plaintiff's allegations must consist of more than mere labels or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," and bare legal conclusions are "not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Initially, the moving party must show that there is "an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden, the opposing party must set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial[,]" FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e), and must introduce evidence beyond the mere pleadings to show that there is an issue of material fact concerning "an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. If, "as to the issueon which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party, summary judgment is improper." Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
In the Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl."), Plaintiff has attempted to name the State of New York ("the State") as a separate defendant. The State argues that it should be dismissed as a party on the basis of sovereign immunity.
The Constitution provides that the power of the federal judiciary "shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST., amend. XI. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment generally "bars suits that seek either money damages, or injunctive relief[,]" McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (), "absent waiver by the State or valid congressional override," Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff seeks only money damages against the State with regard to alleged violations of her Fourth Amendment rights. The State has not waived its EleventhAmendment immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot maintain her Fourth Amendment cause of action against the State.
Plaintiff also claims that the State is liable for unspecified "acts and torts" of its employees under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, see Am. Compl., ¶ 36, and "pursuant to the Court of Claims Acts 10 & 11," id., ¶ 49. It is well-established that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against state officials on the basis of state law." Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1996), and "[t]his applies to state law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction as well." Id.; see also Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 540-41 (2002) () (citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984)). Accordingly, given the absence of waiver by the State, any claims Plaintiff purports to bring based on New York State law are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Emmons v. City of N.Y., 715 F. Supp.2d 394, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Burrell v. City Univ. of N.Y., 995 F. Supp. 398, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
Although the scope of the Second Circuit's remand was narrow, in that Plaintiff only was permitted to amend her Complaint toplead a reasonable expectation of privacy, Plaintiff nevertheless named new defendants, State employees AAG Lee and Inv. Jones. The allegations against them must be dismissed for several reasons.
First, Plaintiff has made allegations concerning AAG Lee in which she attempts to re-assert claims that this Court already has dismissed. Those claims, pertaining to arrests that the Court has found to be outside the statute of limitations (a finding which the Second Circuit did not disturb on appeal), are dismissed, again, with prejudice. Second, in making allegations against Inv. Jones, Plaintiff improperly has disregarded the Stipulation entered into by the attorney assigned by the Second Circuit to represent her on appeal. In the Stipulation dated February 27, 2014, assigned counsel for Plaintiff, Hanna Y.S. Chanoine, Esq., and counsel for Inv. Jones, Assistant Solicitor General Kate H. Nepveu, Esq., "stipulate[d] that the above-captioned case is withdrawn against defendant Dorothy Jones, with prejudice." Stipulation, attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Stephanie Calhoun, Esq. (Dkt #70). Plaintiff has offered no reason why this Stipulation should not be enforced, and the Court sees none on the record before it.
In the interest of completeness, however, the Court will address the new allegations asserted against Inv. Jones and AAG Lee.
The Eleventh Amendment's shield also extends to state employees when they are acting...
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