Davis v. Aetna Life Insurance Company

• Decision Date: 06 July 1960
• Docket Number: No. 16494.,16494.
• Citation: 279 F.2d 304
• Parties: Willie A. DAVIS, Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Charles S. Swanegan, Daisy Swanegan, and Lloyd W. Swanegan, as Administrator, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

279 F.2d 304 (1960)

Willie A. DAVIS, Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Charles S. Swanegan, Daisy Swanegan, and Lloyd W. Swanegan, as Administrator, Appellees.

No. 16494.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

May 21, 1960.

Rehearing Denied July 6, 1960.

Garry, Dreyfus, McTernan & Keller, San Francisco, Cal., Solomon E. Johnson, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, Orfield & Thompson, San Diego, Cal., for appellee.

Before POPE and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges, and KILKENNY, District Judge.

JERTBERG, Circuit Judge.

Appellant appeals from a summary judgment rendered by the district court denying appellant's claim to the proceeds of two insurance policies on the life of his wife.

Diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest, exceeds the required statutory amount. The district court had jurisdiction under Title 28 U. S.C.A. § 1332. This Court's jurisdiction to review the judgment rests on Title 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1294.

At the time of her death the wife of the appellant was the insured under two policies of insurance issued by the Aetna Life Insurance Company on her life. The appellant was the designated beneficiary in both policies. In one policy it was provided that in the event the designated beneficiary should pre-decease the insured, the insured's parents were to be the recipients of the proceeds of such policy. In the other policy it was provided that in the event that the designated beneficiary should pre-decease the insured the proceeds of such policy were to be paid to the estate of the insured.

On November 23, 1956, appellant killed his wife. Thereafter he pleaded guilty to the crime of voluntary manslaughter before the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of San Diego. He was convicted on his plea and was duly sentenced to confinement under the laws of the State of California. As primary beneficiary under both policies, appellant made demand upon the Aetna Life Insurance Company for payment to him of the proceeds of such policies. The parents of the deceased insured, as contingent beneficiaries under one policy, likewise made demand on the insurance company for the payment of the proceeds of such policy to them. The administrator of the estate of the deceased insured likewise made demand on the insurance company for payment to him of the proceeds of the policy in which the estate of the insured was the contingent beneficiary. Thereupon the insurance company commenced the action by filing in the district court a complaint for interpleader praying that the appellant as designated beneficiary, the parents of the deceased insured and the administrator of the estate of the deceased insured be required to interplead their respective claims to the proceeds of such policies.

The relief sought by the insurance company was granted upon deposit into the registry of the court of the amounts payable under such policies. Such amounts were deposited and the insurance company was discharged from further liability under said policies.

The interpleader complaint alleged that the insured was killed by the act of appellant and that appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of voluntary manslaughter in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego and was duly convicted and sentenced on such plea. The appellant, who was not represented by counsel in the proceedings before the district court and who was then and still is confined in a penal institution in the State of California, filed an inartistic pleading in which he alleged the killing of his wife was accidental and claimed the proceeds of both policies. The parents of the deceased insured filed their pleading to the complaint in interpleader and claimed the proceeds of the policy in which they were designated as the contingent beneficiaries. The administrator of the estate of the deceased insured likewise filed a pleading in which he claimed the proceeds of the policy in which the estate of the deceased insured was the contingent beneficiary.

Following several pre-trial conferences, of which the appellant was given notice but at which his incarceration prevented his appearance, the parents of the deceased insured and the administrator filed motions for summary judgment in their favor under the provisions of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. The appellant was notified of the time and place of the hearing of such motions, but of course was unable to be present. No affidavit or deposition was filed by appellant in connection with the hearing on said motions. At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment there was received in evidence a certified copy of the record of the criminal proceedings in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, showing that appellant had pleaded guilty to the crime of voluntary manslaughter, that he had been convicted of such crime on his plea of guilty and had been duly sentenced. Upon such record the district court granted the motions for summary judgment, the effect of which was to award the proceeds of the policies to the parents of the deceased insured and the administrator of the estate of the deceased insured and denied the claim of appellant thereto.

The record is clear that prior to the granting of the summary judgment, the district judge was concerned as to whether or not the appellant had the right to offer testimony concerning the circumstances of the killing of the insured, in view of his plea of guilty to the offense of voluntary manslaughter and his conviction on such plea.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court make it abundantly clear that the district judge entertained the view that under California law appellant's plea of guilty to the crime of voluntary manslaughter and his conviction of such offense conclusively established that appellant was not entitled to participate in the proceeds of the insurance policies, and for such reason the court was precluded from receiving testimony relating to the circumstances of the killing. In the findings of fact the district court found:

"Defendant, Willie A. Davis, is the surviving husband of Sylvia Swanegan Davis, and was named as beneficiary under both of above referred two policies of insurance; that on or about February 8, 1957, defendant, Willie A. Davis, was convicted of the crime of voluntary manslaughter of Sylvia Swanegan Davis, upon his plea of guilty thereto in the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of San Diego."

The court also found:

"The law and public policy of the State of California provides that a person who is convicted of the crime of voluntary manslaughter of a person cannot recover insurance proceeds of insurance policies on the life of said decedent."

From such findings the court concluded that appellant was not entitled to share in the proceeds from the life insurance on his wife.

The question presented on this appeal may be stated as follows: Does proof of the record of conviction in the criminal proceedings of appellant of the crime of voluntary manslaughter conclusively bar him from recovery of the proceeds of the insurance policies in question? If the answer to such question is to be in the affirmative, the judgment of the district court must be affirmed. If in the negative, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to the district court to afford appellant an opportunity to offer evidence in support of the allegation contained in his answer that the killing of his wife was accidental.

Since federal jurisdiction is dependent upon diversity of citizenship, we are to be governed in our decision in this case by the law of the State of California. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188.

The parties to this appeal agree that the precise point involved has not been passed upon by the reviewing courts of the State of California. In support of the judgment appellees rely heavily on the following enactments of the legislature of the State of California:

1. Section 258 of the California Probate Code, which provides:

"No person convicted of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of the decedent shall be entitled * * * to any portion of the estate; but the portion thereof to which he would otherwise be entitled to succeed goes to the other persons entitled thereto under the provisions of this chapter." (Italics ours.)

This section when originally enacted included only conviction of the crime of murder. In 1955 the section was amended to place voluntary manslaughter in the same category as murder.

2. Section 3517, California Civil Code, which provides: "No one can take advantage of his own wrong."

Appellees also rely upon the following decisions of the reviewing courts of the State of California: Estate of Lysholm, 1947, 79 Cal.App.2d 467, 179 P.2d 833; Abbey v. Lord, 1959, 168 Cal.App.2d 499, 336 P.2d 226; Beck v. West Coast Life Insurance Co., 1952, 38 Cal.2d 643, 241 P.2d 544, 26 A.L.R.2d 979; Drown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 1917, 175 Cal. 21, 165 P. 5.

The predecessor section of Section 258 of the Probate Code is Section 1409 of the Civil Code of the State of California, which was enacted in 1905. As enacted the latter section provided that:

"No person who has been convicted of the murder of the decedent shall be entitled to succeed to any portion of his estate; but the portion thereof to which he would otherwise be entitled to succeed descends to the other persons entitled thereto under the provisions of this title."

This section was first construed by the Supreme Court of the State of California in Estate of Kirby, 1912, 162 Cal. 91, 121 P. 370, 39 L.R.A.,N.S., 1088. In that case the court refused to extend the section to conviction of manslaughter and held that the killer was entitled to share in...