Davis v. Alaska 8212 5794

• Decision Date: 27 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 72,72
• Citation: 39 L.Ed.2d 347,415 U.S. 308,94 S.Ct. 1105
• Parties: Joshaway DAVIS, Petitioner, v. State of ALASKA. —5794
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

415 U.S. 308

94 S.Ct. 1105

39 L.Ed.2d 347

Joshaway DAVIS, Petitioner,

v State of ALASKA.

No. 72—5794.

Argued Dec. 12, 1973.

Decided Feb. 27, 1974.

Syllabus

Petitioner was convicted of grand larceny and burglary following a trial in which the trial court on motion of the prosecution issued a protective order prohibiting questioning Green, a key prosecution witness, concerning Green's adjudication as a juvenile delinquent relating to a burglary and his probation status at the time of the events as to which he was to testify.The trial court's order was based on state provisions protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed.Held: Petitioner was denied his right of confrontation of witnesses under the Sixth and FourteenthAmendments, Pp. 315 321.

(a) The defense was entitled to attempt to show that Green was biased because of his vulnerable status as a probationer and his concern that he might be a suspect in the burglary charged against petitioner, and limiting the cross-examination of Green precluded the defense from showing his possible bias.Pp. 315—318.

(b)Petitioner's right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting juvenile offenders and any temporary embarrassment to Green by disclosure of his juvenile court record and probation status is outweighed by petitioner's right effectively to cross-examine a witness.Pp. 319—320.

499 P.2d 1025, reversed and remanded.

Robert H. Wagstaff, Anchorage, Alaska, for the petitioner.

Charles M. Merriner, Anchorage, Alaska, for the respond- ent.

Mr. Chief Justice BURGERdelivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness' probationary status as juvenile delinquent when such an impeachment would conflict with a State's asserted interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of delinquency.

(1)

When the Polar Bar in Anchorage closed in the early morning hours of February 16, 1970, well over a thousand dollars in cash and checks was in the bar's Mosler safe.About midday, February 16, it was discovered that the bar had been broken into and the safe, about two feet square and weighing several hundred pounds, had been removed from the premises.

Later that afternoon the Alaska State Troopers received word that a safe had been discovered about 26 miles outside Anchorage near the home of Jess Straight and his family.The safe, which was subsequently determined to be the one stolen from the Polar Bar, had been pried open and the contents removed.Richard Green, Jess Straight's stepson, told investigating troopers on the scene that at about noon on February 16he had seen and spoken with two Negro men standing alongside a late-model metallic blue Chevrolet sedan near where the safe was later discovered.The next day Anchorage police investigators brought him to the police station where Green was given six photographs of adult Negro males.After examining the photographs for 30 seconds to a minute, Green identified the photograph of petitioner as that of one of the men he had encountered the day before and described to the police.Petitioner was arrested the next day, February 18.On February 19, Green picked petitioner out of a lineup of seven Negro males.

At trial, evidence was introduced to the effect that paint chips found in the trunk of petitioner's rented blue Chevrolet could have originated from the surface of the stolen safe.Fourther, the of the stolen safe.Further, the which were identified as safe insulation characteristic of that found in Mosler safes.The insulation found in the trunk matched that of the stolen safe.

Richard Green was a crucial witness for the prosecution.He testified at trial that while on an errand for his motherhe confronted two men standing beside a late-model metallic blue Chevrolet, parked on a road near his family's house.The man standing at the rear of the car spoke to Green asking if Green lived nearby and if his father was home.Green offered the men help, but his offer was rejected.On his return from the errand Green again passed the two men and he saw the man with whom he had had the conversation standing at the rear of the car with 'something like a crowbar' in his hands.Green identified petitioner at the trial as the man with the 'crowbar.'The safe was discovered later that afternoon at the point, according to Green, where the Chevrolet had been parked.

Before testimony was taken at the trial of petitioner, the prosecutor moved for a protective order to prevent any reference to Green's juvenile record by the defense in the course of cross-examination.At the time of the trial and at the time of the events Green testified to, Green was on probation by order of a juvenile court after having been adjudicated a delinquent for burglarizing two cabins.Green was 16 years of age at the time of the Polar Bar burglary but had turned 17 prior to trial.

In opposing the protective order, petitioner's counsel made it clear that he would not introduce Green's juvenile adjudication as a general impeachment of Green's character as a truthful person but, rather, to show specifically that at the same time Green was assisting the police in identifying petitionerhe was on probation for burglary.From this petitioner would seek to show—or at least argue—that Green acted out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to his probation.Not only might Green have made a hasty and faulty identification of petitioner to shift suspicion away from himself as one who robbed the Polar Bar, but Green might have been subject to undue pressure from the police and made his identifications under fear of possible probation revocation.Green's record would be revealed only as necessary to probe Green for bias and prejudice and not generally to call Green's good character into question.

The trial court granted the motion for a protective order, relying on Alaska Rule of Children's Procedure 23,¹ and Alaska Stat. § 47.10.080(g)(1971).²

Although prevented from revealing that Green had been on probation for the juvenile delinquency adjudication for burglary at the same time that he originally identified petitioner, counsel for petitioner did his best to expose Green's state of mind at the time Green discovered that a stolen safe had been discovered near his home.Green denied that he was upset or uncomfortable about the discovery of the safe.He claimed not to have been worried about any suspicions the police might have been expected to harbor against him, though Green did admit that it crossed his mind that the police might have thought he had something to do with the crime.

Defense counsel cross-examined Green in part as follows:

'Q.Were you upset at all by the fact that this safe was found on your property?

'A.No, sir.

'Q.Did you feel that they might in some way suspect you of this?

'A.No.

'Q.Did you feel uncomfortable about this though?

'A.No, not really.

'Q.The fact that a safe was found on your property?

'A.No.

'Q.Did you suspect for a moment that the police might somehow think that you were involved in this?

'A.I thought they might ask a few questions is all.

'Q.Did that thought ever enter your mind that you—that the police might think that you were somehow connected with this?

'A.No, it didn't really bother me, no.

'Q.Well, but . . ..

'A.I mean, you know, it didn't—it didn't come into my mind as worrying me, you know.

'Q.That really wasn't—wasn't my question, Mr. Green.Did you think that—not whether it worried you so much or not, but did you feel that there was a possibility that the police might somehow think that you had something to do with this, that they might have that in their mind, and that you . . ..

'A.That came across my mind, yes, sir.

'Q.That did cross your mind?

'A.Yes.

'Q.So as I understand it you went down to the—you drove in with the police in—in their car from mile 25, Glenn Highway down to the city police station?

'A.Yes, sir.

'Q.And then went into the investigators' room with Investigator Gray and Investigator Weaver?

'A.Yeah.

'Q.And they started asking you questions about—about the incident, is that correct?

'A.Yeah.

'Q.Had you ever been questioned like that before by any law enforcement officers?

'A.No.

'MR. RIPLEY: I'm going to object to this, Your Honor, it's a carry-on with rehash of the same thing.He's attempting to raise in the jury's mind . . ..

'THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection.'

Since defense counsel was prohibited from making inquiry as to the witness' being on probation under a juvenile court adjudication, Green's protestations of unconcern over possible police suspicion that he might have had a part in the Polar Bar burglary and his categorical denial of ever having been the subject of any similar law-enforcement interrogation went unchallenged.The tension between the right of confrontation and the State's policy of protecting the witness with a juvenile record is particularly evident in the final answer given by the witness.Since it is probable that Green underwent some questioning by police when he was arrested for the burglaries on which his juvenile adjudication of delinquency rested, the answer can be regarded as highly suspect at the very least.The witness was in effect asserting, under protection of the trial court's ruling, a right to give a questionably truthful answer to a cross-examiner pursuing a relevant line of inquiry; it is doubtful whether the bold 'No' answer would have been given by Green absent a belief that he was shielded from traditional cross-examination.It would be difficult to conceive of a situation more clearly illustrating the need for cross- examination.The remainder of the cross-examination...