Davis v. Alaska 8212 5794, No. 72

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBURGER
Citation39 L.Ed.2d 347,415 U.S. 308,94 S.Ct. 1105
Docket NumberNo. 72
Decision Date27 February 1974
PartiesJoshaway DAVIS, Petitioner, v. State of ALASKA. —5794

415 U.S. 308
94 S.Ct. 1105
39 L.Ed.2d 347
Joshaway DAVIS, Petitioner,

v.

State of ALASKA.

No. 72—5794.
Argued Dec. 12, 1973.
Decided Feb. 27, 1974.

Syllabus

Petitioner was convicted of grand larceny and burglary following a trial in which the trial court on motion of the prosecution issued a protective order prohibiting questioning Green, a key prosecution witness, concerning Green's adjudication as a juvenile delinquent relating to a burglary and his probation status at the time of the events as to which he was to testify. The trial court's order was based on state provisions protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. Held: Petitioner was denied his right of confrontation of witnesses under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, Pp. 315 321.

(a) The defense was entitled to attempt to show that Green was biased because of his vulnerable status as a probationer and his concern that he might be a suspect in the burglary charged against petitioner, and limiting the cross-examination of Green precluded the defense from showing his possible bias. Pp. 315—318.

(b) Petitioner's right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting juvenile offenders and any temporary embarrassment to Green by disclosure of his juvenile court record and probation status is outweighed by petitioner's right effectively to cross-examine a witness. Pp. 319—320.

499 P.2d 1025, reversed and remanded.

Robert H. Wagstaff, Anchorage, Alaska, for the petitioner.

Charles M. Merriner, Anchorage, Alaska, for the respond-

Page 309

ent.

Mr. Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness' probationary status as juvenile delinquent when such an impeachment would conflict with a State's asserted interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of delinquency.

(1)

When the Polar Bar in Anchorage closed in the early morning hours of February 16, 1970, well over a thousand dollars in cash and checks was in the bar's Mosler safe. About midday, February 16, it was discovered that the bar had been broken into and the safe, about two feet square and weighing several hundred pounds, had been removed from the premises.

Later that afternoon the Alaska State Troopers received word that a safe had been discovered about 26 miles outside Anchorage near the home of Jess Straight and his family. The safe, which was subsequently determined to be the one stolen from the Polar Bar, had been pried open and the contents removed. Richard Green, Jess Straight's stepson, told investigating troopers on the scene that at about noon on February 16 he had seen and spoken with two Negro men standing alongside a late-model metallic blue Chevrolet sedan near where the safe was later discovered. The next day Anchorage

Page 310

police investigators brought him to the police station where Green was given six photographs of adult Negro males. After examining the photographs for 30 seconds to a minute, Green identified the photograph of petitioner as that of one of the men he had encountered the day before and described to the police. Petitioner was arrested the next day, February 18. On February 19, Green picked petitioner out of a lineup of seven Negro males.

At trial, evidence was introduced to the effect that paint chips found in the trunk of petitioner's rented blue Chevrolet could have originated from the surface of the stolen safe. Fourther, the of the stolen safe. Further, the which were identified as safe insulation characteristic of that found in Mosler safes. The insulation found in the trunk matched that of the stolen safe.

Richard Green was a crucial witness for the prosecution. He testified at trial that while on an errand for his mother he confronted two men standing beside a late-model metallic blue Chevrolet, parked on a road near his family's house. The man standing at the rear of the car spoke to Green asking if Green lived nearby and if his father was home. Green offered the men help, but his offer was rejected. On his return from the errand Green again passed the two men and he saw the man with whom he had had the conversation standing at the rear of the car with 'something like a crowbar' in his hands. Green identified petitioner at the trial as the man with the 'crowbar.' The safe was discovered later that afternoon at the point, according to Green, where the Chevrolet had been parked.

Before testimony was taken at the trial of petitioner, the prosecutor moved for a protective order to prevent any reference to Green's juvenile record by the defense in the course of cross-examination. At the time of the

Page 311

trial and at the time of the events Green testified to, Green was on probation by order of a juvenile court after having been adjudicated a delinquent for burglarizing two cabins. Green was 16 years of age at the time of the Polar Bar burglary but had turned 17 prior to trial.

In opposing the protective order, petitioner's counsel made it clear that he would not introduce Green's juvenile adjudication as a general impeachment of Green's character as a truthful person but, rather, to show specifically that at the same time Green was assisting the police in identifying petitioner he was on probation for burglary. From this petitioner would seek to show—or at least argue—that Green acted out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to his probation. Not only might Green have made a hasty and faulty identification of petitioner to shift suspicion away from himself as one who robbed the Polar Bar, but Green might have been subject to undue pressure from the police and made his identifications under fear of possible probation revocation. Green's record would be revealed only as necessary to probe Green for bias and prejudice and not generally to call Green's good character into question.

The trial court granted the motion for a protective order, relying on Alaska Rule of Children's Procedure 23,1 and Alaska Stat. § 47.10.080(g) (1971). 2

Page 312

Although prevented from revealing that Green had been on probation for the juvenile delinquency adjudication for burglary at the same time that he originally identified petitioner, counsel for petitioner did his best to expose Green's state of mind at the time Green discovered that a stolen safe had been discovered near his home. Green denied that he was upset or uncomfortable about the discovery of the safe. He claimed not to have been worried about any suspicions the police might have been expected to harbor against him, though Green did admit that it crossed his mind that the police might have thought he had something to do with the crime.

Defense counsel cross-examined Green in part as follows:

'Q. Were you upset at all by the fact that this safe was found on your property?

'A. No, sir.

'Q. Did you feel that they might in some way suspect you of this?

'A. No.

'Q. Did you feel uncomfortable about this though?

'A. No, not really.

'Q. The fact that a safe was found on your property?

'A. No.

'Q. Did you suspect for a moment that the police might somehow think that you were involved in this?

'A. I thought they might ask a few questions is all.

'Q. Did that thought ever enter your mind that you—that the police might think that you were somehow connected with this?

Page 313

'A. No, it didn't really bother me, no.

'Q. Well, but . . ..

'A. I mean, you know, it didn't—it didn't come into my mind as worrying me, you know.

'Q. That really wasn't—wasn't my question, Mr. Green. Did you think that—not whether it worried you so much or not, but did you feel that there was a possibility that the police might somehow think that you had something to do with this, that they might have that in their mind, and that you . . ..

'A. That came across my mind, yes, sir.

'Q. That did cross your mind?

'A. Yes.

'Q. So as I understand it you went down to the—you drove in with the police in—in their car from mile 25, Glenn Highway down to the city police station?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. And then went into the investigators' room with Investigator Gray and Investigator Weaver?

'A. Yeah.

'Q. And they started asking you questions about—about the incident, is that correct?

'A. Yeah.

'Q. Had you ever been questioned like that before by any law enforcement officers?

'A. No.

'MR. RIPLEY: I'm going to object to this, Your Honor, it's a carry-on with rehash of the same thing. He's attempting to raise in the jury's mind . . ..

'THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection.'

Since defense counsel was prohibited from making inquiry as to the witness' being on probation under a juvenile court adjudication, Green's protestations of unconcern over possible police suspicion that he might

Page 314

have had a part in the Polar Bar burglary and his categorical denial of ever having been the subject of any similar law-enforcement interrogation went unchallenged. The tension between the right of confrontation and the State's policy of...

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5629 practice notes
  • U.S. v. Vega Molina, No. 03-1625.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • May 19, 2005
    ...said, the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the right to cross-examine those who testify against them. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065. That right includes the right to conduct such cross-exa......
  • Ellison v. Sachs, Civ. A. No. M-83-4455.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland)
    • March 23, 1984
    ...through the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1067-68, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), provides in pertinent part that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the......
  • Barbe v. McBride, No. 06-7550.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • April 7, 2008
    ...1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); (2) the importance of the excluded evidence to the presentation of an effective defense, see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); and (3) the scope of the evidence ban being applied against the accused, see Delaware v. Van Ar......
  • Barresi v. Maloney, No. CIV.A. 00-10403-EFH.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • July 24, 2003
    ...923 (1965). It is axiomatic that "[c]onfrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witnesses physically." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). "A primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination." Id. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5612 cases
  • U.S. v. Vega Molina, No. 03-1625.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • May 19, 2005
    ...said, the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the right to cross-examine those who testify against them. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065. That right includes the right to conduct such cross-exa......
  • Ellison v. Sachs, Civ. A. No. M-83-4455.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland)
    • March 23, 1984
    ...through the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1067-68, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), provides in pertinent part that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the......
  • Barbe v. McBride, No. 06-7550.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • April 7, 2008
    ...1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); (2) the importance of the excluded evidence to the presentation of an effective defense, see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); and (3) the scope of the evidence ban being applied against the accused, see Delaware v. Van Ar......
  • Barresi v. Maloney, No. CIV.A. 00-10403-EFH.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • July 24, 2003
    ...923 (1965). It is axiomatic that "[c]onfrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witnesses physically." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). "A primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination." Id. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Equalizing Access to Evidence: Criminal Defendants and the Stored Communications Act.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 5, March 2022
    • March 1, 2022
    ...VI. (263.) 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (plurality opinion) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1985)). (264.) Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-317 (1974). (265.) Id. at 318 (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966)). (266.) See Christine Hoist, The Confrontation Clause a......
  • Two Rights Collide: Determining When Attorney-Client Privilege Should Yield to a Defendant’s Right to Compulsory Process or Confrontation
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Nbr. 58-2, April 2021
    • April 1, 2021
    ...fairly, the Framers adopted the Sixth Amendment’s 60. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 738 (1987). 61. Id. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). 62. Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 518 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318) (noting that the right to cross-examinatio......
  • Character, Credibility, and Rape Shield Rules
    • United States
    • The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy Nbr. 19-1, January 2021
    • January 1, 2021
    ...complainant about her ongoing extramarital cohabitation with her boyfriend. The boyfriend observed her alight from the defendant’s car 67. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 68. Id. at 316. “The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witnes......
  • Safeguarding the Opportunity for Effective Cross-Examination: The Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Disclosures
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Nbr. 58-2, April 2021
    • April 1, 2021
    ...429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”). 58. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (“Our cases construing the (confrontation) clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.” (......

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