Davis v. Billington, Civil Action No. 10–0036 (RBW).

CourtUnited States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
Writing for the CourtREGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.
Citation775 F.Supp.2d 23
PartiesMorris S. DAVIS, Plaintiff,v.James H. BILLINGTON, in his official capacity as the Librarian of Congress,andDaniel P. Mulhollan, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 10–0036 (RBW).
Decision Date30 March 2011

775 F.Supp.2d 23

Morris S. DAVIS, Plaintiff,
v.
James H. BILLINGTON, in his official capacity as the Librarian of Congress,andDaniel P. Mulhollan, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10–0036 (RBW).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 30, 2011.


[775 F.Supp.2d 26]

Aden J. Fine, Alexander Abdo, Benjamin T. Siracusa Hillman, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, Arthur B. Spitzer, American Civil Liberties Union, Frederick V. Mulhauser, ACLU of the National Capital Area, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.Christopher R. Hall, Deanna Lynn Durrett, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Morris S. Davis, brings this action against James H. Billington, the Librarian of Congress, in his official capacity, and Daniel P. Mulhollan, the director of the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”), in his individual capacity, alleging that the defendants violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 78–85. On October 14, 2010, the Court denied the Defendants' Motion to Stay Litigation Except as to the Individual Capacity Defenses of Daniel P. Mulhollan (“Defs.' Mot. to Stay”), and stated that the reasons for its denial would be explained in a forthcoming memorandum opinion.1 Civil Action 10–0036(RBW), October 14, 2010 Order. This is that Memorandum Opinion. This Memorandum Opinion also addresses the Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Defendant Daniel P. Mulhollan (“Def. Mulhollan's Mot. to Dismiss”), and the Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Defendant James Billington (“Def. Billington's Mot. to Dismiss”), both of which remain pending before the Court and are opposed by the plaintiff.2

[775 F.Supp.2d 27]

In this Memorandum Opinion, the Court first further explains why it denied the motion for a partial stay, and then will address the motions to dismiss, which collectively raise three principal arguments in favor of dismissal: First, that the plaintiff cannot state a claim for damages against defendant Mulhollan in his individual capacity; second, that the plaintiff fails to state a claim under either the First or Fifth Amendments; and third, that defendant Mulhollan is entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiff's constitutional claims. The ensuing pages explain both the Court's earlier denial of the motion to stay and now its denial of both motions to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND 3

Between September 2005 and October 2007, the plaintiff, who at that point in his career had achieved the rank of Colonel in the United States Air Force, served as the Chief Prosecutor for the Department of Defense's Office of Military Commissions. Compl. ¶ 2. In this position, he oversaw the prosecution of suspected terrorists held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (“Guantanamo Bay”) in Cuba. Id. Believing that the military commissions system had become “fundamentally flawed,” id., the plaintiff resigned from his position as Chief Prosecutor in October 2007, id., and retired from his position as a military officer at that same time, id. ¶ 12. He has since become a “vocal and highly public critic of the system, speaking, writing[,] and testifying to Congress about his personal views and firsthand experiences.” Id. ¶ 2.

A. The Plaintiff's Hire by the Library of Congress

In December of 2008, the Library of Congress (the “Library”) hired the plaintiff as its Assistant Director of the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division (the “FADTD” or the “plaintiff's division”) of the CRS. Id. ¶¶ 3, 26. The CRS is the public policy research arm of the United States Congress and a service unit of the Library. Id. ¶ 14. In his position as Assistant Director of the FADTD, the plaintiff represents that his “primary responsibilities were to lead, plan, direct, and evaluate the research and analytical activities in the policy areas assigned to his division, which included matters relating to foreign affairs, the Defense Department, and international trade and finance, but not issues related to military commissions.” Id. ¶ 29. According to the plaintiff, “sole responsibility for topics relating to the military commissions system and the prosecution of the individuals held at Guantanamo [Bay] belongs to the American Law Division” and “[m]embers of Congress and their staffs know that [the American Law Division] is the division responsible for military-commission-related issues.” Id. ¶¶ 31–32. The plaintiff also asserts that, within his division, he “had no authority to establish policy, and he had little opportunity for significant contact with the public.” Id. ¶ 29. He therefore contends that he was “not expected to and did not author written reports or analyses on behalf of [the CRS,]” and that “[h]is name has not appeared on any reports distributed to Congress. Nor have any congressional inquiries or requests for information been directed to him.” Id. ¶ 29.

[775 F.Supp.2d 28]

B. The Plaintiff's Opinion Articles

On November 11, 2009, both the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post published articles written by the plaintiff that “reflect[ed] his personal views regarding Guantanamo [Bay] and the military commissions process.” Id. ¶¶ 43–44, 50. These articles relied exclusively on the plaintiff's professional experiences prior to his employment with the CRS. Id. ¶ 50. According to the plaintiff, neither of these articles criticized Congress, any Member of Congress, any political party, or positions associated exclusively with one political party, nor did they criticize the CRS, the Library, or any of their employees or policies. Id. ¶¶ 47, 50. Rather, the plaintiff contends that the “opinion pieces relate[d] to subjects of immense public concern ... for the foreseeable future,” as they discussed the then-current policies of “President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder ... with respect to [future announcements concerning additional decisions about] the military-commission or federal-court trial of other Guantanamo [Bay] detainees.” Id. ¶ 45. The plaintiff wrote the articles at his home, away from his workplace during non-working hours, and he did not receive any form of compensation for their authorship. Id. ¶¶ 48–49. The plaintiff also indicates that, although he previously engaged in speech similar to that at issue here, he was not reprimanded by either defendant in any way prior to the two articles being published on November 11, 2009. Id. ¶¶ 33–42.

The plaintiff had informed defendant Mulhollan that his articles would be published prior to their publication, and after Mulhollan had the opportunity to review them, Mulhollan sent multiple emails to the plaintiff expressing his dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's actions. Id. ¶¶ 53–54. The day after the articles' publication, on November 12, 2009, Mulhollan told the plaintiff in a meeting that he would not be converted from probationary status to permanent status, as had been the planned development of the plaintiff's employment with the CRS prior to the November 11, 2009 publications. Id. ¶ 55. On November 13, 2009, Mulhollan again called the plaintiff into a meeting and served him with a Memorandum of Admonishment in response to the publication of the two November 11, 2009 articles. Id. ¶¶ 56–57. Mulhollan's last alleged act of retaliation occurred on November 20, 2009, when he informed the plaintiff that, because the plaintiff had written the opinion articles, he would be reassigned to work temporarily as Mulhollan's Special Advisor beginning on December 21, and that thirty days thereafter he would be separated entirely from the CRS. Id. ¶¶ 58–59. Although the plaintiff filed suit on January 8, 2010, Def. Mulhollan's Mem. at 5, which was prior to the expiration of his thirty days as Mulhollan's Special Advisor, subsequent filings with the Court indicate that the expected and allegedly retaliatory acts described in the plaintiff's complaint—namely the complete separation from the CRS—did in fact ultimately occur. See Pl.'s Opp'n to Stay at 1–3.

C. The Library's Regulations

The Library's internal personnel regulations generally encourage employees to speak and write publicly and they do not restrict employees from engaging in public discourse when discussing issues not within an employee's area(s) of specialty. Compl. ¶¶ 65–67 (citing Library of Congress Regulation (“LCR”) 2023–3 § 3(A)-(B)). However, when speaking on “controversial matters,” the regulations dictate that Library employees should “explicitly disassociate” themselves from the Library and “their official positions,” but such statements made by employees are not

[775 F.Supp.2d 29]

subject to prior review.4 Id. ¶¶ 66–67 (citing LCR–2023–3 § 3(A)-(B)). Additionally, the Library's regulations state that “where an employee's writing relates to library science, the administration or policies of the Library, matters relating to an employee's official duties or responsibilities, or matters specifically addressing Members of Congress, the employee is expected to, among other things, “ ‘assure, when appropriate, that staff members' opinions clearly differentiate from Library policy.’ ” Id. ¶ 67 (quoting LCR–2023–3 § 3(B)).

In 2004, defendant Mulhollan issued a statement clarifying the Library's regulations as applied to the CRS, which has since been adopted as policy and is implemented and enforced by defendant Mulhollan. Id. ¶ 68. This clarification, entitled Outside Speaking and Writing, encourages Library employees to submit their authored works for prior review and provides that employees are responsible for using “sound judgment in deciding when engagement in an outside activity may place the reputation of [the CRS] at risk.” Id. ¶ ¶ 69–71. However, the term “sound judgment” is neither defined nor discussed, which the plaintiff alleges affords “the Library and [the CRS] unfettered discretion to determine which speech to punish.” Id. ¶¶ 71, 76.

II. THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY THIS
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15 practice notes
  • Davis v. Billington, Civil Action No. 10–00036 (RBW)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • June 25, 2014
    ...forth in prior memorandum opinions issued by this Court and by this Circuit on appeal of this Court's opinion. See Davis v. Billington, 775 F.Supp.2d 23, 27–29 (D.D.C.2011), vacated and remanded, 681 F.3d 377, 379–80 (D.C.Cir.2012). A divided panel of the District of Columbia Circuit revers......
  • Davis v. Billington, Civil Action No. 10–00036 RBW
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • June 25, 2014
    ...forth in prior memorandum opinions issued by this Court and by this Circuit on appeal of this Court's opinion. See Davis v. Billington, 775 F.Supp.2d 23, 27–29 (D.D.C.2011), vacated and remanded, 681 F.3d 377, 379–80 (D.C.Cir.2012). A divided panel of the District of Columbia Circuit revers......
  • Melton v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 14–0686 RMC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • March 27, 2015
    ...dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint properly states a claim on which relief may be granted. ” Davis v. Billington, 775 F.Supp.2d 23, 32 (D.D.C.2011). Although ‘ “detailed factual allegations' ” are not required, a plaintiff must offer “more than an unadorned, the defen......
  • Burke v. Air Serv Int'l Inc., Civil Action No. 07–02335 (HHK).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • March 30, 2011
    ...was not a Taliban stronghold, the Taliban's mobility and rapid communications made staying there dangerous. Burke Dep. at 190.13 [775 F.Supp.2d 23] In light of Burke's expertise and avowed awareness of the specific risks to which he was exposed, no reasonable jury could conclude that the Ta......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
15 cases
  • Davis v. Billington, Civil Action No. 10–00036 (RBW)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • June 25, 2014
    ...forth in prior memorandum opinions issued by this Court and by this Circuit on appeal of this Court's opinion. See Davis v. Billington, 775 F.Supp.2d 23, 27–29 (D.D.C.2011), vacated and remanded, 681 F.3d 377, 379–80 (D.C.Cir.2012). A divided panel of the District of Columbia Circuit revers......
  • Davis v. Billington, Civil Action No. 10–00036 RBW
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • June 25, 2014
    ...forth in prior memorandum opinions issued by this Court and by this Circuit on appeal of this Court's opinion. See Davis v. Billington, 775 F.Supp.2d 23, 27–29 (D.D.C.2011), vacated and remanded, 681 F.3d 377, 379–80 (D.C.Cir.2012). A divided panel of the District of Columbia Circuit revers......
  • Melton v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 14–0686 RMC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • March 27, 2015
    ...dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint properly states a claim on which relief may be granted. ” Davis v. Billington, 775 F.Supp.2d 23, 32 (D.D.C.2011). Although ‘ “detailed factual allegations' ” are not required, a plaintiff must offer “more than an unadorned, the defen......
  • Burke v. Air Serv Int'l Inc., Civil Action No. 07–02335 (HHK).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • March 30, 2011
    ...was not a Taliban stronghold, the Taliban's mobility and rapid communications made staying there dangerous. Burke Dep. at 190.13 [775 F.Supp.2d 23] In light of Burke's expertise and avowed awareness of the specific risks to which he was exposed, no reasonable jury could conclude that the Ta......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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