Davis v. Blanchard

• Citation: 175 F.Supp.3d 581
• Decision Date: 29 March 2016
• Docket Number: 1:15CV362
• Court: United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: Jacob Branson Davis, Plaintiff, v. William Charles Blanchard, in his individual and official capacities; The Guilford County Board of Education; Crandall Frances Close, in her individual and official capacities; and The State of North Carolina, Defendants.

175 F.Supp.3d 581

Jacob Branson Davis, Plaintiff,
v.
William Charles Blanchard, in his individual and official capacities; The Guilford County Board of Education; Crandall Frances Close, in her individual and official capacities; and The State of North Carolina, Defendants.

1:15CV362

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

Signed March 29, 2016

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Kimberly J. Byrd, Payne Law, PLLC, Kernersville, NC, Ronald D. Payne, II, Payne Law, PLLC, Kernersville, NC, for Plaintiff.

Karl Dean Shatley, II, Campbell Shatley, PLLC, Asheville, NC, Kathryn Hicks Shields, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

This matter comes before the court on the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) filed by Defendants The Guilford County Board of Education (“Board”) and William Charles Blanchard, in his individual and official capacities, (“Blanchard”) (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. 6.) Plaintiff Jacob Branson Davis (“Plaintiff”) filed a response in opposition to this motion to dismiss, (Doc. 21), and Defendants subsequently filed a reply

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(Doc. 23). This matter is ripe for resolution and for the following reasons, this court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). To be facially plausible, a claim must “plead [ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable” and must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true. Id. Further, “the complaint, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, [is] liberally construed in the plaintiff's favor.” Estate of Williams-Moore v. All. One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 646 (M.D.N.C.2004) (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, sufficient factual allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” so as to “nudge[ ] the[ ] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court cannot “ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege any facts which set forth a claim.” Estate of Williams – Moore, 335 F.Supp.2d at 646. Consequently, even given the deferential standard allocated to pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage, a court will not accept mere legal conclusions as true and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [will] not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Further, courts “should dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) if the complaint fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based or if jurisdictional allegations in the complaint are not true.” McLaughlin v. Safway Servs., LLC, 429 Fed.Appx. 347, 348 (4th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.1982) (outlining two ways lack of subject matter jurisdiction arises: failure “to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based” and when “the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint were not true”). A challenged plaintiff “bears the burden of persuasion” in defending subject-matter jurisdiction. Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir.1995).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Consequently, the following facts are drawn from the Complaint (Complaint (“Compl.”) (Doc. 3)) and are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

A. Events Leading to April 29, 2010

Plaintiff, a minor at the time of the events in question, (Compl. (Doc. 3) ¶¶ 17-18), attended Southeast Guilford High School during the 2009-2010 school year. (Id.¶ 55.) Blanchard was principal of Southeast Guilford High School at that time. (Id.¶ 23.) Plaintiff, who was identified as learning disabled, had an Individualized Educational Plan (“IEP”), pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act, that was implemented no later than September 4, 2009. (Id.¶¶ 56-57.) Prior to the events at issue, the last review of his IEP occurred on March 29, 2010. (Id.¶ 58.)

Plaintiff's mother reported to a teacher that another student, Matthew Cagle, was verbally harassing Plaintiff on a daily basis.

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(Id.¶ 59.) She made this report in either late January or early February 2010. (Id.) The teacher then, despite Plaintiff's mother's objection to this arrangement, had Plaintiff and Cagle sit next to each other when in her classroom. (Id.¶ 60.) Plaintiff further alleges that after this change occurred, the taunting increased until, one afternoon, Cagle punched Plaintiff and then ran to his bus. (Id.¶ 61.) The next day, Plaintiff hit Cagle in retaliation for the previous afternoon and then ran to his own bus. (Id.¶ 62.) No disciplinary action is alleged regarding either of these physical incidents. There is also no allegation of any further disruption between Cagle and Plaintiff.

Also in the second semester, Plaintiff enrolled in the Advanced PE class taught by Coach White. (Id.¶ 63.) Dennis Ray Covington Jr. was also enrolled in this class. (Id.¶ 64.) Plaintiff alleges that Covington and his friends taunted Plaintiff during that semester and called him offensive names. (Id.¶ 65.) Throughout this period, Plaintiff alleges that he rarely saw any school personnel in the boys' locker room, as adult contact was limited to when coaches leaned their heads in and informed students that class was nearly over. (Id.¶ 67.)

On April 28, 2010, Covington accused Plaintiff of calling him a “[racial epithet],” but Plaintiff denied this accusation. (Id.¶ 66.) This interaction led to the April 29, 2010 assault that is the foundation of this suit.

B. April 29, 2010

At approximately 1:30 p.m., April 29, 2010, Plaintiff was in the boys' locker room, changing clothes at the end of his Advanced PE class. (Id.¶ 69.) No school employees were present in the locker room at this time. (Id.¶ 77.) While Plaintiff was bent over and leaning into a lower locker to retrieve his clothing, leaving the open locker door on his right side, Covington approached his left side and Covington's friend, Brandon Jacobi South, stood behind Plaintiff. (Id.¶ 70.) Covington asked Plaintiff, “Who you calling a [racial epithet]?” and Plaintiff replied, “I don't know what you're talking about.” (Id.¶¶ 71-72.) At that point, Covington began repeatedly punching Plaintiff in the face and head as Plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to escape. (Id.¶¶ 73-74.) Finally, Plaintiff got up and pushed past Covington, who continued to beat him in the back of the head as Plaintiff ran to the door and out of the locker room. (Id.¶¶ 75-76.) No school employers were close enough to the locker room to hear the attack or the commotion or to see Plaintiff come into the hallway. (Id.¶ 78.)

Plaintiff then ran down the hallway to an office where Coaches Fritz, Coble, and White were located. (Id.¶ 79.) As Plaintiff's nose and mouth were bleeding profusely, a coach asked, “Dear God what has happened?” (Id.¶¶ 80—81.) Unable to speak because of the injuries he sustained in the attack, Plaintiff pointed towards the locker room in response. (Id.¶ 82.) Coach White rendered some medical aid to Plaintiff, stuffing gauze into his nose to help stop the bleeding. (Id.¶ 83.) Then, Coach White took Plaintiff to Principal Blanchard's office. (Id.)

C. Initial Response to the Assault

Coach White, who had taken Plaintiff to the principal's office, spoke with Blanchard about what had happened. (Id.¶ 85.) Then, Blanchard called Plaintiff's mother to notify her of what had happened. (Id.¶ 86.) However, he did not notify local law enforcement of the assault. (Id.¶ 89.)

Blanchard moved Plaintiff into his personal office area to wait for his mother, while Blanchard returned to the outer office area. (Id.¶ 88.) Plaintiff's mother arrived at approximately 3:30 p.m., entered

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the office, and briefly spoke with Blanchard. (Id.¶¶ 90-91.) At this point, Plaintiff was still bleeding from his nose and mouth. (Id.¶ 92.) His mother said she wanted charges filed against Covington for the assault and then she took Plaintiff out of the office. (Id.¶¶ 93-94.)

Plaintiff and his mother went to the nearest emergency room for treatment. (Id.¶ 94.) On the ride, Plaintiff used a sixteen-ounce cup to catch the blood from his nose and mouth. (Id.¶ 95.) It...