Davis v. Brown

• Decision Date: 02 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 100624.,100624.
• Citation: 851 N.E.2d 1198,221 Ill.2d 435
• Parties: Marvel DAVIS et al., Appellants, v. Kirk BROWN et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1198

851 N.E.2d 1198

221 Ill.2d 435

Marvel DAVIS et al., Appellants, v. Kirk BROWN et al., Appellees.

No. 100624.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 2, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Timothy P. Dwyer, St. Charles, for appellants.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Carl J. Elitz, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

Justice McMORROW delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Section 4-510 of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/4-510 (West 2004)) authorizes the Illinois Department of Transportation to prepare and record maps that "establish presently the approximate locations and widths of rights of way for future additions to the State highway system." Pursuant to this statute, the Department of Transportation prepared and recorded a map that set forth a right-of-way for a proposed highway, known as the Prairie Parkway, located in northern Illinois. Plaintiffs, over 40 landowners whose property falls within the right-of-way, filed an action for declaratory judgment, seeking to have section 4-510 declared unconstitutional. The circuit court of Kendall County dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, primarily on the basis that plaintiffs had not shown any injury and, therefore, lacked standing. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment that plaintiffs lacked standing, but rejected plaintiffs' constitutional arguments on the merits. 357 Ill.App.3d 176, 292 Ill.Dec. 979, 827 N.E.2d 508. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

On October 14, 2003, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint for declaratory relief in the circuit court of Kendall County. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged the following. In 1999, the defendants, the Illinois Department of Transportation and its then-director, Kirk Brown¹ (collectively, the Department), began feasibility studies for a proposed highway that would connect Interstate 80 with Interstate 88 in northern Illinois. The proposed highway, which was named the Prairie Parkway, would run north and south through portions of Kendall, Kane and Grundy Counties.

Under the enabling authority granted by section 4-510 of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/4-510 (West 2004)), the Department began preparing a map to establish a right-of-way for the Prairie Parkway. A public hearing was held on December 11, 2001, at which time testimony was heard regarding various proposed locations for the right-of-way. Sometime after the hearing, the Department selected a right-of-way and completed a final map. The map was filed with the relevant county authorities on July 31, 2002.

As required by section 4-510, the Department notified those landowners with property in the Prairie Parkway right-of-way, including plaintiffs, that the final map had been approved and filed. After receiving notice, plaintiffs commenced the present action.

Plaintiffs' second amended complaint challenges the constitutionality of section 4-510. In relevant part, section 4-510 provides:

"The Department may establish presently the approximate locations and widths of rights of way for future additions to the State highway system to inform the public and prevent costly and conflicting development of the land involved.

* * *

The Department shall make a survey and prepare a map showing the location and approximate widths of the rights of way needed for future additions to the highway system. The map shall show existing highways in the area involved and the property lines and owners of record of all land that will be needed for the future additions and all other pertinent information. Approval of the map with any changes resulting from the hearing shall be indicated in the record of the hearing and a notice of the approval and a copy of the map shall be filed in the office of the recorder for all counties in which the land needed for future additions is located.

Public notice of the approval and filing shall be given in newspapers of general circulation in all counties where the land is located and shall be served by registered mail within 60 days thereafter on all owners of record of the land needed for future additions.

* * *

After the map is filed and notice thereof given to the owners of record of the land needed for future additions, no one shall incur development costs or place improvements in, upon or under the land involved nor rebuild, alter or add to any existing structure without first giving 60 days notice by registered mail to the Department. This prohibition shall not apply to any normal or emergency repairs to existing structures. The Department shall have 45 days after receipt of that notice to inform the owner of the Department's intention to acquire the land involved; after which, it shall have the additional time of 120 days to acquire such land by purchase or to initiate action to acquire said land through the exercise of the right of eminent domain. When the right of way is acquired by the State no damages shall be allowed for any construction, alteration or addition in violation of this Section unless the Department has failed to acquire the land by purchase or has abandoned an eminent domain proceeding initiated pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph." 605 ILCS 5/4-510 (West 2004).

Plaintiffs' complaint is in three counts. Count I, though captioned "violation of due process," is more accurately read as alleging a takings clause violation. As the Department noted in its memorandum of law in response to plaintiffs' second amended complaint, "[u]nderlying/permeating Count I is the notion that the Defendants improperly used the sovereign's police powers, resulting in a regulatory taking." Specifically, plaintiffs allege in count I that under section 4-510, those landowners whose property falls within the right-of-way established by a map must give notice to the Department if they plan to develop their property; that once a landowner has so notified the Department, the Department has the option to commence eminent domain proceedings against the landowner; that this "option to take" has "no time constraints"; and that no compensation is provided to landowners under the statute for the creation of the "option to take." Two plaintiffs, Marvel Davis and Rojean Gum, further allege in the complaint that they would like to develop their property but have not done so for fear that if they give notice to the Department, as required by section 4-510, the Department will commence eminent domain proceedings against them.

In count II of their complaint, plaintiffs allege that section 4-510 violates separation of powers principles. Plaintiffs allege that under the state constitution, as interpreted by this court, a showing of necessity must be made before the power of eminent domain may be lawfully exercised. According to plaintiffs, section 4-510 negates this requirement, thus effectively changing "the judicial interpretation of the Illinois Constitution by way of legislative fiat" in violation of the separation of powers clause of the state constitution.

Finally, in count III, plaintiffs allege that section 4-510 violates principles of substantive due process. Plaintiffs contend that section 4-510 "is an attempt by the State to freeze property values in anticipation of possible, future land acquisitions" and, as such, is "an impermissible exercise of the State's police power."

After plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, the Department filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004)). The circuit court granted this motion, primarily on the ground that the plaintiffs had not yet been injured by section 4-510 and so had no standing to pursue their action for declaratory judgment. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment with respect to standing. The appellate court concluded that plaintiffs had sufficiently pled a threatened injury to their interests so as to meet the pleading requirements necessary to maintain an action for declaratory relief. Having reached this conclusion, the appellate court then accepted plaintiffs' invitation to reach the merits of their facial challenges to the constitutionality of section 4-510. Citing to Shortridge v. Sherman, 84 Ill.App.3d 981, 986, 40 Ill.Dec. 559, 406 N.E.2d 565 (1980), the appellate court noted that it had the authority to render any judgment that ought to have been made in the circuit court (see 155 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5)), and that plaintiffs' facial challenges to the validity of section 4-510 could be addressed on appeal because they presented pure questions of law. Effectively treating the case as if the parties had filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the appellate court rejected plaintiffs' arguments and upheld the facial validity of section 4-510. We subsequently granted plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

At the outset, we note that neither party to this appeal contests the appellate court's decision to reach the merits of plaintiffs' facial challenges to the constitutionality of section 4-510. Further, the Department concedes that both Marvel Davis and Rojean Gum, the two plaintiffs who allege that they have forgone developing their property because of a fear that the Department will begin eminent domain proceedings, have standing to contest the facial validity of section 4-510. Accordingly, the only matter at issue before this court is the appellate court's judgment that section 4-510 is facially constitutional.²

Statutes are presumed constitutional. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill.2d 341, 351, 240 Ill.Dec. 710, 718 N.E.2d 191 (1999). The party challenging the validity of a statute has the burden of rebutting this presumption and clearly establishing a constitutional violation. In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d 291, 296, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233 (200...