Davis v. Buchanan Cnty.
| Decision Date | 20 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-1834,20-1834 |
| Citation | 5 F.4th 907 |
| Parties | Brenda DAVIS; Frederick Stufflebean, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BUCHANAN COUNTY, MISSOURI, Defendant-Appellant. Harry Roberts; Dan Hausman; Ron Hook ; Mike Strong; Jody Hovey; Brian Gross; Natalie A. Bransfield; Dustin Nauman; Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc.; Catherine Van Voorn, MD; Ann Marie Slagle, LPN; Ryan Crews, Warden; Corizon Health, Inc., Dft. terminated on 5/7/2018. Dft added back on 9/4/2018, Amended Complaint, Doc. 78. ; Donna Euler, RN; April Powers, also known as April Griffin, also known as April Helsel ; Amy Mowry; Alice Bergman; Fredrick Covillo; Michelle Munger; Karen S. Williams, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Kenneth J. Berra, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, LLP, Overland Park, KS, argued (David A. Cadoret, David S. Baker, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, LLP, Overland Park, KS, on the brief), for defendant-appellant Buchanan County, Missouri.
William W. Bird, The Bird Law Firm, P.C., St. Joseph, MO, argued, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
Justin Stufflebean died after he allegedly was denied necessary medication while incarcerated. His parents brought this action against numerous defendants purportedly responsible for Stufflebean's medical care, including Buchanan County (the "County"). They alleged that the County was liable for, inter alia , wrongful death under Missouri law.
The County moved to dismiss this claim, arguing that it had sovereign immunity.1 See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600. The district court2 denied this motion, concluding that the County had waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance that covered the wrongful-death claim. See § 537.610(1). The County asked the district court to reconsider its decision, but the district court denied its request. The County appeals, and we have appellate jurisdiction over these interlocutory orders under the collateral-order doctrine. See Argonaut Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Audrain Cty. Joint Commc'ns , 781 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2015). For the following reasons, we affirm.
We "review de novo the district court's interpretation of state law." Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Dev., LLC , 526 F.3d 343, 348 (8th Cir. 2008).3 In interpreting Missouri law, "we are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri." Washington v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 747 F.3d 955, 957-58 (8th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, "the Supreme Court of Missouri has not addressed an issue, we must predict how the court would rule, and we follow decisions from the intermediate state courts when they are the best evidence of Missouri law." See id. at 958.
Generally, Missouri law immunizes political subdivisions from state-law tort claims. See Div. of Emp. Sec. v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs , 864 F.3d 974, 981 (8th Cir. 2017) ; § 537.600. But a political subdivision "may purchase liability insurance for tort claims, made against the state or the political subdivision," thereby waiving the entity's sovereign immunity for claims covered by such insurance. § 537.610(1).
Here, the County entered into an inmate-health-services contract with Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc. ("ACH"). In the contract, the County agreed to pay ACH approximately $300,000 per year. In exchange, ACH agreed to provide various services, including to "procure and maintain" various liability insurance policies and "to name ... the COUNTY as an additional insured." Accordingly, ACH obtained liability insurance from Arch Insurance Group and named the County as an additional insured. The County does not contest that this insurance covers the wrongful-death claim at issue here. Thus, this case presents a narrow question of statutory interpretation: Did the County's indirect acquisition of liability insurance constitute a "purchase" under section 537.610(1) ?
"The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent, which is most clearly evidenced by the plain text of the statute."
State ex rel. Goldsworthy v. Kanatzar , 543 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Mo. 2018). Here, the statute does not define the term "purchase," so we give the term its "plain and ordinary meaning as found in the dictionary." Sun Aviation, Inc. v. L-3 Commc'ns Avionics Sys., Inc. , 533 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Mo. 2017). "Purchase" means "to obtain (as merchandise) by paying money or its equivalent." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1844 (2002); see also Becker Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue , 749 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Mo. 1988) ().4 And that is what happened here—the County paid ACH approximately $300,000 per year and obtained, among other things, liability insurance.
True, it seems the County did not purchase liability insurance directly from an insurance provider. But the statute does not require that a public entity directly purchase liability insurance for tort claims. Nor does it require that a public entity purchase liability insurance for tort claims from an insurance provider . Rather, the statute states only that a public entity waives sovereign immunity if it "purchase[s] liability insurance for tort claims." § 537.610(1).
As the dissent notes, because section 537.610(1) is a provision waiving sovereign immunity, we must strictly construe it. Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm'n , 863 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1993). But while this principle may require us to put a thumb on the scale against waiver it does not permit us to rewrite the statute. See Peters v. Wady Indus., Inc. , 489 S.W.3d 784, 792 n.6 (Mo. 2016) (). Even though we give section 537.610(1) a strict construction, what the County did here "fall[s] fairly within [the] letter" of the statute as a "purchase." See Allcorn v. Tap Enters., Inc. , 277 S.W.3d 823, 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) ; cf. Schneider ex rel. Schneider v. State, Div. of Water Safety , 748 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Mo. 1988) ().
The Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision in Fugate v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc. , 347 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011), supports our reading. There, in a different statutory context, the court explained that "[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of ‘purchase’ is to obtain (as merchandise) by paying money or its equivalent: buy for a price." Id. at 86. It then held that the term "purchase" does not "require[ ] that the payment from the buyer to the [seller] be a direct payment." Id. So too here, the County's purchase, while perhaps indirect, is a purchase nonetheless.
Our conclusion also comports with the statute's purpose. See generally State v. Hobokin , 768 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Mo. 1989) (). The Missouri Supreme Court has explained that, in enacting section 537.610(1), "the legislature intended to balance the need for protection of governmental funds against a desire to allow redress for claimants injured." Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence Cty., Miller , 636 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Mo. 1982) ; see also Richardson , 863 S.W.2d at 880 (). This purpose is agnostic as to how an entity acquires insurance. What matters is that an entity acquires insurance. Further dispelling the notion that there is anything talismanic about how the entity obtains insurance is the fact that a public entity also waives sovereign immunity if it self-insures, which does not involve any purchase at all. See § 537.610(1) ; cf. id. § 537.705(1) ().
In arguing to the contrary, the County relies on the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision in Gregg v. City of Kansas City , 272 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). But, if anything, Gregg actually supports our reading of section 537.610(1). There, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful-death action against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners, alleging it negligently licensed an airport security officer. Gregg , 272 S.W.3d at 356, 362. Regulations required the security company that employed the officer to purchase liability insurance and name the Board as an additional insured. Id. at 362-63. Although it seems no such insurance was ever purchased, the plaintiffs argued that these regulations still amounted to a de facto waiver of the Board's sovereign immunity. Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding that the Board had not purchased insurance for two reasons:
Plaintiffs make no showing that the Board was instrumental in causing the regulations to be issued for the Board's protection such that the regulations can be said to constitute a waiver by the Board. And even if Plaintiffs had made such a showing, we could not ignore the undisputed fact that the Board in this instance did not require [a third party] to purchase liability insurance protecting the Board.
Id. (emphasis omitted). This language suggests that, had the Board caused another entity to purchase liability insurance on its behalf, that would have constituted a "purchase" waiving sovereign immunity under section 537.610(1). So too here.
In sum, section 537.610(1) ’s plain text, bolstered by the statute's purpose...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Brandon v. Bd. of Educ.
... ... Similarly, ... in Lukaszczyk v. Cook Cnty. , the Seventh Circuit ... reviewed three state and local vaccination policies. In a ... rights” and members of “suspect ... classifications.” Brandt v. Davis , 191 F.3d ... 887, 893 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Batra v. Bd. of Regents ... of the ... court would rule.” Davis v. Buchanan Cnty., ... Missouri , 5 F.4th 907, 909 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting ... Washington v ... ...
-
Torres v. City of St. Louis
...is not the immunity inherent to sovereigns that we usually discuss in the Eleventh Amendment context." Davis v. Buchanan Cnty. (Davis I ), 5 F.4th 907, 909 n.1 (8th Cir. 2021).10 We have reviewed appellees’ motion to supplement the record on appeal and the list of payments made by the PFPC ......