Davis v. Cargill Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 2:12-cv-704-MEF |
| Parties | CHARLIE DAVIS and JOYCE DAVIS, Plaintiffs, v. CARGILL INCORPORATED and RETAIL WHOLESALE DEPARTMENT STORE LOCAL 105, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
(WO — Do Not Publish)
This cause is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union Local 105 ("Local 105") and Defendant Cargill, Inc. ("Cargill") (collectively, "Defendants") pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. #11, 13). In their motions, both Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Charlie and Joyce Davis ("Plaintiffs" or the "Davises") have asserted state law claims that are preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and the federal duty of fair representation and, therefore, are due to be dismissed. In addition, Defendants argue that if Plaintiffs' claims are not due to be dismissed based solely on preemption, and are instead treated by the Court as § 301/duty of fair representation claims, they are due to be dismissed as untimely and because of Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Defendants' motions are well-taken and due to be GRANTED.
Plaintiff Charlie Davis ("Mr. Davis") was employed by Cargill loading trucks at its Animal Nutrition facility in Montgomery, Alabama. Mr. Davis was an active, dues-paying member of Local 105 (a union) during his employment with Cargill. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Joyce Davis ("Ms. Davis") was legally married to Mr. Davis.1
During Mr. Davis's employment with Cargill, Local 105 and Cargill entered into a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA"),2 the purpose of which was to set the wages, terms, and conditions of employment for all production and maintenance employees and truck drivers employed at Cargill's Montgomery facility. The CBA was effective betweenAugust 1, 2009, and July 31, 2011. Under the CBA, Local 105 is the exclusive bargaining representative for covered employees. However, Cargill was vested with the sole and exclusive right under the CBA to manage its business, direct its workforce, and maintain rules and regulations governing the operations of the Montgomery plant and the conduct of its employees. This meant that, subject to the specific terms of the CBA, Cargill had the exclusive right to manage the Montgomery plant and its business, including the right to suspend, discipline, or discharge an employee for "just cause"; to maintain quality and efficient operations; to terminate employees from duty for legitimate reasons; and to establish, change, or abolish policies, practices, procedures, regulations, and rules for conducting its business.
The CBA includes a grievance and arbitration procedure for the resolution of complaints made by any employee-member of Local 105 "who feels aggrieved." (Doc. #13-1.) The grievance and arbitration procedure is the "exclusive forum" for a covered employee. (Doc. #13-1.) Further, in signing the CBA, Local 105 waived, on behalf of all covered employees, "all state law claims and rights, relating to or arising out of discharge from employment, including claims which are not preempted by federal law or which are independent of the collective bargaining agreement." (Doc. #13-1.)
On March 17, 2010, Mr. Davis was asked to work overtime by his supervisor. Mr. Davis went to the warehouse office to pick up the paperwork to begin loading trucks. Until he received this paperwork, Mr. Davis did not have any knowledge of which truck he would be assigned to load, what product he would be loading, or which driver would be picking upthe load.
Mr. Davis was unable to completely load his assigned truck with all of the product listed on his paperwork because some of the product was not yet available for loading. Mr. Davis recorded the shortages on the "board" in accordance with company procedure and left for the day. Plaintiffs allege that, after Mr. Davis left, unknown Cargill employees placed additional products onto the same truck that Mr. Davis had already partially loaded.
Some time after Mr. Davis left work on March 17, 2010, he met with Willie Barber to show him a motor that was available for sale. Mr. Davis alleges that, at an unspecified date and time, Cargill filed an affidavit and had him taken into custody by the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department. (Doc. #1-2, ¶ 11, Count IV, ¶ 4.) Mr. Davis further alleges that, at an unspecified date and time, Cargill "signed a warrant alleging that [Mr. Davis] had stolen product from the defendant's place of business earlier that day by loading extra product on the truck driven by Willie Barber." (Doc. #1-2, ¶ 12, Count IV, ¶ 3.) Mr. Davis was subsequently indicted for Theft of Property 2nd degree in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. On April 9, 2011, Mr. Davis was found not guilty and acquitted of that charge.
Plaintiffs never allege in the Amended Complaint that Mr. Davis attempted to or actually submitted a grievance through Local 105 following these events. Nor do Plaintiffs specifically allege that Mr. Davis was terminated from his employment with Cargill following these events. Plaintiffs only allege that they are seeking damages in the form of "lost wages." (Doc. #1-2, Count IV, ¶ 7, Count V, ¶ 7.) Finally, Plaintiffs do not allege inthe Amended Complaint that Local 105's conduct was discriminatory, arbitrary, or done in bad faith.
On July 12, 2012, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint against Cargill and Local 105 in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama.3 (Doc. #1-2.) In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims against both Cargill and Local 105 for negligence (Count I), wantonness (Count II), loss of consortium (Count III), and breach of contract (Count VI). Plaintiffs also assert claims of malicious prosecution (Count IV) and defamation (Count V) against Cargill. (Doc. #1-2.) On August 15, 2012, Defendants timely removed Plaintiffs' state court action to this Court4 on the grounds that removal was "proper because all of Plaintiffs' claims are completely preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act . . ., 29 U.S.C. § 185, which governs claims based on rights created by collective bargaining agreements and claims that are substantially dependent on the analysis of such agreements." (Doc. #1.) A copy of the CBA was filed with Defendants' removalpapers. (Doc. #1-4.) Plaintiffs never moved for remand or otherwise objected to Defendants' notice of removal or this Court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendants have now filed separate Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss based on § 301/duty of fair representation preemption as well as untimeliness and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims in their entirety. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants' motions but not on preemption grounds. Indeed, Plaintiffs only briefly discuss preemption in their opposition and, for all practical purposes, concede that their claims are preempted by federal law. Plaintiffs also do not address the alleged untimeliness of their claims or otherwise make any arguments as to why their claims, as currently plead, should survive Rule 12(b)(6). Rather, Plaintiffs rely on the exhaustion doctrine, arguing that, as a matter of law and policy, they were not required to, or they should be excused from, having to comply with administrative prerequisites. (Doc. #18.) The Court will address these arguments below.
In assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true and construe them in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., 640 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2011). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred."Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment CSX Transp. N. Lines v. CSX Transp., Inc., 522 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2008).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but must include enough facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In addition to considering the properly pleaded allegations in a complaint, a court may also consider on a motion to dismiss any exhibits attached to the complaint, see Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005), as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
Section 301 of the LMRA permits suits in federal court for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). "This section grants jurisdiction to federal courts to adjudicate employment disputes involving collective bargaining agreements, and it embodies the policy that federal law, fashioned from national labor law, should provide the substantive law that applies in § 301(a) suits." Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2...
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