Davis v. Central Utah Counseling Center
Decision Date | 12 September 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 20040544.,20040544. |
Citation | 147 P.3d 390,2006 UT 52 |
Parties | Robert L. DAVIS and Jenean Brothers, each on their own behalf and also as the natural parents, and Robert L. Davis, as personal representative of the Estate of Bryan R. Davis, deceased, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CENTRAL UTAH COUNSELING CENTER, Dr. Robert Jeppson, D.O., State of Utah, Juab County, Clark Holladay, David Dye, John Reeves, and John Doe Health Care Providers 1-10, Defendants and Appellees. |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Jeffrey N. Aldous, Arthur Dupre, Provo, Bruce M. Pritchett, Jr., Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Clifford C. Ross, Salt Lake City, for Counseling Center and individuals.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Debra J. Moore, Asst. Att'ys Gen., for the State.
Jared W. Eldridge, Nephi, for Juab County.
¶ 1 Plaintiffs Robert Davis and Jenean Brothers seek recourse for the tragic death of their son Bryan Davis, who committed suicide while under the care of Central Utah Counseling Center ("CUCC"). Plaintiffs filed suit against CUCC, identified and unidentified employees of CUCC, the State of Utah, and Juab County. The district court dismissed the State of Utah and Juab County because of plaintiffs' failure to state a cognizable claim against them. It thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of CUCC and its employees because of plaintiffs' noncompliance with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.1 Plaintiffs appeal both orders. We affirm.
¶ 2 Nineteen-year-old Bryan Davis committed suicide on November 23, 1998, while undergoing treatment at CUCC in Nephi, Utah. Plaintiffs retained attorney Bruce Pritchett to pursue claims against CUCC.
¶ 3 Utah's Governmental Immunity Act ("Immunity Act") provides that actions against a governmental entity and its employees may proceed only if a notice of claim is directed and delivered to specified persons within one year after the claim arises. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -13 (1998). On December 23, 1998, Pritchett visited CUCC's office and inspected Davis' medical records. During this visit, Pritchett spoke with a man "who apparently had authority over the office." Uncertain about CUCC's legal identity, Pritchett asked this unidentified employee whether CUCC was "part of the state's mental health system for this area." The employee answered affirmatively.
¶ 4 Eleven months later, on November 22, 1999, Pritchett called the Division of Mental Health of the Utah State Department of Human Services and received confirmation from an unidentified employee that CUCC was part of that Department. Pritchett then telephoned the Utah State Attorney General's office and spoke with Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham. After Pritchett told Stringham that CUCC was a state agency, Stringham instructed him to direct the notice of a claim against CUCC to the State Attorney General's office. Pritchett then visited the website for the Department of Human Services, which listed CUCC among its "Mental Health offices."
¶ 5 That same day, Pritchett finalized and directed a notice to the State Attorney General's office and, "as an additional precaution," to the Juab County Clerk. Pritchett did not direct a notice to CUCC. Sometime after the one-year limitations period had expired, one of the Juab County Commissioners provided a copy of the notice to CUCC's governing board.
¶ 6 In December 2000, CUCC filed a declaratory judgment action in Juab County, seeking a determination that it was entitled to the protections of the Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -34 (1998). CUCC claimed that it had been formed by an agreement executed on December 31, 1990, by Juab, Millard, Piute, Sanpete, Sevier, and Wayne Counties. According to CUCC, the six counties acted pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-13-1 to -36 (1990), and formed CUCC as an interlocal agency with the intention that CUCC would provide mental health services to the counties' residents. CUCC was originally named Central Utah Mental Health Alcohol and Drug Center. In 1993, the name of the agency was changed to Central Utah Mental Health Substance Abuse Center. The agency's name was changed one final time to Central Utah Counseling Center in 1994.
¶ 7 Because of its status as an interlocal agency, CUCC argued that it was entitled to the protections of the Immunity Act. Under the Immunity Act, interlocal agencies are given protection as "political subdivisions." See Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-5.5 (1989) (). The Immunity Act provides that an action against a political subdivision may proceed only if a notice of claim is directed and delivered to "a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary" within one year after the claim arises. Id. §§ 63-30-11, -13.
¶ 8 Plaintiffs responded to CUCC's commencement of the declaratory judgment action by filing a medical malpractice claim against CUCC, employees of CUCC, the State, and Juab County. Plaintiffs later amended the complaint to include a cause of action for wrongful death. The district court dismissed the State and Juab County for failure to state a claim, granted plaintiffs' motion for a change of venue from Tooele County to Juab County, and consolidated the two cases.
¶ 9 After the consolidation of the cases, CUCC moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Immunity Act. The district court denied the motion. The district court also denied CUCC's subsequent partial summary judgment motion, finding that there was insufficient evidence that CUCC was a governmental entity. After discovery, CUCC renewed its motion for summary judgment, which the district court then granted. On the basis of the undisputed facts, the district court determined that CUCC was in fact a governmental entity and that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the notice requirement of the Immunity Act. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied.
¶ 10 Plaintiffs timely appealed the summary judgment order, as well as the district court's earlier dismissal of the State and Juab County, but failed to serve either the State or Juab County with its notice of appeal. Plaintiffs did, however, later serve a copy of their appellate brief on the State and Juab County. We initially transferred this case to the court of appeals but subsequently vacated the transfer order and recalled the case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j) (2000).
¶ 11 Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order dismissing their claims against the State and Juab County, as well as the summary judgment entered in favor of CUCC and its employees. We first review and affirm the dismissal of the State and Juab County. We then evaluate the summary judgment order and affirm the district court's determination that CUCC was entitled to summary judgment because it is a properly formed interlocal agency entitled to the protections of the Immunity Act and plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with its notice requirements.
¶ 12 The State and Juab County contend that we lack jurisdiction over plaintiffs' appeal of their dismissal because plaintiffs failed to serve them with a copy of their notice of appeal. We disagree, concluding that plaintiffs' failure to serve the State and Juab County with copies of their notice of appeal was not jurisdictionally fatal.
¶ 13 Notices of appeal are governed by rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appealing party must file a notice of appeal with the trial court and serve a copy of the notice on "counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order" from which the appeal is taken. Utah R.App. P. 3(a), (e). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the act that vests the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, in cases where an appellant timely files notice but fails in some other respect to comply with rule 3, the appellate court may dismiss the appeal but is not required to do so. Subsection (a) of the rule provides:
Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
Id. 3(a).
¶ 14 We have applied rule 3(a) to hold that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional requirement for appellate review. See, e.g., Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ¶ 19, 17 P.3d 1110 (). Even where an appellant files a notice "crippled with defects" and fails to effectively serve the opposing party, the notice is jurisdictionally sufficient if it complies with the timeliness requirement. Harley Davidson of N. Utah v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005 UT 38, ¶ 16, 116 P.3d 349.
¶ 15 In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiffs fulfilled this jurisdictional requirement by filing a timely notice of appeal. Therefore, while we have discretion to dismiss the appeal due to plaintiffs' failure to serve the notice on the State and Juab County, we are not required to do so. And we are disinclined to do so here where there is no evidence that plaintiffs' failure to serve the notice resulted in any actual prejudice to either the State or Juab County. Indeed, both the State and Juab County received...
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