Davis v. Chicago Edison Co.

• Citation: 195 Ill. 31,62 N.E. 829
• Parties: DAVIS v. CHICAGO EDISON CO.
• Decision Date: 21 February 1902
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

195 Ill. 31

62 N.E. 829

DAVIS

v.CHICAGO EDISON CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1902.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by James Davis against the Chicago Edison Company. From a judgment of the appellate court (93 Ill. App. 284) reversing a judgment of the trial court in favor of plaintiff, he appeals. Affirmed.

Gann & Peaks and Crews & Crews, for appellant.

A. B. Melville and Frank J. Canty, for appellee.

RICKS, J.

This is an appeal from the appellate court for the First district, reversing, without remanding, a judgment obtained by appellant upon a trial before a jury in the circuit court of Cook county for personal injury. Appellant was employed by appellee in dismantling and tearing out a battery of boilers and other machinery in one of its buildings in Chicago, and while so at work fell and received serious injuries. Appellant's declaration contained but one count, and, in substance, charged that in course of and as a part of his employment he was directed by appellee's foreman to help certain other employés of appellee carry and transport large iron boiler plates from one place in said building to another place therein, which he accordingly did, and in the course thereof had necessarily to pass over and across a certain walk or platform there, which platform was unsafe and improper for use, in that the same was narrow and scarcely wide enough for appellant to walk upon, and was open upon one of its sides, so that there was nothing to prevent the plaintiff from walking or falling off the said platform and falling down to the ground below, a distance of 10 feet. He further avers that it was so dark that he was unable to see the danger to himself in walking across the said platform; that he had no warning or knowledge of any kind, or any means of knowing, of his own knowledge, of the danger to him in walking across said platform, but that the appellee knew, or ought to have known, of said danger, and ought to have so constructed said platform, and so guarded and protected the side thereof, that appellant would not have been subject to the danger in the performance of said work; that appellee, not regarding its duty in that behalf, so negligently constructed and maintained the said platform and the premises aforesaid that, by and through its negligence and carelessness in that behalf, appellant, while passing over and across said platform in the performance of his duties, in ignorance of said danger, and with due care and caution for his own safety, necessarily and unavoidably slipped and fell off the said platform down to and upon the ground, and was injured, etc. The general issue was pleaded, and a verdict for $3,500 was obtained. Appellee prosecuted an appeal, and the appellate court made the following finding of facts, which was incorporated in its judgment: ‘The court finds that appellee was injured in the prosecution of the work upon which he was employed, by a danger of which he was aware, incident to the nature of his employment, and constituting an ordinary and obvious peril of such occupation, which he assumed in accepting the employment, and that such injury was not caused by any negligence of appellant.’ Appellant prosecuted this appeal from that judgment, and here insists that the finding of facts above is not of such a character as to preclude this court from going into the record far enough to find out whether or not there is evidence tending to support the verdict, and further insists that if, upon such investigation of the record, such a case is not disclosed as would have warranted the circuit court in directing a verdict for the defendant, then the appellate court erred in reversing it. He further contends that, if that position is not tenable, it is at least the duty of this court to remand this cause, with directions to the appellate court that it recite in its judgment material, ultimate facts as found by it, from the evidence, upon the issues submitted to and tried by the circuit court, and cites Hawk v. Railroad Co., 138 Ill. 37, 27 N. E. 450, in support of his first contention, and Pease v. Ditto, 185 Ill. 317, 56 N. E. 1072, in support of his second.

The appellate court derived its authority to enter the judgment in question from section 87 of the practice act. That section, and the powers of the appellate court under it, have so frequently been before this court for consideration that it seems hardly necessary to again enter into a discussion of them. Borg v. Railway Co., 162 Ill. 348, 44 N. E. 722;Hawk v. Railroad Co., 147 Ill. 399, 35 N. E. 139. The above cases, and those cited in them, in all of which the questionshere made have received extensive consideration, have settled the practice and determined the question of the extent of the powers of review of this court. In the Borg Case, supra,...