Davis v. City of Charlottesville Sch. Bd.

• Decision Date: 07 May 2012
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-cv-00026
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
• Parties: SHEILA DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL., Defendants.

SHEILA DAVIS, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-cv-00026

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA CHARLOTTESVILLE DIVISION

Dated: May 7, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORMAN K. MOON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Charlottesville School Board (the "School Board" or "CSB") alleging, inter alia, that Plaintiff's rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., were violated when a co-worker, Warren Mawyer, assaulted her and the School Board allegedly failed to prevent Mawyer's conduct or to respond in a manner that Plaintiff found appropriate. I granted CSB's and Mawyer's motions to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff's allegations failed to state a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII against the School Board, and I declined, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against both defendants.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the following: a "Motion to File Amended Complaint" (docket no. 28); a "Motion to Seal Amended Complaint" (docket no. 30); and a "Rule 59 Motion to Amend"¹ (docket no. 32). My review of the motions and the proposed amended complaint does not dissuade me from my finding that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title VII. Accordingly, I will deny the motions.

I.

A.

A district court may not grant a post-judgment motion to amend the complaint unless the court first vacates its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Katyle v. Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2011).

To determine whether vacatur is warranted, however, the court need not concern itself with either of those rules' legal standards. The court need only ask whether the amendment should be granted, just as it would on a prejudgment motion to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In other words, a court should evaluate a postjudgment motion to amend the complaint "under the same legal standard as a similar motion filed before judgment was entered—for prejudice, bad faith, or futility." Laber, 438 F.3d at 427; accord Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). Futility is apparent if the proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim under the applicable rules and accompanying standards: "[A] district court may deny leave if amending the complaint would be futile—that is, if the proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of the federal rules." United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Katyle, 637 F.3d at 471.

Futility is the crucial factor here. I dismissed the complaint because Plaintiff's Title VII allegations regarding her co-worker's actions did not recount conduct so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of her employment and created an abusive work environment, and the allegations established that the co-worker's actions were not imputable to her employer. For the same reasons stated in my pervious memorandum opinion, Plaintiff's additional factual allegations do not state a claim against CSB that Plaintiff suffered sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, and to permit the amendment would be an exercise in futility. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (a court properly may refuse to allow leave to amend pleadings when the proposed changes would be futile).My memorandum opinion regarding the motion to dismiss summarized Plaintiff's factual allegations as follows:

Plaintiff is a woman who "was and is an employee of CSB." Mawyer is a man who "was an employee of CSB" on the relevant dates.

On Friday, December 11, 2009, when Plaintiff and Mawyer were both working at Jackson-Via Elementary School, "Mawyer approached [Plaintiff] in the cafeteria and made an abrupt, highly inappropriate but fortunately unsuccessful grab for her breasts with his hands." Plaintiff "was frightened by the physical moves against her, believing that she was about to suffer an outrageous battery." Mawyer "then demanded to know whether [Plaintiff's] breasts are 'real' or not." Plaintiff "responded very negatively" and,

[r]ight after Mr. Mawyer's attempt to grab [Plaintiff's] breasts ended, the assistant principal of the school, Tracy Daniels, walked in. [Plaintiff] told Dr. Daniels what had just happened. Dr. Daniels did not indicate that she was going to do anything about it. And, to the best of [Plaintiff's] knowledge, Dr. Daniels did not do anything about it.

On the following Monday, December 14, 2009, in the cafeteria, "Mr. Mawyer apparently slipped over to [Plaintiff], and while facing [Plaintiff], he abruptly reached out with his left arm and squeezed her right breast." Mawyer grabbed Plaintiff's breast "against her will." Mayer's actions "frightened her immensely," and Plaintiff "believed that she was the potential victim of a coming rape. . . ." Plaintiff struck Mr. Mayer out of "shock, and to stop the sexual attack and in her mind to prevent a potential rape. . . ."

Plaintiff reported the incident to Dr. Daniels, and "explicitly referred to the earlier incident that she had told Dr. Daniels about on Friday." Plaintiff states her belief that "Dr. Daniels involved the school principal, ElizaBeth McCay," but that "CSB did not react immediately by getting rid of Mr. Mawyer," but instead "transferred him to Charlottesville High School."

Plaintiff "swore out a warrant against Mr. Mayer," the "Commonwealth's Attorney prosecuted the case, and Mr. Mawyer eventually [pleaded] guilty to the assault and battery. . . ." Mawyer "has been ordered to stay away from" Plaintiff.[]

Plaintiff "complained to the superintendent, Dr. Rosa Atkins, about the decision to keep this man employed, especially near high school girls who could be his victims." Plaintiff adds that she "has discovered since this time that CSB knew or should have known of Mr. Mawyer's inappropriate behaviors with other females before" he assaulted Plaintiff, and that CSB "failed to take appropriate action and enabled him to be in a situation to victimize her."

Count I, against CSB, asserts that Plaintiff "suffered sexual harassment in violation of Title VII." Counts II, III, IV, and V assert against both defendants the torts of battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, adding that "CSB is vicariously and strictly liable pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior for Mr. Mawyer's torts." Count VI asserts "negligent retention" against CSB.

(Footnote omitted.)

The additional facts alleged in the proposed amended complaint are as follows:

• Paragraph 14 alleges that CSB violated its own harassment policy, as set forth in the Charlottesville City Schools Employee Handbook, when CSB failed "to immediately react and investigate" the initial encounter between Plaintiff and her co-worker on Friday, December 11, 2009, and waited until the following Monday, December 14, 2009, after further conduct had occurred.

• Paragraph 18 compares the sizes of Plaintiff and Mawyer, who "is a much larger person than" she is.

• Paragraph 22 adds that, when Plaintiff complained to the school superintendent about the decision to transfer Mawyer to another school, rather than terminate his employment, she did so "bitterly."

• Paragraph 24 alleges that, "[w]ell before Mr. Mawyer's attacks" on Plaintiff, Mawyer's supervisor at CSB had been told by one teacher that "Mawyer was lewdly and brazenly staring at her breasts," that this teacher did not want "Mawyer to come into her room any longer" because she thought he stared at her breasts, and that, for unspecified reasons, "multiple female teachers" had told Mawyer's supervisor that they did not want Mawyer to enter their rooms.

• Paragraph 25 asserts that Plaintiff's "anticipates" obtaining expert testimony in support of her further assertion that "CSB's response to [Plaintiff's] complaints and earlier complaints violated the basic standards of human resource management."

• Paragraphs 26 and 27 allege that CSB's harassment policy violated Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "enforcement guidance on the content of sexual harassment policies." Plaintiff asserts that CSB's policy fails to "contain a 'clear explanation of prohibited conduct,'" and that the policy does not "contain 'assurance that the employer will protect the confidentiality of harassment complaints to the extent possible.'" Plaintiff alleges that "[t]his failure . . . reflects a serious disregard for Title VII and the proper deterrence and handling of sexual harassment," and that this "disregard is further reflected by CSB's terrible lack of response to [Plaintiff's] and other complaints aboutMr. Mawyer, which ultimately enabled Mr. Mawyer to sexually harass, assault and batter" Plaintiff.

• Paragraphs 28 and 29 assert that, although the incident on Monday, December 14, 2009, led to Mawyer being "(belatedly) fired and convicted" of a misdemeanor assault charge, "the principal of the school astonishingly allowed Mr. Mawyer in the building over the summer to work as an independent contractor." Although Plaintiff does not allege that Mawyer had any contact with her during this time, when the school was closed and she apparently was not present, she asserts that "[a]llowing a criminal and sexual harasser in the building . . . reflects a serious disregard for Title VII and the proper deterrence and handling of sexual harassment." She adds that "CSB knew of Mr. Mawyer's harassment and should have known he would have continued to harass. It failed miserably to take appropriate action."

• Paragraph 31 is redacted, and is the subject of the motion to seal, which I will deny, as explained elsewhere in this opinion. Suffice it to say that ¶ 31 raises personal

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