Davis v. City of Aurora
| Decision Date | 14 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 08-cv-002107-PAB-MJW |
| Parties | JOHN DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF AURORA, a Home Rule Municipality, by and through its governing body the City Council, DANIEL J. OATES, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police, ED TAUER, individually and in his official capacity as Mayor, DANIEL BYRD, individually, ERIC BUGGE, individually, JEREMY SEXTON, individually, GENNIFER WOLF, individually, JILL BILL, individually, MICHAEL WOODYARD, individually, and DONALD AINSWORTH, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This case involves the alleged unlawful detention of plaintiff John Davis by Aurora Police Department officers in response to a burglary report from defendant Donald Ainsworth. The matter is before the Court on defendant Donald Ainsworth's motion to dismiss [Docket No.115] plaintiff's second amended complaint [Docket No. 111]. The Court's subject-matter jurisdiction is founded upon the existence of federal questions, as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Court's supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
A more complete recounting of the facts which prompted this case can be found in the Court's March 31, 2010 order addressing Mr. Davis' claims against the Aurora Police Department defendants. See Docket No. 85 at 2-5. For purposes of the present motion, the following relevant facts are alleged in plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint [Docket No. 111]:
Plaintiff John Davis is a black male in his fifties who resides in Aurora, Colorado. Just before noon on October 2, 2006, Mr. Davis, who is a licensed real estate broker associate, previewed a house located at 3697 South Cathay Circle in Aurora for a potential showing to clients. Mr. Davis is a resident of this neighborhood. Most of his neighbors are white.
The house at 3697 South Cathay Circle was publicly listed for sale; it had a "for sale" sign prominently displayed in the front yard, there was a lockbox containing a key so prospective agents and buyers could access the home, and the owners had vacated the premises, leaving only "staging" furniture. Prior to arriving at the South Cathay Circle property on October 2, 2006, Mr. Davis contacted the listing real estate broker and obtained permission to enter the home and the lockbox code which allowed him to access the keys to unlock the doors. Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:50 a.m., dressed in what he describes as "casual-professional dress" - "a sports shirt and casual pants" -plaintiff left his home and walked approximately one block to the house at 3697 South Cathay Circle. As Mr. Davis approached the house, he did not have any tools in hispossession that might suggest a burglary. Mr. Davis entered the code into the lockbox, retrieved the key, unlocked the front door, and entered the home. Plaintiff estimates that he spent five to ten minutes previewing the house and making mental notes to himself about the property.
While Mr. Davis was inside the home, defendant Ainsworth, who apparently resides across the street from the property Mr. Davis was previewing, called the Aurora Police Department to report that a black male was burglarizing the house at 3697 South Cathay Circle. Mr. Davis alleges that Mr. Ainsworth has not called the police on white real estate agents and that his false report regarding Mr. Davis was motivated by racial bias and Mr. Ainsworth's desire to keep black individuals from purchasing the house. Upon leaving the house, Mr. Davis was detained and questioned at gunpoint by Aurora police officers.
Mr. Davis filed his complaint in this action on September 30, 2008, which he later amended on December 12, 2008 and amended again August 24, 2010. The second amended complaint asserts seven claims and names ten defendants: the City of Aurora, Daniel J. Oates, Ed Tauer, Daniel Byrd, Eric Bugge, Jeremy Sexton, Gennifer Wolf, Jill Bill, Michael Woodyard, and Donald Ainsworth. Plaintiff's fifth claim for relief alleges that defendant Ainsworth intentionally made a false report to the police that plaintiff was burglarizing a home in order to dissuade black persons from purchasing or living at that location, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. His sixth claim alleges that Mr. Ainsworth's actions amount to the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distressby Mr. Ainsworth. Mr. Davis' seventh claim asserts that Mr. Ainsworth's actions are actionable under a claim for outrageous conduct.
On September 10, 2010, Mr. Ainsworth filed a motion to dismiss all three of the claims Mr. Davis asserts against him. Mr. Ainsworth first argues that Mr. Davis has failed to state a claim under § 1982 and that, as a result, dismissal is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mr. Ainsworth's motion raises a narrow legal issue, claiming that § 1982 is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Mr. Ainsworth also appears to question the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction by claiming that Mr. Davis lacks standing to assert a § 1982 claim. Finally, Mr. Ainsworth argues that the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over and dismiss Mr. Davis' two state-law claims.
Mr. Ainsworth's motion to dismiss purports to be a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); however, it was filed after Mr. Ainsworth answered the complaint. See Docket No. 113. Despite this timing, Mr. Ainsworth has not waived his argument that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1982, nor has he waived his argument that plaintiff does not have standing to bring a § 1982 claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) - (3) (). Thus, Mr. Ainsworth's motion is more appropriately treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Lowe v. Town of Fairland, Okla., 143 F.3d 1378, 1381 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998) (). Nonetheless, this distinction has little relevance here, as the same standard applies to a Rule 12(c) motion seeking dismissal for failure to state a claim as would apply if it were a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002).
Mr. Ainsworth argues that Mr. Davis lacks standing to bring a § 1982 claim and, as a result, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. His motion, however, seeks dismissal under Rule 12(6)(6) for failure to state a claim rather than Rule 12(b)(1), the typical method of challenging the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. The distinction between the rules often does not matter because the manner in which a party challenges the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction and even the fact of such a challenge are inconsequential. See City of Colorado Springs v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 587 F.3d 1071, 1078-79 (10th Cir. 2009) . Here, the interplay between Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) becomes somewhat more significant because, where subject-matter jurisdiction is closely intertwined with the substantive claims, the case is best resolved on the merits. See Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). "When subject-matter jurisdiction is dependent upon the same statute which provides the substantive claim in the case, the jurisdictional claim and the merits are considered to be intertwined." Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir. 1987). Mr.Ainsworth's motion argues that Mr. Davis lacks standing to bring a § 1982 claim because Mr. Davis has not identified an interest in real or personal property which he was inheriting, purchasing, leasing, selling, holding, or conveying, as required by the statute. Therefore, because Mr. Ainsworth's argument depends on an interpretation of § 1982, the question is best addressed on the merits. To the extent that Mr. Davis attempts to raise the interests of third parties, that is, his real estate clients, questions of standing are still implicated and will be addressed below.
Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to state a claim, it must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). Rule 8(a)'s "short and plain statement" mandate requires that a plaintiff allege enough factual matter that, taken as true, makes his "claim to relief . . . plausible on its face." Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
"The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's Complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003). In doing so, the Court "must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210,1215 (10th Cir. 2007). At the same time, however, a court need not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint. Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
Generally, "[s]pecific facts...
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