Davis v. City of Fultondale, Case No.: 2:13-CV-1070-RDP

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Decision Date: 04 August 2015
• Docket Number: Case No.: 2:13-CV-1070-RDP
• Citation: Davis v. City of Fultondale, Case No.: 2:13-CV-1070-RDP (N.D. Ala. Aug 04, 2015)
• Parties: STEVEN DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FULTONDALE, et al., Defendants.

STEVEN DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FULTONDALE, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 2:13-CV-1070-RDP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

August 4, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on Defendant Belinda Cox's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 93). The Motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 94, 96 and 97).

Plaintiff asserts a deliberate indifference to serious medical need claim against Defendant Belinda Cox pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law negligence and wantonness claims based on the same events. (Doc. # 79).

I. Relevant Background and Facts¹

On September 15, 2012, Defendant Cox was working as dispatcher for the Fultondale Police Department. (Doc. # 79 at ¶ 9). Just after midnight on that date, Fultondale policeofficers Jim Henderson and David Hale arrested Plaintiff for public intoxication. (Doc. # 79 ¶¶ 11-12; Doc. # 81-3 p. 21). Plaintiff was brought to the booking room/holding cell area of the Fultondale Jail at approximately 12:24 a.m. (Doc. #81-5). Officers Henderson and Hale testified that they believed that Plaintiff was intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics. (Doc. # 81-2 at 22, 28-29; Doc. # 81-3 p. 22).

Officer Hale tased Plaintiff at 12:26 a.m. (Doc. #81-5). Although Cox did not see Henderson tase Plaintiff, she testified that she heard him hit the floor. (Doc. # 95-2 p. 33). At 12:27 a.m., Cox looked into the holding cell. She saw Officer Hale still holding the taser and Plaintiff lying on the floor with the wires still in his chest. (Doc. # 95-2 p. 34; Doc. #81-5). Cox left the cell and, within approximately a minute, called for Fultondale Fire & Rescue to come to the jail to attend to someone who had been tased. (Doc. # 95-1 p. 2). After Plaintiff was tased, Officer Hale observed that he was breathing, and left the cell. (Doc. # 81-3).

Officers Henderson and Hale, along with Reserve Officer Randall Posey, remained in the booking room/holding cell area until 12:30 a.m. (Doc. #81-5). When the officers exited the booking room, Cox informed the officers that she had called the fire department paramedics to come to the jail. (Doc. # 95-2 at pp. 45-46). Cox heard someone comment that Plaintiff was snoring. (Doc. # 95-2 p. 46; Doc. # 84-2 p. 30-31). Officer Posey testified that he could hear Plaintiff snoring. (Doc. # 84-2 p. 30-31).

At 12:33 a.m., the paramedics, Fultondale Fire Department Rescue 71, radioed Cox to report that they were in route to the jail. (Doc. # 95-3).

Cox's view of the holding cell from her monitor in the dispatch office showed only Plaintiff's legs and feet. (Doc. # 95-2 p. 48; Doc. #81-5). As Cox waited for the paramedics toarrive, she occasionally glanced at the monitor. Cox testified that Plaintiff appeared to be asleep, which was consistent with what she had heard from one of the officers. (Doc. # 95-2 p. 47, 60). In Cox's experience, it was not unusual for an inmate to sleep on the floor. (Doc. # 95-2 p. 61).

Cox did not enter the holding cell to physically check Plaintiff's pulse, nor did she examine whether he was breathing. (Doc. # 95-2 p. 49). Cox was able to listen to and to communicate with detainees in the holding cells through an intercom. (Dox. # 95-2 p.31). If she was unable to rouse a detainee by her voice, she could call an officer to go into the cell to check the detainee. (Doc. # 95-2 p.32). Cox made no attempt to use the intercom to determine whether Plaintiff was breathing or snoring, nor did she attempt to rouse him. (Doc. # 95-2 pp.46, 49, 60, 63- 64, 69-70, 75-76).

At approximately 12:35 a.m. the paramedics reported to Cox that they were at the jail, and they arrived inside the booking room/holding cell area at about 12:37 a.m. (Doc. # 95-3). At approximately 12:38 a.m., Cox left the booking room to call an ambulance.² (Doc. #81-5).

As a dispatcher, Cox did not go through peace officer certification or training. (Doc. # 95-2 p. 28). Cox had received no training or education on the use of a taser and had never seen a taser deployed. (Doc. # 95-2 pp. 28-29). Cox was not aware of how a person generally reactsafter being tased. (Doc. # 95-2 pp. 77-78). Cox had never been told that if someone who had been tased did not move for an extended period of time, she was required to check on them, (Doc. # 95-2 p. 53), nor did she have any familiarity with tasers prior to this incident. (Doc. # 95-2 p. 61).

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, the Rule requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -- designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may begranted. See id. 249.

When faced with a "properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the non-moving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations." Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. teaches, Rule 56(c) "does not allow the plaintiff to simply rest on his allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof of trial, he must come forward with at least some evidence to support each element essential to his case at trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. "Mere allegations" made by plaintiffs are insufficient. Id.

Summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. "Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative." Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp.2d 1257, 1262 (D.Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250-51).

"[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Essentially, the inquiry is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Sawyer, 243 F. Supp.2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also LaRoche v. Denny's, Inc., 62 F. Supp.2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("The law is clear ... that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment.").

III. Discussion

Plaintiff has sued Cox under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges that she was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. He also asserts state law negligence and wantonness claims. (Doc. # 79). Obviously, Cox is not the only defendant sued in this case; Plaintiff has also sued the City of Fultondale and the officers involved in the events leading up to (and including) his tasing—Henderson and Hale. The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that each individual defendant must be judged separately based on what each person knows and did. Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008).

A. Cox Is Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claim Alleging Deliberate Indifference To A Serious Medical Need

Plaintiff contends that Cox was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of section 1983. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, which includes deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs arise under the Eighth Amendment when the claimant is a convicted prisoner. However, when a section 1983 Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee, the claim must be asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment. Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 271 (11th Cir. 2013). In any event, the minimum standard for providing medical care to a pretrial detainee is identical to the minimum standard required by the Eighth Amendment for a convicted prisoner, and courts analyze the claim under the decisional law of both amendments. Id.

"Our cases have consistently held that knowledge of the need for medical care and an intentional refusal to provide that care constitutes deliberate indifference." Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Carswell v. Bay Cnty, 854 F.2d 454, 457 (11th Cir. 1988);Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)). However, not every claim of inadequate medical treatment states a cognizable claim under the federal constitution. Id. "Medical treatment [is deliberately...