Davis v. City of Chi., 16-1430

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Kanne, Circuit Judge.
• Citation: 889 F.3d 842
• Parties: Lorenzo DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 16-1430,16-1430
• Decision Date: 08 May 2018

889 F.3d 842

Lorenzo DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-1430

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 5, 2018
Decided May 8, 2018

Torreya L. Hamilton, Attorney, Hamilton Law Office, LLC, Thomas P. Needham, Attorney, Law Office of Thomas P. Needham, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Kerrie Maloney Laytin, Attorney, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before Kanne, Rovner, and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.

Kanne, Circuit Judge.

889 F.3d 844

Lorenzo Davis worked for Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority. He alleges that his supervisor fired him because he refused to change his findings in a number of investigations into police misconduct. Davis sued the City of Chicago, arguing that his firing violated his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed Davis’s claim. We affirm because Davis’s refusal to change his reports is not protected speech.

I. BACKGROUND

Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority ("IPRA") investigated¹ certain types of complaints against Chicago police, including domestic violence, excessive force, and death in police custody. Chi., Ill., Municipal Code §§ 2-57-020, -040(a)–(f). After investigating such allegations, IPRA made a disciplinary recommendation to the Chicago Police in the form of a report. The reports summarized the investigation and included findings on the alleged misconduct: namely, whether the allegations were "sustained," "not sustained," "exonerated," or "unfounded."

IPRA investigators played a key role in creating these reports. They interviewed police and civilian witnesses and procured and preserved other evidence. They also drafted the report. Nevertheless, IPRA’s Chief Administrator retained final responsibility for making recommendations to the Chicago Police. Id . § 2-57-040(h). The Administrator could also create "rules, regulations and procedures for the conduct of [IPRA’s] investigations." Id. § 2-57-040(m).

Lorenzo Davis began working for IPRA in 2008 as an investigator. In 2010, he was promoted to supervisor. In both positions, Davis collected and reviewed evidence on complaints of police misconduct, then submitted draft reports. In 2014, Scott Ando became IPRA’s Chief Administrator. Ando hired Steven Mitchell as his First Deputy Chief Administrator.

Davis alleges that between 2014 and 2015, Ando and Mitchell ordered Davis to change "sustained" findings of police misconduct and to change his reports to reflect more favorably on the accused officers. Davis refused to change his findings. Ando allegedly threatened to fire Davis if he did not change his disciplinary recommendations, but Davis still refused. Davis also alleges that Ando and Mitchell requested Microsoft Word versions of Davis’s reports to alter them in a way that would look like Davis had made the changes.

In March 2015, Ando implemented a policy requiring his approval for all "sustained" findings. Under the new policy, if an investigator refused to make a change recommended by Ando, he would be disciplined

889 F.3d 845

for insubordination. After the policy was implemented, Davis again refused to change "sustained" findings. Ando fired him in July 2015.

In the district court, Davis claimed that Ando fired him because he refused to change his "sustained" findings. He insisted that this violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also alleged violations of the Illinois Whistleblower Act and common law retaliatory discharge.

The district court dismissed his constitutional claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. Davis appeals only his First Amendment claim, which we review de novo . Tamayo v. Blagojevich , 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).

II. ANALYSIS

"There is considerable value ... in encouraging, rather than inhibiting, speech by public employees." Lane v. Franks , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2377, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014). But "government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter." Connick v. Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 143, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Thus, "[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." Garcetti v. Ceballos , 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006).

To show that his speech is protected under the First Amendment, Davis—a public employee—must demonstrate that "(1) he made the speech as a private citizen, (2) the speech addressed a matter of public concern, and (3) his interest in expressing that speech was not outweighed by the state’s interests as an employer in ‘promoting effective and efficient public service.’ " Swetlik v. Crawford , 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Houskins v. Sheahan , 549 F.3d 480, 490 (7th Cir. 2008) ). Because Davis did not speak as a private...