Davis v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L.R. Co.

Decision Date22 May 1906
Docket NumberLaw.,417
Citation146 F. 403
PartiesDAVIS v. CLEVELAND, C.,C. & ST. L.R. CO.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

The plaintiff, a citizen of Iowa, as administrator of the estate of Frank E. Jandt, deceased, filed in the district court of Iowa in and for Woodbury county a petition against the defendant railway company, asking judgment against it in the sum of $10,000 for the alleged wrongful and negligent killing of the deceased in the state of Illinois while a passenger on one of its trains in that state. An order was allowed by a judge of that court authorizing the attachment of property of the defendant company not exceeding $15,000 in value. Thereupon writs of attachment were issued to the sheriffs of Woodbury and Pottawattamie counties in the state of Iowa, and thereunder 22 other railroad companies, who had severally brought one or more of such cars into the state of Iowa, were attached by said sheriffs in Pottawattamie and Woodbury counties, and said railroad companies were also attached as garnishees of the defendant company, and required to appear and answer in said district court of Woodbury county. The defendant was not served in the state of Iowa with notice of the filing of said petition, the commencement of said action or of any of the proceedings under said writs of attachment but was served with such notices at its office and principal place of business in Cincinnati, Ohio. The defendant appeared specially in the state court for the purpose of removing said cause to this court, and in due time did so remove the same on the grounds of the diverse citizenship of the plaintiff and the defendant. The record has been filed in this court and the defendant appears specially, and moves to set aside the service of the notices upon it, and to quash the writs of attachment and the proceedings thereunder, upon the ground that the state court by the proceedings therein acquired no jurisdiction of the defendant or of its property, and that this court has none, for the reason that the defendant is, and was when the proceedings were commenced, a corporation created and existing under the laws of Ohio and Indiana, and not under the law of Iowa; that it does not and did not own or operate any railroad in Iowa, did not business in that state, and had no officer or agent in said state upon whom process could be served, and that none was served upon it in said state of Iowa; that the cars attempted to be seized under said writs of attachment and garnishee process were loaded with property upon defendant's line of railroad outside of the state of Iowa, to be carried without change of cars to points within that and other states, and were delivered by the defendant outside the state of Iowa to the several garnishee companies which are connecting carriers with the defendant, pursuant to agreements with each of them for the formation of continuous lines of railroad for the transportation of property from one state to and through others over their respective roads, pursuant to the acts of Congress so authorizing; that the cars in question were brought into the state of Iowa by said several garnishees, pursuant to such agreements, for the purpose only of completing an interstate shipment of the property with which they were loaded, and when emptied were to be returned to the defendant company in the state of its incorporation, or, where the cars were delivered to said garnishees, as soon as it could reasonably be done; that said several garnishees, under the agreements between them, the defendant, and each other, had the right to use the cars of this defendant in the transportation of property in the regular course of business while returning said cars; in other words that said cars at the time of their attachment were being used by the defendant and its connecting carriers, the said several garnishees, in interstate commerce; that all of the indebtedness, if any, that might be due the defendant from said several garnishees is solely and only by reason of the contracts and agreements heretofore stated, and that such agreements and contracts are to be discharged,satisfied, and settled only in the city of Chicago, state of Illinois, where the same were made, and that such accounts or debts, if any, in favor of this defendant have no situs in the state of Iowa, and are not subject to attachment in that state. The motion is supported by the affidavit of an officer of the defendant, which sets forth in detail the facts above stated. Each of said garnishees severally answered under oath in the state court, admitting that it had cars of the defendant in its possession, but alleged that said cars were delivered to it by the defendant at points outside the state of Iowa, loaded with freight consigned to points within that or other states, and were brought into that state by it in the regular course of its business in the transportation of property between the states; that said cars were so received by it from the defendant pursuant to an agreement between it and the defendant company for the purpose of forming continuous lines of railway for the transportation of property between different states, and for the interchange of cars and traffic between them, substantially as alleged in the motion of defendant to quash the attachment, and to release said cars and the several garnishees therefrom. Some of the garnishees deny being indebted to the defendant in any sum, and others allege that, if any indebtedness is due to the defendant from them it is on account of the interchange of traffic between them and defendant, as alleged, which account was constantly changing from amounts due defendant to amounts due from it to the garnishee; and that if upon a settlement thereof anything was found to be due to defendant, it was so due in Chicago, where the agreement was made, or at the principal place of business of the defendant in Cincinnati, Ohio, and not in the state of Iowa. The railroads of the defendant and the several garnishees are operated by steam, and each of the garnishees except one is a foreign corporation, and all operate their roads in Iowa and other states, and have agents in Iowa upon whom process may be served, as provided by section 3529, Code Iowa 1897.

The plaintiff filed in the state court a pleading, as authorized by the statute of Iowa, but not under oath, taking issue upon the answers of the several garnishees, and in such pleading denies generally the answers of said garnishees except as admitted or otherwise answered by said pleading. It is admitted that said cars were delivered to the several garnishee companies for the purpose of completing an interstate shipment of the property with which they were loaded; but it is not alleged that either of the garnishee companies has in its possession or under its control any property of the defendant other than said cars, or that either is indebted to the defendant in any sum other than for its proportionate share of the compensation for the carriage of said property from the point of shipment to its destination, which the garnishees may have collected at said destination as the terminal or final carriers of such interstate shipment. It is also alleged that some of the cars at the time they were attached were empty.

The plaintiff resists the motion to quash the writs of attachment and proceedings thereunder, upon the grounds: (1) That the state court rightly acquired jurisdiction of the defendant's cars, because they were within the state of Iowa at the time of their attachment; and (2) that the defendant has appeared in this court, and moved to quash the attachment proceedings, and has thereby waived its special appearance, and submitted itself and its attached property to the jurisdiction of this court. No evidence is submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion of the defendant to quash the attachment, or in support of its pleading controverting the answer of the several garnishees, and the matters are submitted upon the record, including such motion and admissions of the pleadings.

Wilbur Owen and Bevington & McVey, for vington & McVey, for plaintiff.

Shull & Farnsworth, for defendant.

Wright & Call, J. C. Davis, Clark & McLaughlin, W. S. Kenyon, Henderson & Fribourg, J. W. Hallam, W. A. Kelly, and John N. Baldwin, for the several garnishees.

REED District Judge (after stating the facts).

The removal of the case by the defendant from the state court, even if its appearance in that court had not been limited to such purpose, doe snot preclude it from challenging in this court the jurisdiction of the state court or of this court of its person, or from claiming exemption from being sued in a state other than that of its residence. Wabash Western Railway Co. v. Brow, 164 U.S. 271, 17 Sup.Ct. 126, 41 L.Ed. 431; Murray v. Wilcox, 122 Iowa,188, 97 N.W. 1087, 64 L.R.A. 534, 101 Am.St.Rep. 263.

The contention of the plaintiff is that the defendant by moving to quash the attachment, though appearing specially for that purpose, thereby invoked the judgment of the court upon a question other than that of its jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and that by so doing it has appeared generally to the action. The question of the jurisdiction or right of a court to attach property at all, and that of its right to determine what disposition shall be made of property that it has the right to and has in fact attached, are quite distinct. In the one case the court can only determine its jurisdiction or right to attach the property, and, if it has not such right, then to order its release in case it has been attached; but if it has the right to attach the same, and has in fact done so, then it may and must determine the rights of claimants thereto if any are...

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5 cases
  • Rosenbush v. Bernheimer
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1912
    ... ...          A ... Nathan Williams and Harold S. Davis, for trustee ...          OPINION ...          RUGG, ... In ... passing it may be observed that this contention was raised in ... Davis v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. Louis Ry. Co., 217 ... U.S. 157, 164, 30 S.Ct. 463, 54 L.Ed. 708, 27 L. R. A. (N ... ...
  • Southern Flour & Grain Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1907
    ...a proposition does not rest upon sound reason. What we have said seems not to be in entire harmony by some courts. See Davis v. Cleveland R. Co. (C. C.) 146 F. 403; Wall v. N. & W. R. Co., 52 W.Va. 485, 44 S.E. 64 L.R.A. 501, 94 Am.St.Rep. 948; Connery v. Q., O. & K. C. R., 92 Minn. 20, 99 ......
  • Clark Milling Co v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 11, 1925
    ...Flour & Grain Company Case. The point decided so far as here apropos (see the decision and judgment under review, Davis v. Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. [C. C] 146 F. 403), was that the enforcement of the local garnishment laws of the state of Iowa, where the case originated, was not, un......
  • Clark Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 11, 1925
    ... ... subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States ... in Davis v. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co., 217 U.S. 157, ... 30 S.Ct. 463, 54 L.Ed. 708 (4), 27 L.R.A. (N. S.) ... ...
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