The
petitioner was the defendant in three matters spending under
Dockets CR6-0490576, CR23-0024537, and CR23-024538 in the
Judicial District of New Haven. Over several objections by
defense counsel, the matters were consolidated for trial
where the jury could have reasonably found the following
facts:
In September 1998, the first victim, Victoria Standberry, had
been introduced to the defendant by her best friend
Taraneisha Brown. Brown and the defendant were involved in a
personal relationship. On September 27, 1998, Standberry
asked Brown for payment toward a substantial debt owed by
Brown. Brown replied that she would return Standberry’s
telephone call but never did.
The next day, the defendant received a telephone call in the
afternoon and left work early. On the evening of September
28, 1998, Standberry parked her vehicle in the Pro Park
parking lot located near Yale-New Haven Hospital (hospital),
where she was employed in the food and nutrition department.
Brown knew that Standberry parked in that particular lot when
working at the hospital. Standberry left the hospital
carrying a plate of food at approximately 9:25 p.m. and went
to her vehicle. As she was placing the food in her vehicle,
she observed an individual approach. She attempted to close
her door, but it was forced open. The defendant came up to
Standberry, said ‘revenge, ’ and shot her several times
before slowly walking away.
The next day, Standberry identified the defendant as the
shooter to the investigating police detective. The police
commenced a search for the defendant but were unsuccessful in
locating him. The defendant missed his October 20, 1998
meeting with his parole officer. Law enforcement agents
eventually apprehended the defendant in Atlanta, Georgia, on
September 4, 1999. After returning to Connecticut on April
19, 2000, the defendant was released on bond.
Attorney Thomas Farver represented the defendant and attended
a pretrial conference on October 1, 2001. The court,
Fracasse, J., scheduled the defendant’s trial for October 9,
2001, and Farver informed the defendant of this date. The
defendant failed to appear at the courthouse on October 9 and
10, 2001, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest.
Members of the Connecticut violent crime fugitive task force
searched for the defendant and learned that he was residing
in Florida. The defendant was arrested in Palm Beach County
on October 6, 2003, and was returned to Connecticut on
December 3, 2003. These events resulted in the state’s
charging the defendant with assault in the first degree,
carrying a pistol without a permit, criminal possession of a
firearm, failure to appear in the first degree and, in a part
B information, being a persistent dangerous felony offender.
These charges were filed under docket number CR00-490576.
The second victim, Lenwood E. Smith, Jr., was at a club in
New Haven on January 25, 2002. After speaking with the
defendant for approximately twenty minutes, he left at 2 a.m.
The defendant stopped Smith in the parking lot and asked for
a ride to Sheffield Street. Smith agreed, and the defendant
and his friend entered Smith’s vehicle. After arriving, the
defendant asked Smith to drive them to Carmel Street, where
an individual known as "Mizzy" owed him money.
After Smith drove to the bottom of a hill, the defendant took
out a gun and threatened him. Smith continued on to Carmel
Street and parked. The defendant placed his gun against
Smith’s head and demanded money. Smith gave the defendant his
wallet and told him that he could get more from an automated
teller machine. Smith drove to a nearby bank and, after
parking, fled to a nearby gas station. Smith telephoned the
police and showed them the bank parking lot where he had left
his vehicle. The police recovered Smith’s vehicle
approximately one week later.
The events surrounding the Smith incident resulted in charges
against the defendant of robbery in the first degree, larceny
in the second degree and, in a part B information, being a
persistent dangerous felony offender. These charges were
filed under docket number CR03-24537.
A summary of the evidence presented against the defendant
with respect to a third victim, Leonard Hughes, is necessary
for our discussion. There was evidence presented that Hughes
was the superintendent of a building at 260 Dwight Street in
New Haven. During the early morning of March 13, 2002, the
defendant rang Hughes’ doorbell and said he was there to pick
up items that an individual known as "Magnetic"
[a.k.a. Nathaniel Wilson] had left for him. These items
included a motor vehicle, a safe, a bulletproof vest and 2.5
kilograms of cocaine. The defendant entered the apartment,
pointed a gun at Hughes and ordered him to turn over the
requested items. The defendant took the keys to the motor
vehicle and specifically asked for the cocaine. Hughes
responded that there was no cocaine in the apartment. After
being told to get on his knees, Hughes indicated that he
would give the defendant the cocaine. The two men walked into
a storage area, and Hughes managed to duck behind a steel
door, escape through a window and flee to a nearby hotel.
Hughes reported the incident to the police, who searched for
the defendant, but were unable to locate him. Later that day,
police officers recovered Hughes’ motor vehicle.
The events surrounding the Hughes’ incident led to the
defendant’s being charged with burglary in the second degree,
robbery in the first degree and larceny in the second degree.
State v. Davis, 98 Conn.App. 608, 611-14, 911 A.2d
753, 758-60 (2006), aff’d, 286 Conn. 17, 942 A.2d
373 (2008). The jury found the defendant guilty of all the
charges pertaining to the Standberry and Smith incidents, as
well as two counts of being a persistent dangerous felony
offender. The court also found that the defendant had
violated the terms of his probation, and imposed a total
effective sentence of eighty years imprisonment. The jury
acquitted the defendant on all of the charges pertaining to
the Hughes incident. The petitioner was originally
represented by an Attorney Thomas Farver, however, he failed
to appear for a pretrial appearance on October 9, 2001, and
then absconded from the jurisdiction. When he was apprehended
in 2003, Attorney Robert Berke was assigned to represent the
petitioner and represented him through sentencing. The
petitioner, represented by Attorney Ira Grudberg, appealed
his conviction, which were affirmed. Id.
The
petitioner filed a prior petition for writ of habeas corpus
alleging ineffective assistance against trial counsel and
violation of his due process rights as a result of alleged
police misconduct. He was represented by Attorney Roger
Crossland in that matter, which was denied following trial.
Davis v. Warden, Superior Court judicial district of
Tolland, Docket No. CV08-4002425 (Cobb, J., Oct. 28, 2013),
aff’d, Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, 160
Conn.App. 444, 124 A.3d 992 (2013), cert. denied, 319 Conn.
957, 123 A.3d 1012 (2015).
The
present habeas action was commenced on July 21, 2014. The
Second Amended Petition, filed on April 30, 2017, alleges
ineffective assistance against Attorney Grudberg for his
representation during the petitioner’s criminal appeal in
Count One; ineffective assistance against Attorney Berke for
his representation before the criminal court in Count Two;
[1]
and ineffective assistance against Attorney Crossland for his
representation in the prior habeas trial. The respondent
filed a return generally denying the allegations and raising
the special defenses of procedural default and res judicata
on April 13, 2017. The matter was tried before the Court on
December 4, 2018.
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot
be relied on as having produced a just result."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "A convicted
defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective
as to require reversal of a conviction ... has two
components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
"The proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms." Id. 688. "[T]he performance
inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances." Id.
"Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to
second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable." Id., 689. "Thus, a court
... must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged
conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the
time of counsel’s conduct. [The petitioner] must identify the
acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have
been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The
court must then determine whether, in light of all the...
