Davis v. Commonwealth

• Citation: 491 Mass. 1011,200 N.E.3d 518
• Decision Date: 12 January 2023
• Docket Number: SJC-13281
• Parties: Matthew DAVIS v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

491 Mass. 1011

200 N.E.3d 518

Matthew DAVIS

v.COMMONWEALTH.

SJC-13281

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

January 12, 2023

Matthew Spurlock, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the petitioner.

Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

RESCRIPT

The petitioner, Matthew Davis, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in which he sought a determination that a third trial in the underlying criminal cases against him impermissibly would violate his protections against double jeopardy, where, he contends, the evidence presented at his second trial, which ended in a mistrial, was insufficient to convict him. For the reasons below, we affirm the decision of the single justice.

Prior proceedings. Davis was convicted by a jury of armed assault with intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b ), and related charges, in connection with a shooting that occurred on September 15, 2015. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 449, 168 N.E.3d 294 (2021). The Appeals Court initially affirmed the convictions. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 646, 150 N.E.3d 770 (2020). On further appellate review, this court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Davis's conviction, and further, that it was permissible to admit location data from the global positioning system (GPS) device worn by him at the time in connection with his probation on a Federal drug charge. Davis, 487 Mass. at 449, 459-460, 461-464, 168 N.E.3d 294. Nevertheless, this court held that it was an abuse of discretion amounting to prejudicial error for the trial court to admit evidence of speed data from the particular GPS device worn by Davis¹ based on the insufficient proffer made below. Id. at 456-459, 460-461, 168 N.E.3d 294. Specifically, because Davis's speed, in tandem with other evidence in the trial record, was used to correlate his movements to the time and place of the shooting, this court set aside the verdicts against Davis and remanded the case for a new trial in the Superior Court. Id. at 461, 469, 168 N.E.3d 294.

After remand, the trial judge rejected a further proffer from the Commonwealth as to the GPS speed data, and Davis was retried without it; but the jury could not reach a decision, and so a mistrial resulted. Davis then filed a posttrial motion asking for a required finding of not guilty or, alternatively, for dismissal. He argued that the evidence produced at the second trial was not sufficient to convict him, and therefore, a third trial would impermissibly violate his protections against double jeopardy. The trial judge denied the motion.

Davis then sought relief by petition to a single justice of this court under G. L. c. 211, § 3. Specifically, he sought allowance of his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds due to insufficient evidence. The petition was denied, and he appealed. Pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), Davis filed a memorandum in this court, arguing that review of the trial judge's denial of his motion on double jeopardy grounds could not adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in a further trial or by other available means. We agreed and issued an order permitting the appeal to proceed to full briefing in the ordinary course. The appeal is now before us for decision.

Summary of relevant facts. "Because [Davis] raises a sufficiency challenge, we recite the facts the jury could have found, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for later discussion." Davis, 487 Mass. at 450, 168 N.E.3d 294. As in Davis's first trial, in his second trial "[t]he Commonwealth primarily relied on three pieces of evidence to establish the defendant's guilt:" the GPS data, a surveillance video recording, and the testimony of eyewitness Ilene Rock. See id. at 462, 168 N.E.3d 294. This time, for the reasons stated above, the GPS evidence was limited to GPS location data because GPS speed data was excluded.

Here, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following facts. The GPS location evidence placed Davis at Quincy Street and Baker Avenue at 10:27 A.M. on the day of the shooting.² At 10:28 A.M. , a 911 call received in connection with this incident reported "shots fired." At approximately 10:28 A.M. or 10:29 A.M. , a dispatcher informed Boston police via radio that shots had been fired and called responding officers to Quincy Street and Baker Avenue, the site of the shooting. Video evidence from a home security camera showed that the shooter was a Black man with long braids or dreadlocks wearing a red or pink shirt or sweatshirt.

The video evidence further showed that after firing a gun, the shooter in the red shirt immediately fled on Baker Avenue in the direction of Bodwell Street.

The GPS location evidence places Davis at the corner of Baker Avenue and Bodwell Street at 10:28 A.M.

Rock testified that a little bit before 10:30 A.M. , she was standing at the corner of Bodwell Street and Columbia Road when someone ran past her very quickly. This person was only five feet from her as he passed, running from the direction of Bodwell Street to Columbia Road. This direction of travel matches the reported location points from Davis's GPS device for 10:28 A.M. and 10:29 A.M.

Rock described the runner as a tall, thin Black man wearing a long-sleeved red shirt whose hair was in thin braids "that were sort of pulled back in a ponytail." He was running very quickly even though he was not wearing running shoes, and though running, his right hand was tucked into his shirt or pocket such that it was hidden, and this fact struck the witness as peculiar. Rock did not see anyone else running in that area at the time. The GPS location evidence placed Davis on Columbia Road at 10:29 A.M.

Davis was arrested the day after the shooting. A week later, detectives executed a search warrant at his residence and recovered a red sweatshirt in a pile of clothing. The sweatshirt tested negative for the presence of gunshot primer residue.

Discussion. "We review a decision of a single justice pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, for clear error of law or abuse of discretion." Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 552, 556, 192 N.E.3d 1106 (2022).

"Following a mistrial, double jeopardy precludes the Commonwealth from retrying a defendant for the same offense where the evidence presented at the [previous] trial was legally insufficient to warrant a conviction." Baxter v. Commonwealth, 489 Mass. 504, 507, 185 N.E.3d 15 (2022). "[T]he Commonwealth may retry a defendant only if it has presented evidence at the [previous] trial that, if viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, would be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt" (alteration and citation omitted). Pinney v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 1001, 1001-1002, 90 N.E.3d 1234 (2018). See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979). The Commonwealth does not need to introduce direct evidence to meet this standard. See Davis, 487 Mass. at 462, 168 N.E.3d 294. "Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to find someone guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and inferences drawn from such circumstantial evidence ‘need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.’ " Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 141, 741 N.E.2d 25 (2001). Where the evidence is circumstantial, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 316, 77 N.E.3d 278 (2017). Even so, a conviction may not be based on "speculation" or "conjecture," Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 51, 112 N.E.3d 239 (2018), or "inference piled upon inference," Jones, supra.

Here, the only question is the identity of the assailant. And the evidence was not direct but circumstantial. Therefore, we ask whether, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer from the evidence that Davis was the shooter. See Baxter, 489 Mass. at 509, 185 N.E.3d 15 ; Ayala, 481 Mass. at 51-53, 112 N.E.3d 239 ; Jones, 477 Mass. at 316-318, 77 N.E.3d 278.

In this case, a rational trier of fact reasonably could infer that Davis was the shooter. From the 911 and radio calls, a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that the shooting occurred at about 10:28 A.M. , or immediately before, at Quincy Street and Baker Avenue. From the video, a rational trier of fact could ...