Davis v. Cox, No. 90233–0.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
Writing for the CourtSTEPHENS, J.
Citation351 P.3d 862,183 Wash.2d 269
PartiesKent L. and Linda DAVIS; Jeffrey and Susan Trinin; and Susan Mayer, derivatively on behalf of Olympia Food Cooperative, Petitioners, v. Grace COX; Rochelle Gause; Erin Genia; T.J. Johnson; Jayne Kaszynski; Jackie Krzyzek; Jessica Laing; Ron Lavigne; Harry Levine; Eric Mapes; John Nason; John Regan ; Rob Richards ; Suzanne Shafer; Julia Sokoloff ; and Joellen Reineck Wilhem, Respondents.
Docket NumberNo. 90233–0.
Decision Date28 May 2015

183 Wash.2d 269
351 P.3d 862

Kent L. and Linda DAVIS; Jeffrey and Susan Trinin; and Susan Mayer, derivatively on behalf of Olympia Food Cooperative, Petitioners
v.
Grace COX; Rochelle Gause; Erin Genia; T.J. Johnson; Jayne Kaszynski; Jackie Krzyzek; Jessica Laing; Ron Lavigne; Harry Levine; Eric Mapes; John Nason; John Regan ; Rob Richards ; Suzanne Shafer; Julia Sokoloff ; and Joellen Reineck Wilhem, Respondents.

No. 90233–0.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Jan. 20, 2015.
Decided May 28, 2015.


351 P.3d 863

Robert M. Sulkin, Avi Joshua Lipman, McNaul Ebel Nawrot & Helgren, Seattle, WA, for Petitioners.

351 P.3d 864

Bruce Edward Humble Johnson, Angela Catherine Galloway, Ambika Kumar Doran, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Seattle, WA, Barbara M. Harvey, Detroit, MI, Steven Goldberg, Portland, OR, Maria C. Lahood, New York, NY, for Respondents.

George M. Ahrend, Ahrend Law Firm PLLC, Ephrata, WA, Bryan Patrick Harnetiaux, Attorney at Law, David P. Gardner, Winston & Cashatt, Spokane, WA, for amicus counsel for Wa State Association for Justice Foundation.

Alicia O. Young, Attorney General's Office, Torts Division A.G. Office, Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, amicus counsel for State of Washington.

Jeffrey Lowell Needle, Maynard Building, Jesse Andrew Wing, Joseph Robert Shaeffer, Tiffany Mae Cartwright, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Employment Lawyers Association.

Matthew J. Segal, Sarah Christine Johnson, Pacifica Law Group LLP, Sarah A. Dunne, Attorney at Law, Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Aclu.

Jessica L. Goldman, Summit Law Group, Seattle, WA, Bruce D. Brown, Report Comm. for Freedom of Press, Arlington, VA, for amicus counsel for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 29 Others.

Neil Martin Fox, Law Office of Neil Fox, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for amicus counsel for Jewish Voice for Peace, Palestine Solidarity Legal Support, National Lawyers Guild, American Muslims for Palestine, International Jewish Anti-zionist Network.

Opinion

STEPHENS, J.

183 Wash.2d 274

¶ 1 This case requires us to decide the constitutionality of the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP statute). Laws of 2010, ch. 118 (codified at RCW 4.24.525 ). In the statute's prefatory findings, the legislature explained it was “concerned about lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances,” id. § 1(1)(a), and so the statute's purpose was to establish “an efficient, uniform, and comprehensive method for speedy adjudication” of such lawsuits, id. § 1(2)(b).

¶ 2 The statute attempts to achieve this goal in three principal ways. It halts discovery in such cases presumptively, RCW 4.24.525(5)(c), creates a “special motion to strike a claim” (anti-SLAPP motion), id. at (4)(b), and awards a prevailing party on the motion attorney fees and a $10,000 assessment, id. at (6)(a). When ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court first determines whether the claim at issue is “based on an action involving public participation and petition,” a defined term that broadly describes rights of expression and petition. Id. at (4)(b). If that is so, the trial court then decides whether the party bringing the claim can prove by “clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.” Id. at (4)(b). If the party cannot meet that burden, the statute requires the trial court to dismiss the claim and award statutory remedies to the opposing party. Id. at (6)(a).

¶ 3 Though the statute seeks to “[s]trike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits and to trial by jury and the rights of persons to participate in matters of public concern,” Laws of 2010, ch. 118, § 1(2)(a), we conclude

183 Wash.2d 275

the statute's evidentiary burden fails to strike the balance that the Washington Constitution requires. Because RCW 4.24.525(4)(b) requires the trial judge to adjudicate factual questions in nonfrivolous claims without a trial, we hold RCW 4.24.525 violates the right of trial by jury under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution and is invalid. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the superior court for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Overview of Washington's Anti–SLAPP Laws

¶ 4 Anti–SLAPP statutes punish those who file lawsuits—labeled strategic lawsuits against public participation or SLAPPs—that abuse the judicial process in order to silence an individual's free expression or petitioning activity. Tom Wyrwich, A Cure for a “Public Concern”: Washington's New Anti–

351 P.3d 865

SLAPP Law, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 663, 666–68 (2011). Such litigation is initiated “[w]ith no concern for the inevitable failure of the lawsuit” and instead only forces the defendant into costly litigation that “devastate[s] the defendant financially and chill[s] the defendant's public involvement.” Id. at 666–67. Though such suits are “typically dismissed as groundless or unconstitutional,” the problem is that dismissal comes only after “the defendants are put to great expense, harassment, and interruption of their productive activities.” Laws of 2010, ch. 118, § 1(1)(b).

¶ 5 In 1989, Washington became the first state to enact anti-SLAPP legislation. Laws of 1989, ch. 234 (codified as amended at RCW 4.24.500 –.520). This initial statute grants speakers immunity from claims based on the speaker's communication to a governmental entity regarding any matter reasonably of concern to the governmental entity. See RCW 4.24.510. However, this statute has come to be seen as having a limited effect because it applies only to communications to governmental entities and it creates no method for early dismissal. Wyrwich, supra, at 669–70.

183 Wash.2d 276

¶ 6 In 2010, the legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute at issue in this case. Laws of 2010, ch. 118 (codified at RCW 4.24.525 ). This statute is unique from its predecessor in that it creates an entirely new method for adjudicating SLAPPs, separate from the rules of civil procedure. The new statute did not amend or repeal the prior statute and instead codifies its new procedures in one new statutory section. See RCW 4.24.525. Subsections (1) and (2) define key terms. Subsection (3) provides that the law does not apply to prosecutors. Subsection (4) is the law's mainspring: it establishes a “special motion to strike a claim” and sets forth the evidentiary standard that trial courts must use to adjudicate the motion. Subsection (5) contains various procedural rules to halt discovery and ensure speedy adjudication of an anti-SLAPP motion. Subsection (6) provides the prevailing party on the motion statutory damages of $10,000, attorney fees, costs, and discretionary additional relief. Subsection (7) states the statute does not abridge any other rights the movants possess.

¶ 7 The law's mainspring, subsection (4), provides that a party may bring a special motion to strike any claim that is based on “an action involving public participation and petition.” RCW 4.24.525(4)(a). That phrase—“an action involving public participation and petition”—is a defined term that uses capacious language in five nonexclusive examples. See id. at (2)(a)-(e). When a party brings such a motion, the moving party has “the initial burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence” that the claim is based on an action involving public participation and petition. Id. at (4)(b). If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the responding party “to establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.” Id. When a trial judge adjudicates such a motion, “the court shall consider pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” Id. at (4)(c). If the court determines the responding party has met its burden to establish by

183 Wash.2d 277

clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim, “the substance of the determination may not be admitted into evidence at any later stage of the case,” id. at (4)(d)(i), and the case proceeds toward trial.

¶ 8 Upon the filing of a special motion to strike, subsection (5) freezes all other aspects of the litigation. Discovery is stayed, as are pending motions and hearings. Id. at (5)(c). The discovery stay remains in effect until the court rules on the special motion to strike, though on a party's motion and for good cause shown, the court may order that “specified discovery or other hearings or motions be conducted.” Id.

¶ 9 Subsection (5) also ensures the special motion to strike will be resolved quickly. The motion must be filed within 60 days of service of the most recent complaint or at a later time in the court's discretion. Id. at (5)(a). The court must hold a hearing on the motion within 30 days, unless “the docket...

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78 practice notes
  • Schuck v. Beck, 37213-8-III
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • October 19, 2021
    ...that the right must remain the essential component of our legal system that it has always been. Davis v. Cox, 183 Wn.2d 269, 288-89, 351 P.3d 862 (2015). When the question is doubtful, the court always preserves the right to a jury trial. Bain v. Wallace, 167 Wash. 583, 587, 10 P.2d 226 (19......
  • State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., NO. 91615-2
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • February 16, 2017
    ...right, the constitutional right would certainly prevail. U.S. CONST , art. VI, cl. 2 (federal constitutional supremacy); Davis v. Cox, 183 Wash.2d 269, 294-95, 351 P.3d 862 (2015) (state constitutional provision prevails over state statute to the contrary). We therefore analyze each of Stut......
  • Inst v. Mann, No. 14–CV–101
    • United States
    • District of Columbia Court of Appeals of Columbia District
    • December 22, 2016
    ...succeed ....' " (quoting Dino D eLaurentiis Cinematografica v. D–150, Inc., 366 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1966) )).29 See Davis v. Cox, 183 Wash.2d 269, 351 P.3d 862, 873–74 (2015) (en banc) (declaring that Washington state's Anti–SLAPP special motion to dismiss, Wash. Rev. Code§ 4.24.525 (201......
  • In re Gawker Media LLC, Case No. 16–11700 (SMB)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of New York
    • August 21, 2017
    ...state's constitution. E.g. , Opinion of the Justices (SLAPP Suit Procedure ), 138 N.H. 445, 641 A.2d 1012, 1015 (1994) ; Davis v. Cox , 183 Wash.2d 269, 351 P.3d 862, 874 (2015) (en banc ).17 Accordingly, the Court concludes that even though the California anti-SLAPP statute is substantive ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
78 cases
  • Schuck v. Beck, 37213-8-III
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • October 19, 2021
    ...that the right must remain the essential component of our legal system that it has always been. Davis v. Cox, 183 Wn.2d 269, 288-89, 351 P.3d 862 (2015). When the question is doubtful, the court always preserves the right to a jury trial. Bain v. Wallace, 167 Wash. 583, 587, 10 P.2d 226 (19......
  • State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., NO. 91615-2
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • February 16, 2017
    ...right, the constitutional right would certainly prevail. U.S. CONST , art. VI, cl. 2 (federal constitutional supremacy); Davis v. Cox, 183 Wash.2d 269, 294-95, 351 P.3d 862 (2015) (state constitutional provision prevails over state statute to the contrary). We therefore analyze each of Stut......
  • Inst v. Mann, No. 14–CV–101
    • United States
    • District of Columbia Court of Appeals of Columbia District
    • December 22, 2016
    ...succeed ....' " (quoting Dino D eLaurentiis Cinematografica v. D–150, Inc., 366 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1966) )).29 See Davis v. Cox, 183 Wash.2d 269, 351 P.3d 862, 873–74 (2015) (en banc) (declaring that Washington state's Anti–SLAPP special motion to dismiss, Wash. Rev. Code§ 4.24.525 (201......
  • In re Gawker Media LLC, Case No. 16–11700 (SMB)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of New York
    • August 21, 2017
    ...state's constitution. E.g. , Opinion of the Justices (SLAPP Suit Procedure ), 138 N.H. 445, 641 A.2d 1012, 1015 (1994) ; Davis v. Cox , 183 Wash.2d 269, 351 P.3d 862, 874 (2015) (en banc ).17 Accordingly, the Court concludes that even though the California anti-SLAPP statute is substantive ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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