Davis v. Dantzler Lumbe Co
| Decision Date | 26 February 1923 |
| Docket Number | No. 228,228 |
| Citation | 261 U.S. 280,28 A.L.R. 834,43 S.Ct. 349,67 L.Ed. 654 |
| Parties | DAVIS, Director General of Railroads, etc., v. L. N. DANTZLER LUMBE CO |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. R. C. Beckett and Carl Fox, both of St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner.
Mr. W. A. White, of Gulfport, Miss., for respondent.
This case presents an asserted conflict between the laws of Mississippi, subjecting property to attachment, and the statutes of the United States which empowered the President to take control of the railroad transportation systems of the United States, and exempt their property from state processes. Act August 29, 1916, 39 Stat. 619, 645; 40 Stat. 451 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115 3/4 a-3115 3/4 p). See, also, 41 Stat. 456.
The respondent, the L. N. Dantzler Lumber Company, herein called the lumber company, is a corporation of Mississippi. It filed a bill for attachment under the Code of Mississippi of 1906 against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, a nonresident of Mississippi, and certain other railroads, including the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company, a Mississippi corporation, having officers and agents in the state.
The purpose of the bill was to subject the indebtedness of the defendant railroads to the Texas & Pacific Railway Company to the satisfaction of a claim for damages to a shipment of cattle from Fort Worth, Tex., to a station in Harrison county, Miss. The shipment was evidenced by a bill of lading dated October 10, 1917.
The charge is that, by reason of the negligence of the railroad companies, the lumber company was damaged in the sum of $5,600, and for the payment of this amount a claim was rendered by the lumber company to the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Payment was refused.
It is further charged that the several railroad companies are indebted to the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, and that the lumber company has the right to subject such sums to the satisfaction of its claim against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, that company being a nonresident of Mississippi, and having no officer in the state upon whom service of process can be had. Personal service is prayed against those companies upon which it can be had, and service by publication upon those companies upon which personal service cannot be had, and that they make answer stating what funds of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company they have in their hands, and in what amounts they will be indebted to that company in the future, and that the respective funds in their hands be subjected to the demand of the lumber company.
The Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company alleged that the suit is one in attachment and that the company was made a party simply as garnishee in order that any indebtedness from it to the Texas & Pacific Railway Company might be condemned to pay the demand of the lumber company, and that the service for that process is mesne process and within the prohibition of the act of Congress (41 Stat. 305), violates that act, and is void.
A statement of its indebtedness to the Texas & Pacific Railway Company was attached to the answer, showing an indebtedness of $3,053.94.
The company, further answering, alleged that on December 26, 1917, the President of the United States took possession of and assumed control of the transportation systems of the United States, including the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company and the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, and proclaimed in part, as follows:
'Except with the prior written consent of said Director General [a Director General was appointed by the President] no attachment by mesne process or on execution shall be levied on or against any of the property used by any of said transportation systems in the conduct of their business as common carriers.'
And further that Congress ratified the action of the President and provided for the control of the railroads by an act approved March 21, 1918, section 10 of which provides as follows:
'No process, mesne or final, shall be levied against any property under such federal control.'
And that any money due from the company to the Texas & Pacific Railway Company is property under federal control within the meaning of the President's proclamation and the act of Congress under the orders of the Director General appointed by the President.
A decree pro confesso was entered against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, the decree reciting that the company had been summoned according to law, and, having failed to appear and plead, answer, or demur, the allegations of the bill were taken as confessed against the company.
Subsequently the cause was set down for hearing on the decree, the answer of the other railroads, including that of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company, and upon the motion of the latter to discharge it as garnishee. The motion was sustained and the writ of garnishment dismissed as to it. Relief against the other roads, however, was denied, the court being of the opinion that it had no jurisdiction. The dismissal was reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court of the state. Dantzler Lumber Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 119 Miss. 328, 80 South. 770, 4 A. L. R. 1669.
The Supreme Court stated the question to be whether the suit could be maintained by reason of the attachment, no other property of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company being within the state than the indebtedness of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company to the Texas & Pacific Railway Company.
The court decided the question in the affirmative, expressing a contrary view of the President's proclamation and the acts of Congress than that asserted by the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company, and even intimating that otherwise the proclamation and acts would be an encroachment upon the power of the state. The court, besides, defined the words 'mesne' to mean 'intermediate; intervening; the middle between two extremes.' This being the definition of 'mesne' process, it was the conclusion of the court, as we understand its opinion, that the present proceeding was commenced under the law of the state by original process and did not incur the prohibition of section 10.
The conclusion and judgment were that the——
'court below erred in discharging the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company as garnishee, and in holding that it had no jurisdiction to proceed to determine the controversy before it.'
Upon return of the case a supplemental bill was filed and a new garnishment served on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company.
The company answered the bill, repeating, in effect, its former answer, and making other defenses, not of importance to consider.
The Director General filed what he called an amended answer to the bill, averring that his former answer was filed in the name of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company, and was intended to be, and was in fact the answer of the Director General, and the indebtedness admitted therein to be due the Texas & Pacific Railway Company was the indebtedness of the Director General, and not the indebtedness of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company. It set forth, as the answer of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company had done, that on December 26, 1917, the President by proclamation issued in pursuance of law, took possession of the railroad transportation systems of the United States, including the property of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company. The Director General of Railroads was created by the President, to whom the present Director General is the successor, and as such was, at the time of the summons against the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company, operating the same, and that the latter company has not been in possession or control of, nor has it operated or had anything to do with the operation of, that railroad since December 28, 1917.
And the Director General further answered that after the answer of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company was filed, in order to avoid confusion, he issued General Order No. 50, afterward amended by Order No. 50a,...
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