Davis v. Davis
| Decision Date | 16 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | 2160019,2160022 |
| Citation | 240 So.3d 621 |
| Parties | Roy DAVIS and Voncile Davis v. A.M. SAMARA Roy Davis and Voncile Davis v. Terek Samara |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Philip A. Geddes, Decatur, for appellants.
Eddie Beason and Daniel G. McDowell of McDowell, Beason & Hamilton, P.C., Russellville, for appellees.
Roy Davis and Voncile Davis appeal from summary judgments entered by the Franklin Circuit Court ("the trial court") in favor of A.M. Samara in case number CV–15–900107 and in favor of Terek Samara in case number CV–15–900106 on their ejectment claims against the Davises. The two cases involve the same relevant facts and have essentially the same procedural history. The Davises assert that the claims against them are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We hold that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar either claim and that the Davises' arguments do not establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgments. We have consolidated the appeals for the purpose of issuing one opinion.
In order to understand the issues presented on appeal, we begin with a summary of the undisputed facts and relevant procedural history relating to previous state and federal cases involving the parties. The Davises are in possession of certain real property ("the property"). Roy Davis was the sole owner of a company named Strickland and Davis International, Inc. A.M. Samara sued Strickland and Davis International, Inc., in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ("the federal district court") seeking to enforce a partnership agreement between A.M. Samara and Strickland and Davis International, Inc. ("the first federal case"). On November 17, 2004, after the jury returned a verdict in favor of A.M. Samara, the federal district court entered a judgment awarding A.M. Samara $1,087,585 against Strickland and Davis International, Inc. The federal district court imposed a constructive trust on the assets owned by Roy Davis and Strickland and Davis International, Inc. By agreement of the parties, the Davises executed a mortgage on the property, which had an estimated value of 1.5 million dollars, in favor of the clerk of the federal district court, partly for the purpose of providing surety for an appeal. In a decision issued on October 19, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ("the Eleventh Circuit") vacated the federal district court's judgment based on a lack of due process and remanded the case with instructions for the federal district court to elaborate on the rationale for its decision and for the imposition of the constructive trust.
While the first federal case was pending on remand, Strickland and Davis International, Inc., filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee in bankruptcy ("the trustee") was aligned as the plaintiff in the case. The trustee thereafter filed an amended complaint that included claims of fraudulent transfer against Voncile Davis, Cindy Denise Taylor, Melissa Susanne Terrell, and Native American Development, LLC. Thereafter, the federal district court entered a judgment against those defendants as well as the Davises and awarded damages to the trustee. The federal district court also assigned the interest in the mortgage held by the clerk to the trustee. On August 10, 2012, the trustee assigned his interest in the mortgage and the judgment to A.M. Samara.
A.M. Samara foreclosed on the property and purchased it at the foreclosure sale. A.M. Samara obtained a foreclosure deed to the property dated December 4, 2012.
On December 14, 2012, the Davises filed a complaint in the trial court against A.M. Samara alleging that the foreclosure had been wrongful. The Davises alleged that they had appealed the latest judgment entered on remand by the federal district court to the Eleventh Circuit and that the foreclosure sale violated a stay of the federal district court's latest judgment. On January 13, 2013, A.M. Samara filed a separate complaint in the trial court against the Davises seeking to eject them from the property ("the original ejectment action"). The two cases were consolidated and removed to the federal district court ("the second federal case"). The federal district court entered a judgment in favor of A.M. Samara and against Roy Davis on the Davises' wrongful-foreclosure claim and remanded the original ejectment action to the trial court. Roy Davis appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment.
After the federal district court remanded the original ejectment action, A.M. Samara conveyed his interest in a portion of the property to his son Terek Samara. A.M. Samara then filed a motion in the trial court to add Terek Samara as a plaintiff to the proceedings. The motion included the assertion that Terek Samara had purchased a portion of the property. The trial court entered an order adding Terek Samara as a plaintiff. The Davises filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., and a demand for an abstract of the claimed title to the property pursuant to § 6–6–283, Ala. Code 1975. In their Rule 12(c) motion, the Davises argued that the original ejectment action should be dismissed with prejudice because A.M. Samara could not show that he had maintained ownership of the property as a single estate from the time of the filing of the complaint to the time of a trial. The Davises claimed that the original ejectment action could not be sustained as a result of the transfer of ownership of a portion of the property. After conducting a hearing on the Davises' motion, the trial court entered a judgment on March 24, 2015, dismissing the original ejectment action. In the judgment, the trial court stated: The case-action-summary sheet contains the following notation: "DISPOSED ON: 03/24/2015 BY (DISM W/O PREJ)." The notation is not initialed or signed by the trial judge.
On June 11, 2015, the Samaras initiated the separate cases that are the subject of these appeals. A.M. Samara filed a complaint in the trial court in case number CV–15–900107, and Terek Samara filed a complaint in case number CV–15–900106. Both complaints alleged claims against the Davises to eject them from the property. A.M. Samara based his ownership claim of his portion of the property on his purchase of the property at the foreclosure sale. Terek Samara based his ownership claim on A.M. Samara's conveyance of a portion of the property to him. The Davises filed answers in response, alleging, among other defenses, that the Samaras' claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata based on the judgment of dismissal entered in the original ejectment action.
On September 22, 2015, the Davises moved for a summary judgment in each case, arguing that the claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In support of the motions, the Davises submitted, among other exhibits, copies of motions and the judgment from the original ejectment action. On October 16, 2015, the Samaras each filed materials in opposition to the Davises' motions for a summary judgment and argued that the judgment of dismissal in the original ejectment action had been without prejudice. The Samaras submitted a transcript of a hearing on the Davises' motions in the original ejectment action and a copy of the case-action-summary sheet in the original ejectment action that contained the unsigned notation indicating that the case had been dismissed without prejudice. On October 29, 2015, the trial court entered an order denying the Davises' motion for a summary judgment in each case.
On June 27, 2016, the Samaras each filed a motion for a summary judgment in his respective case. They argued that they had had legal title to the property before the commencement of the actions, that the validity of the title derived from the foreclosure had already been adjudicated in federal court, and that the Davises had admitted to possession of the property in their pleadings. The Samaras submitted, among other exhibits, an affidavit from the attorney who had represented A.M. Samara in previous cases, the mortgage agreement, the trustee's assignment of his interest in the mortgage and the judgment in his favor in the first federal action to A.M. Samara, a letter dated November 2, 2012, notifying the Davises of a foreclosure sale, the foreclosure deed to the property, a letter dated December 7, 2012, providing notice to the Davises to vacate the property, the deed dated March 14, 2013, conveying a portion of A.M. Samara's interest in the property to Terek Samara, the Davises' complaint alleging a wrongful-foreclosure claim against A.M. Samara, and the latest judgment entered on remand in the first federal case.1
The Davises filed responses to the Samaras' motions for a summary judgment, arguing that the federal district court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the latest judgment on remand in the first federal case and that the Samaras' motions fail to establish a prima facie cause of action for ejectment. The Davises also argued that the mortgage had become unenforceable and void based on the following condition in the mortgage:
"Upon condition, however, that if the Judgment for Constructive Trust entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in [the first federal case] in favor of ... A.M. Samara against Roy Davis [and] Strickland & Davis ... shall be reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ... then this conveyance to be null and void ...."
The Davises submitted the decision of the Eleventh Circuit dated October 19, 2006, vacating the federal district court's November 17, 2004, judgment based on lack of due process and remanding the cause to the federal district court....
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