Davis v. Davis

• Decision Date: 01 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 107,107
• Citation: 646 A.2d 365,335 Md. 699
• Parties: Frank Joseph DAVIS v. Patricia Lee DAVIS. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 699

335 Md. 699

646 A.2d 365

Frank Joseph DAVIS v. Patricia Lee DAVIS.

No. 107, Sept. Term, 1993.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 24, 1994.

Allen J. Kruger (Kruger, Kovelant & Hollmann, all on brief), Laurel, for petitioner.

Debra B. Koehler, Naji P. Maloof, on brief, Upper Marlboro, for respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.

RAKER, Judge.

The petitioner in this appeal has raised several procedural challenges to the validity of both a judgment of absolute divorce and a marital property distribution. We are asked to determine whether the trial court's failure to comply with the time limitations set by Maryland Code (1991 Repl.Vol.) § 8-203(a) of the Family Law Article and/or with Maryland Rule S75(c), which prohibits the use of stale testimony in entering final decrees in certain actions, divests the court of jurisdiction over the underlying action. We hold that neither § 8-203(a) nor Rule S75(c) is jurisdictional in nature and that a trial court's failure to comply with either provision has no effect upon the power of the court to render a valid and binding judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

I.

Petitioner Frank Davis and Respondent Patricia Davis were married on December 14, 1985 and separated in January 1988. On July 29, 1988, Mr. Davis filed a complaint for limited divorce in the Circuit Court for Charles County. Ms. Davis answered and filed a counterclaim for absolute divorce, alimony and other relief on August 15, 1988. Throughout the remainder of 1988 and through 1989, the parties were embroiled in various discovery disputes which caused a hearing on the merits to be delayed until February 1990. At the hearing held on February 28, 1990 before Judge George W. Bowling, Mr. Davis amended his complaint to request an absolute divorce based upon the parties' two-year separation. The testimony at the hearing was subsequently limited to the issue of whether grounds for an absolute divorce existed. At the close of the hearing, the following colloquy took place between the court and counsel for the parties THE COURT: The Court concludes, based on the testimony, that the plaintiff [Mr. Davis] has established grounds to grant him a divorce absolute on the grounds that the parties have lived separate and apart for the statutory period of more than two years. The Court reserves, however, the authority under the statute to make a marital award, if any, after hearing testimony on the property interest of the parties and that the parties will be entitled at that time to present any testimony that they desire to present on the issues or the factors that are to be considered by the Court in reaching a conclusion as to what award, if any, ought to be made. And those factors are listed in the statute, and therefore all parties are entitled to present any evidence they care to on the issues, including the cause of the breakup of the marriage.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. DAVIS]: Could we have a time reservation on that?

THE COURT: 90 days.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. DAVIS]: And if we cannot get a date within that period, Your Honor--

THE COURT: Then the Court will extend it beyond the 90 days, if need be, but I would suggest--we ought to try to get this settled as soon as possible, so you just inform the assignment office that we need this to be heard within 90 days.

[COUNSEL FOR MS. DAVIS]: Maybe we can go over there from here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

The docket entry for February 28, 1990 reads as follows:

Court grants Absolute Divorce to Plaintiff, Frank Joseph Davis from Defendant, Patricia Lee Davis.

Court reserves authority to make marital award for ninety (90) days.

Although the ninety-day period from the February 28 hearing expired on or about May 28, 1990, the court did not make a marital property determination and disposition within that time period, nor did the court extend the time for determination of the marital property matters. The hearing on the issue of marital property was scheduled for May 8, 1990, but the court was unable to reach the matter on that date. The matter was rescheduled to October 5, 1990, and then, on June 18, 1990, was reset again to September 28, 1990. As of May 28, 1990, however, the parties had not presented the trial judge with the evidence necessary to permit him to designate and make a disposition of marital property.

After the February 28 hearing, the parties, on their own initiative, drafted an order of divorce and forwarded the order to the court, although the court had at no time during the February 28 hearing indicated that a written order of divorce would be issued. On June 11, 1990, however, the court signed an Order for Judgment of Absolute Divorce, which stated:

This matter having come on for a hearing on the 28th day of February, 1990, and testimony and evidence having been taken herein, it is thereupon this 11th day of June, 1990, by the Circuit Court for Charles County, Maryland,

ORDERED, that the Plaintiff, FRANK JOSEPH DAVIS, is hereby granted a Judgment of Absolute Divorce from the defendant, PATRICIA LEE DAVIS; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Court reserves the authority to make a marital award, if any, after taking testimony and evidence on the property interests of the parties, and that the parties will be entitled at that time to present any testimony they desire to present on the issues or factors that are to be considered by the Court in reaching a conclusion as to what award should be made; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Court reserves the authority to take testimony and evidence on any and all other issues including alimony and the cause of the break-up of the marriage which exist by and between the parties.

The docket entry dated June 11, 1990 reads "Order for Judgment of Absolute Divorce filed and copy mailed Attorneys."

On August 2, 1990, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of counsel regarding the court's ninety-day limitation on the resolution of marital property issues. The stipulation provided:

FRANK JOSEPH DAVIS, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, and PATRICIA LEE DAVIS, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff, by and through their respective counsel, hereby enter into this Stipulation as provided by the Annotated Code of Maryland Family Law Article, Section 8-203 (1989 Supplement) with the intent and purpose to extend the ninety (90) days from the date of Absolute Divorce signed on June 11, 1990, within which the issue of marital property and property distribution would be reserved. Counsel for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant and counsel for Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff further consent to have all issues of marital property and property distribution heard at the hearing scheduled for October 5, 1990 at 9:30 a.m.

Although the parties' stipulation was filed with the court and entered on the docket, the stipulation was never signed or otherwise consented to by the court.

Beginning on September 28, 1990, and continuing on October 19, December 12, and December 13, the court heard testimony and arguments on the reserved issues of marital property, counsel fees, and alimony. On July 2, 1991, the court filed an extensive Opinion and Order in which the court designated certain property as marital property, granted Ms. Davis a monetary award of $30,000, and denied Ms. Davis' requests for alimony and counsel fees. The court denied both parties' post-judgment motions on January 7, 1992.

On January 20, 1992, Mr. Davis filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging for the first time the Circuit Court's jurisdiction to make the marital property determination and monetary award. Mr. Davis offered three arguments in support of his contention that the July 2, 1991 Opinion and Order was void ab initio. First, Mr. Davis asserted that the court had failed to comply with the time requirements set by § 8-203(a) of the Family Law Article. Section 8-203 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Time of court action.--In a proceeding for an annulment or an absolute divorce, if there is a dispute as to whether certain property is marital property, the court shall determine which property is marital property:

(1) when the court grants an annulment or an absolute divorce;

(2) within 90 days after the court grants an annulment or divorce, if the court expressly reserves in the annulment or divorce decree the power to make the determination; or

(3) after the 90-day period if:

(i) the court expressly reserves in the annulment of divorce decree the power to make the determination;

(ii) during the 90-day period, the court extends the time for making the determination; and

(iii) the parties consent to the extension.

Mr. Davis contended that the court's failure to resolve the marital property issues within ninety days of February 28, 1990, the date that Mr. Davis asserted that the judgment of divorce was granted, divested the court of the power to render a judgment on the marital property issues.

Second, Mr. Davis argued that the court had violated Maryland Rule S75(c) in that the July 2, 1991 Opinion and Order was issued more than ninety days after the testimony on the issues of marital property had been concluded. Maryland Rule S75(c) provides:

c. Stale Testimony.

In an action for divorce, annulment, or alimony in which the testimony has been concluded for more than 90 days without entry of a final decree, a final decree may not be entered until supported by additional testimony justifying the conclusion that there has been no substantial change since the prior testimony was concluded.

Mr. Davis contended that the violation of Maryland Rule S75(c) provided an independent basis for concluding that the trial court was without jurisdiction to make the marital property determination.

Finally, Mr. Davis attacked the validity of the July 2, 1991 Opinion and Order by claiming that the court was without jurisdiction to grant the judgment of absolute divorce....