Davis v. DeJoy
| Docket Number | 20-cv-7456 |
| Decision Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Parties | Anthony D. Davis, Plaintiff, v. Louis DeJoy, U.S. Postmaster General, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Anthony Davis claims that his former employer, Defendant Louis DeJoy, United States Postmaster General, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by terminating him due to his race, color, and sex. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all Plaintiff's claims. [41]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants Defendant's motion.
“Local Rule 56.1 statements serve to streamline the resolution of summary judgment motions by having the parties identify undisputed material facts and cite the supporting evidence.” Laborers' Pension Fund v. Innovation Landscape, Inc., No. 15 CV 9580, 2019 WL 6699190, at *1 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 9, 2019). The Seventh Circuit has “consistently upheld district judges' discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1.” Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc., 919 F.3d 405, 414 (7th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). “We have frequently said that it is within the district court's discretion to strictly enforce local rules regarding summary judgment by accepting the movant's version of facts as undisputed if the non-movant has failed to respond in the form required.” Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 770 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 56.1 [53] at 2-3. The Court agrees that Plaintiff did not fully comply and considers some of Defendant's facts undisputed because of this. Many of Plaintiff's responses to Defendant's statements improperly add argument, noncontradictory facts, and/or fail to provide a record citation. [48] ¶¶ 10, 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24-30, 32-39, 41-44, 47-48, 51, 55, 69-71, 74-75, 78-80. Additionally, Plaintiff improperly responds “unknown” to properly supported facts. [48] ¶¶ 56-57, 62.
In addition, many of Plaintiff's responses and statements rely on improper evidence. [53] at 3-5. Under Rule 56(c), an affidavit or declaration used to oppose a motion for summary judgment must “be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). Rule 602 similarly states that a “witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed.R.Evid. 602. Accordingly, in an affidavit opposing summary judgment, “[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, will not suffice.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). Many of Plaintiff's responses and statements mirror Plaintiff's affidavits that contain allegations and speculation not based on personal knowledge or other evidence. Thus, the Court disregards those facts.
Plaintiff Anthony Davis is an African American man, who was hired as a postal inspector at the Chicago division headquarters of the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) in January 2013. [43] ¶¶ 1-2. As a postal inspector, Plaintiff conducted investigations and was expected to serve as a witness in court and administrative proceedings. Id. ¶ 3. Therefore, Plaintiff understood that his honesty and credibility were important attributes to develop and maintain for his job. Id. ¶ 4.
Plaintiff was first assigned to a team called the mail theft team, which was comprised of about six inspectors and was supervised by a team leader. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Beginning in June 2014, Juan Vargas, a Hispanic male, led the mail theft team. Id. ¶ 6. Vargas was supervised by an assistant inspector in charge (AIC), who at all times relevant was Victor Demtschenko, a white male. Id. ¶ 7. Demtschenko was Plaintiff's second-level supervisor. Id. An inspector in charge (INC) leads the USPIS's Chicago division and directly supervises the assistant inspectors in charge. Id. ¶ 8. Beginning in 2013, the INC was Antonio Gomez, a Hispanic male. Id.; Def. Ex. 11. Plaintiff was later assigned to the homeland security team, where his team leader was Phillip Dunne, a Black man. [43] ¶¶ 5, 9.
Inspectors were expected to log 50 hours of work each week. Id. ¶ 10. They recorded their daily work and leave hours, as well as a summary of the work performed and cases involved, in a database called ISIIS, which was also referred to as an eDiary. Id. Submitting eDiary entries for supervisory approval was accompanied by an electronic certification of their accuracy. Id. ¶ 11. To perform their work, inspectors were issued vehicles, which, according to agency policy, were “for official purposes only” and “use . . . for personal convenience [was] strictly prohibited.” Id. ¶ 12; Def. Ex. 9. USPIS policy further dictated that “[n]o employee shall obtain, use or disclose official, non-public information for other than authorized reasons” and that any “[d]eliberate falsification or misrepresentation in official communications, either written or oral, is prohibited.” Id. ¶ 13.
The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) is a criminal records database that was available to postal inspectors. Id. ¶ 14. In August 2014, Plaintiff applied for access to an additional database, the Consolidated Lead and Evaluation Reporting (CLEAR) database, which provides greater geographic reach than NCIC. Id. ¶ 15. Access to CLEAR required an application and vetting process, which involved a criminal background check. Id. ¶ 16; Def. Ex. 11. During the vetting, an arrest in Plaintiff's history had come to the agency's attention. [43] ¶ 16. Vargas met with Plaintiff in the cafeteria to ask him about it. Id. Plaintiff found the way Vargas conducted this conversation discriminatory because he believed Vargas would not have held such a conversation in the cafeteria with non-Black inspectors but would have instead had them in his office. Id. ¶ 18.
Next, Plaintiff met with Vargas, Demtschenko, assistant-inspector-in-charge Bill Hedrick, and Gomez in Gomez's office. Id. ¶ 19. Because it was agency policy to refer issues related to inspector arrests to the OIG, a separate law enforcement agency within the Postal Service with oversight over misconduct investigations, Gomez told Plaintiff that he had referred the matter to the OIG. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Gomez also told Plaintiff that he was transferring Plaintiff to the homeland security team during the investigation to protect Plaintiff and the agency. Id. ¶ 21.
OIG Special Agent David Enos, a white man, interviewed Plaintiff as part of the investigation. Id. ¶ 23. Agent Enos questioned Plaintiff about his arrest and, as relevant, about a 1999 civil legal action against Plaintiff involving unpaid rent. Id. ¶ 24. Regarding the outstanding rent, Agent Enos commented that Plaintiff “may want to take care of this debt so it can be off your record as a postal inspector.” Id. The OIG issued findings in this investigation, and Plaintiff was not disciplined as a result. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges that this investigation and the resulting transfer to homeland security was evidence of race discrimination as it was “excessive” and unfair because it meant that he had to transfer all his mail theft cases to a white colleague. Id. ¶ 26.
After his interview with Agent Enos, Plaintiff took action to pay the unpaid rent from the 1999 civil lawsuit from his college days at Illinois State University in Bloomington, Illinois. Id. ¶ 27. Specifically, Plaintiff noticed a hearing for January 9, 2015, in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in McLean County, Illinois to satisfy and dismiss the matter. Id. ¶ 28. On January 9, 2015, while on duty Plaintiff drove his agency-issued vehicle to Bloomington. Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff attended his court hearing and then performed five or six hours of postal inspection work in Bloomington. Id.; Def. Ex. 16. Plaintiff reported in an eDiary entry that he worked 9.5 hours for that day, did not “back out” any time for personal business or take any leave, and “[p]erformed vehicle and safety checks in the Bloomington/Normal zip area.” [43] ¶ 30.
At the court hearing, Plaintiff learned that he needed to pay the owner of the apartment before he could have the case dismissed. Id. ¶ 31. To locate the owner, Plaintiff searched a county database for deeds, and on January 12, 2015, he used a criminal records database at work (NCIC or CLEAR) to further investigate the property owner. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff admitted that these searches were considered personal business. Id. ¶ 33. After locating the owner, Plaintiff arranged to meet him in DeKalb, Illinois on January 28, 2015 to settle the debt. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff admitted that this meeting was also personal business. Id. Plaintiff drove his government vehicle from Chicago to DeKalb and met with the property owner, paid the settlement, and received the documents he needed to dismiss the case. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff performed postal work nearby. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff reported in an eDiary entry that he worked 9 hours that day doing “[s]eeding and carrier and vehicle checks in Dixon[,] IL,” and did not back out any time for personal activities or take any leave. Id. ¶ 36. However, Plaintiff's toll records reflected that he only spent about three total hours in Dixon that day. Id. ¶ 37.
On January 30, 2015, Plaintiff drove his government car to Bloomington, went to court, and resolved the matter against him, all while on duty. Id. ¶ 38. Like his previous...
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