Davis v. Director, Patuxent Inst.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1976
• Docket Number: 597,Nos. 478,612 and 862,s. 478
• Citation: 29 Md.App. 705,351 A.2d 905
• Parties: Ronald DAVIS v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 705

29 Md.App. 705

351 A.2d 905

Ronald DAVIS v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION.

Nos. 478, 597, 612 and 862.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 27, 1976.

Certiorari Denied May 5, 1976.

Donald B. W. Messenger, Assigned Public Defender, Beltsville, with whom was G. Dent Lynch, Jr., Assigned Public Defender, Beltsville, on the brief, for Davis

Donald R. Stutman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty., for Prince George's County, and William A. Swisher, State's Atty., for Baltimore City, and Anthony McCarthy and James S. Nickelsporn, Asst. State's Attys., for Prince George's County, and Stephen A. Wilder, Asst. State's Atty., for Baltimore City, on the brief, for Director, Patuxent Institution.

Leonard C. Redmond, III, Asst. Public Defender, with whom were Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, and Victoria A. Salner, Asst. Public Defender, on the brief, for Powell.

Philip L. Marcus, Assigned Public Defender, Wheaton, for Shorter.

Joseph F. McBride, Assigned Public Defender, Greenbelt, for Cane.

Argued before ORTH, C. J., and MORTON and MOYLAN, JJ.

ORTH, Chief Judge.

The primary issue in these appeals is whether the application of the preponderance of the evidence standard in defective delinquency proceedings offends the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. ¹ We hold that it does not.

THE LAW OF MARYLAND

It is the firmly established law of Maryland that the sufficiency of the evidence in a defective delinquency proceeding is to be tested by the preponderance of the evidence standard. ² This rule was early enunciated by the Court of Appeals, Purks v. State, 226 Md. 43, 171 A.2d 726 (1961), ³ consistently followed by that Court, e. g., Crews v. Director, 245 Md. 174, 180, 225 A.2d 436 (1967); Dickerson v. Director, 235 Md. 668, 670, 202 A.2d 765 (1964), and by the Court of Special Appeals, e. g., Long v. Director, 8 Md.App. 627, 632, 261 A.2d 819 (1970); Walker v. Director, 6 Md.App. 206, 211, 250 A.2d 900 (1969), and recently confirmed, explicitly by the Court of Special Appeals in Bush v. Director, 22 Md.App. 353, 360, 324 A.2d 162 (1974), and implicitly by the Court of Appeals in denying certiorari in that case, sub nom. Mazan v. Director, 272 Md. 745 (1974).

In Bush v. Director, supra, decided 8 August 1974, we were faced squarely with the contentions that the application of the preponderance of the evidence standard in defective delinquency proceedings denied the constitutional guarantees of due process of law and of equal protection of the laws. We held that those rights were not offended by the standard, thus maintaining inviolate the long standing rule "The short answer to such an argument is that when a person has committed a crime and is found to be deficient in either the intellectual or emotional qualities, or both, and to possess the other opprobrious qualities which render him a defective delinquent, it is not unreasonable for the legislature to treat him differently from the criminal not a defective delinquent, or the incompetent not a criminal.' (Emphasis supplied).'

of this State. The equal protection challenge to the application of the standard was on the ground that the test for the sufficiency of the evidence to commit a person as a defective delinquent was 'lower' than the test for the involuntary commitment of a person to mental health facilities under Code, art. 59, 'Mental Hygiene', and its associated regulations. Bush recognized that by § 6 of art. 59 'The Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene shall make such rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of this article and for the operation and administration of the Department (of Health and Mental Hygiene) as are needed.' The Court was aware that the Secretary had promulgated Regulation 10.04.03, effective 5 December 1970, applying 'to every patient whose admission is sought to be effected, on an involuntary basis to any mental health facility licensed by or under the jurisdiction of the Department. . . .', except institutions for the care of mentally retarded patients. The opinion pointed out that § 03G of the Regulation, as amended effective 1 October 1973, required that every patient who is involuntarily confined to a mental health facility is to be afforded a hearing, at which, in order to justify the admission or retention of the patient, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that he is suffering from a mental disorder, and is in need of institutional inpatient care or treatment, and presents a danger to his own life or safety or the life or safety of others. 22 Md.App., at 361, 324 A.2d 162. We perceived no denial of equal protection. Gilbert, J., speaking for the Court, observed that there were 'vital differences between the Secretary's regulations and Md.Ann.Code, art. 31B 'Defective Delinquency'.' The differences in procedure were set out in tabular form, and we declared: 'A perusal of the above comparison table makes it crystal clear that an alleged defective delinquent is not denied equal protection of the law.' Id., at 362, 324 A.2d at 168. We compared the elements of defective delinquency with the elements necessary to justify admission to a mental hygiene facility, at 362-363, 324 A.2d 162. We quoted with approval, at 365, 324 A.2d at 170, what Winter, J. said in Monroe v. Director, 227 F.Supp. 295, 303 (D.Md.1964) ⁴ in rejecting an equal protection attack upon the defective delinquency law grounded on the fact that defective[351 A.2d 909] delinquents are not eligible for parole:

We referred, at 366-367, 324 A.2d 162, to the distinctions made by Hammond, C. J. in Director v. Daniels, supra, at 30-31, 221 A.2d 397, between defective delinquents and those who are non compos mentis. We concluded, 22 Md.App., at 367, 324 A.2d 162, that Maryland's election to treat those persons alleged to be defective delinquents differently from those alleged to be subject to admission to a mental hygiene facility does not violate the equal protection rights. Upon denial of certiorari in Bush, sub nom., Mazan v. Director, 272 Md. 745 (1974), our holding therein stood as the law of this State.

THE EFFECT OF DOWER V. DIRECTOR

On 8 May 1975, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland decided Dower v. Director, 396 F.Upp. 1070. ⁵ Four inmates of Patuxent Institution, who had been convicted of felonies and adjudicated defective delinquents 'Under our decisions in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620) (1966), Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394) (1972), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435) (1972), petitioners' challenge to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law should be considered in relation to the criteria, procedures, and treatment that the State of Maryland makes available to other persons, not 'defective delinquents,' committed for compulsory psychiatric treatment. We are informed that the statutes governing civil commitment in Maryland are presently undergoing substantial revision, designed to provide greater substantive and procedural safeguards to committed persons. Accordingly it seems a particularly inopportune time for this Court to consider a comprehensive challenge to the Defective Delinquency Law.'

                sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that their original commitment to and continued confinement at, the Institution was in violation of their constitutional rights.  6  Among the contentions presented to the court were those regarding the standard of proof which were before us in Bush.  The federal District Court concluded, as did we, that Maryland's utilization of the preponderance of the evidence test in defective delinquency proceedings passed federal constitutional muster insofar as due process considerations were concerned.  But its view with respect to the equal protection ground was different from ours.  It quoted extensively from our discussion concerning the equal protection aspect of the preponderance of evidence standard and disagreed.  396 F.Supp., at 1089.  It held that 'equal protection principles require that there be utilized in a hearing involving determination or redetermination of defective delinquency a standard no less than the standard Maryland utilizes with regard to civil commitment.'  Id., at 1090.  The civil commitment standard, it found, was the clear and convincing evidence requirement of the Department of Mental Health and Hygiene Regulation 10.04.03G.  Therefore, the court concluded, any person who was determined to be a defective delinquent by application of the preponderance of the evidence standard on or after 1 October 1973 was denied equal protection of the law and was entitled to a new hearing.  7  The federal court reached its conclusion basically through Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 92 S.Ct. 2091, 32 L.Ed.2d 791 (1972).  Habeas corpus proceedings were instituted by certain inmates [351 A.2d 910] committed to Patuxent Institution as defective delinquents.  They challenged on constitutional grounds the criteria and  
                procedures that led to their commitment, and the conditions of their confinement.  Among their contentions was that they were entitled to put the State to the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The District Court denied relief sub nom.  Sas v. Maryland, 295 F.Supp. 389 (Md.1969), and the Court of Appeals affirmed sub nom.  Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 404 U.S. 999, 92 S.Ct. 567, 30 L.Ed.2d 552 (1971) to consider whether, and to what extent, the constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners applied to this kind of commitment process.  After briefing and oral argument, it appeared that the case did not present the issues in a manner that warranted the exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court.  By a per curiam opinion, to which Mr.

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