Davis v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 04-1866(RMU).
| Decision Date | 01 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 04-1866(RMU). |
| Citation | 503 F.Supp.2d 104 |
| Parties | Abraham DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Gary T. Brown, Gary T. Brown & Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Nicola N. Grey, DC Attorney General's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
This employment discrimination case comes before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff, Abraham Davis, brought this action against the defendant, the District of Columbia, alleging employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 et seq., ("ADEA"), and the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-615.51 et seq. (2005), ("Whistleblower Act"). For the following reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment and in part dismisses sua sponte the plaintiffs claims.
The plaintiffs claims stem from four alleged adverse employment actions: his denial of comparable pay at the DS-14 level and three nonselections for promotion. See generally Second Am. Compl. The plaintiff, a 67-year-old male, has been working for the defendant, the District of Columbia, since 1972. Id. ¶ 6. He eventually became a DS-13 Public Health Analyst for the Department of Health in the Maternal and Family Health Administration ("Family Health"). Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 2. In August 1999, the plaintiff's supervisor Michelle Davis asked him to develop a Men's Health Initiative ("MHI") to parallel the efforts already being implemented by the Women's Health Initiative. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 4 ("Davis, Decl.") ¶ 4 & Ex. 12 at 2. As the program developed, the plaintiff took on the responsibilities of Project Director and Coordinator1 for MHI. Id., Ex. 12 at 2.
The plaintiff claims his troubles began when Marilyn Seabrooks Myrdal ("Seabrooks") replaced Davis as the Chief of Family Health in May 2000. Pl.'s Opp'n at 4; Davis Decl. ¶ 7. In "late 2000/early 2001," the plaintiff asked Seabrooks for a promotion to the DS-14 level for his work as MHI Coordinator, but Seabrooks denied the pay increase.2 Pl.'s Opp'n at 30. In her deposition, Seabrooks indicated that while "there was really no discussion" specifically about the appropriate grade for the MHI Coordinator position when the plaintiff requested the promotion, management had an interest in establishing parity between the men's and women's positions. Id., Ex. 48 ("Seabrooks Dep.") at 252:9-14. Joyce Brooks, a Family Health manager familiar with the Men's and Women's Health Coordinator positions, later testified that both positions should be at the DS-14 level, id., Ex. 8 ("Brooks Dep.") at 63:22-64:5, and management later forwarded selection certificates3 to Seabrooks that, listed the position at the DS-14 level. Id., Ex. 25 (Selection Certificate, Dec. 2001), Ex. 29 (Selection Certificate, July 2002), Ex. 39 (Selection Certificate, Jan. 2004). Seabrooks eventually hired the plaintiffs replacement, Dr. Jackson Lee Davis II ("Dr.Davis"), at the DS-14 level in 2004. Id. at 31.
In early 2001, the plaintiff and Seabrooks's relationship deteriorated substantially. On April 1, 2002, Bernardine Booker Brown, an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") Officer, concluded that "supervisor/supervisee relations are so poor at this time that no beneficial relationship individually, as a team, or to the Department can come of this pairing." Id., Ex. 27 at 2338. Brooks, a Family Health supervisor and Seabrooks's friend, testified that the plaintiff and Seabrooks in general display "shrewd behavior toward one another," and "both have an axe to grind with one another." Brooks Dep. at 158:7-8, 15-16.
At the end of 2001, the plaintiff began applying for promotional positions within Family Health. Id. at 9. In total, he submitted six applications for three positions but he was never selected. Id. at 9-10, 12, 15. First, in November 2001, he applied for the Public Health Advisory Officer/MHI Coordinator Position ("Officer position"),4 and Seabrooks received the selection certification on December 19, 2001 with the plaintiff listed as the only candidate. Id. at 9. Seabrooks returned the selection certificate on January 28, 2002 having not selected the plaintiff "based on professional knowledge of applicant's work ethics and practice." Id., Ex. 25.
Second, the plaintiff applied for the Deputy Maternal and Child Health Officer Position ("Deputy position"), which opened on December 10, 2001. Id. at 9. Seabrooks received the selection certificate listing two D.C. residents (the plaintiff and another highly qualified candidate), but she returned the certificate on March 8, 2002 without selecting either candidate. Id. at 11 & Ex. 26. Seabrooks again wrote that she did not select the plaintiff "[b]ased on professional knowledge of candidate's work ethics and practice," while for the other candidate she did not submit remarks. Id., Ex. 26.
Third, the plaintiff applied on December 20, 2001 for the Supervisory Public Health Analyst Position ("Analyst position"), which opened on December 11, 2001. Id. at 9. Although the Vacancy Announcement indicated that Human Resources would begin to evaluate the applications on December 26, 2001, management prematurely requested the selection certificate on December 19, 2001. Id. at 10. In her deposition, Seabrooks testified that management expedited the certificate because it needed to fill the position immediately to receive departmental bonus dollars that had recently become available. Seabrooks Dep. 246:18-247:5. Colleen Whitmore, a Maryland resident who had been working in that position temporarily since October 2001, applied for the position on December 17, 2001 Pl.'s Opp'n at 9-10, 23 & Ex. 24. Because she was the only applicant listed on the certificate at the time management made the expedited request, they accepted her application on December 20, 2001 without conducting an interview. Id., Ex. 23 at 2. According to the returned selection certificate, management did not receive the plaintiffs application until after selecting Whitmore. Id., Ex. 23 at 2.
While seeking these promotions, the plaintiff remained employed as an analyst for Family Health, and on March 15, 2002, Seabrooks relocated him to another office where he was the only Family Health employee located in the building who reported to Seabrooks. Id. at 13. The plaintiff alleges that, as a result, he suffered the strain of relocating and the loss of his parking privileges. Id. Seabrooks did not, however, relocate his female coworkers, who were able to keep their parking privileges. Id.
The plaintiff continued to apply to the Officer and Deputy positions without success. Id. at 12. He applied a second time for the Officer position in July 2002, as the only highly qualified candidate, but Seabrooks returned the selection certificate without selecting him on September 25, 2002. Id., Ex. 29. In August 2002, the plaintiff and another candidate, William Hunter,5 applied for the Deputy Position, and on December 23, 2002, Seabrooks returned the selection certificate without selecting either candidate. Id., Ex. 30. While Hunter recalled only submitting one application for the Deputy Position, id., Ex. 33 (Hunter Dep., 9:12-17, May 9 2006), his name appeared on a second selection certificate along with a nonresident female for the position on January 6, 2003. Id, Ex. 32. The plaintiff alleges that Seabrooks sent a memorandum to the D.C. Office of Personnel requesting the plaintiffs name be excluded from future selection certificates for the Deputy position. Id, Ex. 31. This, the plaintiff argues, was to sidestep the, preference given to D.C. residents. Id. at 27; D.C. Municipal Regulation § 301.10. Having two nonresidents to choose from, Seabrooks selected Hunter for the position and returned the selection certificate on April 17, 2003. Pl.'s Opp'n., Ex. 32.
When management listed the Officer position a third time in 2004, the plaintiff applied, but management again removed his name from the selection certificate. Id. at 15. The plaintiff protested by sending a letter to the Mayor, and as a result, Seabrooks received an amended certificate on February 6, 2004, which included his name. Id., Ex. 39. Five days later the plaintiff was interviewed for the position. Id. at 15. That same day, Seabrooks sent a memorandum to her supervisor Ronald Lewis indicating that the interview panel unanimously recommended Dr. Davis because of his experience as a physician, his experience as a military officer, his excellent communication skills and his high marks from the interview committee.6 Id., Ex. 40. Lewis accepted the recommendation on February 11, 2004. Id.
Seabrooks released the plaintiff from his duties as MHI Coordinator on February 15, 2001. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 12 ("Response to Proposed Reprimand") at 3. Because he was the only employee working on the Initiative, all work for the MHI projects ceased. Seabrooks Dep. 48:6-16. Shortly thereafter, on February 27, 2001, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Inspector General's Office against Seabrooks, alleging hiring improprieties and retaliation. Pl's Opp'n at 8 & Ex. 15.
In August 2001, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which indicated that he had complained...
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