Davis v. DOLLAR RENT A CAR SYSTEMS, INC.

• Decision Date: 17 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 5D02-599.,5D02-599.
• Citation: Davis v. Dollar Rent a Car Systems Inc., 909 So.2d 297 (Fla. App. 2004)
• Citation: 909 So. 2d 297
• Parties: Cecilia DAVIS, etc., Appellant, v. DOLLAR RENT A CAR SYSTEMS, INC., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

909 So.2d 297

Cecilia DAVIS, etc., Appellant, v.DOLLAR RENT A CAR SYSTEMS, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 5D02-599.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

November 17, 2004.

Opinion Denying Rehearing September 1, 2005.

Madison B. McClellan and Linda L. Weiksnar of Gary, Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis, McManus, Watson & Sperando, Stuart; and Diran V. Seropian and Russell S. Bohn of Edna L. Caruso, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellant.

Jack W. Shaw, Jr. and George E. Carr of George E. Carr, P.A., Orlando for AppelleeBeverly Williams.

Jeanelle G. Bronson and Stephen P. Matzuk of Grower, Ketcham, Rutherford, Bronson, Eide & Telan, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee, Orange County Board of County Commissioners.

No Appearance for AppelleesDollar Rent A Car Systems, Inc., Walden Auto Leasing, III, Inc., JSK Trucking, Inc., Jose Das Garcia Guimaraes, Diamond Transportation Services, Inc., Melanie Winn and Shafter Williams.

SAWAYA, C.J.

Cecilia Davis, as personal representative of the estate of her deceased daughter, Twanda Green, appeals a summary final judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Beverly Williams, in a wrongful death action arising out of an automobile accident that occurred at an intersection adjacent to property owned by Williams.There are two issues we must resolve: 1) did the failure of Davis to respond to a request for admissions asking her to admit or deny that Williams owed a duty of care to Twanda establish as a matter of law that no duty was owed; and 2) did Williams, as owner of non-commercial property, owe a duty of care regarding foliage on the property that blocked Twanda's view of the intersection that allegedly caused the fatal accident.We answer no and yes respectively.We will explain our answers by discussing the factual and procedural background of the instant case, followed by a discussion of each issue in the order presented.

Factual And Procedural Background

Twanda Green, an employee of Diamond Transportation Services, Inc., an automobile transportation service, was involved in a traffic accident as she drove in a procession of other employees who were attempting to shuttle rental cars from one location to another.The fatal accident occurred at the intersection of Sidney Hayes Road and Pine Street in Orlando.A traffic control sign at the intersection directed Twanda and the others traveling on Pine Street to yield to traffic approaching on Sidney Hayes Road.As Twanda, driving the fifth of six vehicles in the procession, approached the intersection, Twanda reduced her speed and slowly pulled out into the intersection to make a left turn.As she proceeded through the intersection, she was hit broadside by a dump truck driven by another defendant approaching the intersection via Sidney Hayes Road.Twanda died as a result of the injuries she sustained in this collision.Davis alleges that Twanda's vision of the intersecting roadway and the approaching traffic thereon was obscured for a distance of twelve feet by foliage located on property owned by Williams at the corner of the intersection.

Davis filed a wrongful death action against several defendants, including Williams.¹Williams served the request for admissions asking Davis to admit or deny that Williams owed or assumed a duty of care to motorists passing through the intersection adjacent to Williams' property to maintain the property so that the foliage thereon would not block the motorists' view of the intersection.Davis did not timely respond and, accordingly, the trial court entered the summary judgment under review, concluding that Williams did not owe a duty of care in the instant case.Davis appeals, contending that her failure to timely answer the request for admissions did not establish as a matter of law that Williams owed no duty of care.Alternatively, Williams argues that even if Davis' assertion is correct, as a matter of law she did not owe a duty of care based on the obstructing foliage and, therefore, the summary judgment should be affirmed.We will first discuss the failure to timely respond to the request for admissions.

Failure To Timely Respond To The Request For Admissions

The parties devote much time and effort to the issue whether Davis' failure to respond to the request for admissions established as a matter of law that Williams did not owe a duty of care to Twanda.Specifically, Williams requested Davis admit that:

7.Beverly Williams at no time had a duty to motorists passing through the intersection of Pine Street and Sidney Hayes Road in Orlando, Orange County, Florida to maintain the property on the northeast corner of the intersection so that the vegetation would not obstruct the vision of such motorists.

. . . .

9.Beverly Williams at no time assumed a duty to motorists passing through the intersection of Pine Street and Sidney Hayes Road in Orlando, Orange County, Florida to maintain the property on the northeast corner of the intersection so that the vegetation would not obstruct the vision of such motorists.

Requests for admission are governed by rule 1.370,Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part that "[a]party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission of the truth of any matters within the scope of rule 1.280(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request."Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(a).Prior to its 1972amendment, this rule "provided that a party could serve a written request for `. . . the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request.'"Salazar v. Valle,360 So.2d 132, 134(Fla. 3d DCA1978).The case law that interpreted the earlier version of the rule held that only requests directed to factual issues that did not lie at the heart of the case were appropriate and that requests seeking admissions relating to conclusions of law were similarly inappropriate and did not require a response.SeeOld Equity Life Ins. Co. v. Suggs,263 So.2d 280, 281(Fla. 2d DCA1972)("Essentially, this was not a request for admission as to a fact, but rather a request for admission of a conclusion; the conclusion being that Old Equity was legally liable for the full amount claimed by Suggs.The Request for Admission was thus objectionable on its face and did not legally call for a response under the rules.")(citingCity of Miami v. Bell,253 So.2d 742(Fla. 3d DCA1971);Graham v. Eisele,245 So.2d 682(Fla. 3d DCA1971)).

The committee notes appended to the current version of rule 1.370 specifically state that the rule was amended to "eliminate distinctions between questions of opinion, fact, and mixed questions."Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370 committee notes.We conclude that while the current rule now allows for requests directed to opinions, facts, and the application of law to facts, it continues to make no provision for requests seeking a purely legal conclusion.Accordingly, because the response to a request seeking an admission or denial regarding whether a duty of care is owed is a purely legal conclusion, prior case law, which holds that such requests are inappropriate and that a response is thus unnecessary, is still applicable.²Therefore, we conclude that Davis' failure to respond to the request for admissions relating to the legal issue of whether Williams owed Twanda a duty of care may not be the basis for a summary judgment in favor of Williams.SeePandol Bros., Inc. v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Fla.,450 So.2d 592, 594(Fla. 4th DCA1984)("Request number 8 was not objectionable as asking for a conclusion of law, but would more appropriately be characterized as requiring `an application of law to fact,' permissible under Salazar v. Valle,360 So.2d 132, 134(Fla. 3d DCA1978).").

Next, we will address whether a common law duty of care was owed by Williams to passing motorists.

Common Law Duty Of Care

Williams, an owner of private noncommercial property, argues that she did not owe a duty of care to Twanda, a motorist on a public roadway whose vision of the intersection and highway adjacent to Williams' property was obscured by foliage thereon.The trial court agreed, eschewing the foreseeable zone of risk analysis that the supreme court established in McCain v. Florida Power Corp.,593 So.2d 500(Fla.1992), to determine whether a duty of care exists.Instead, the trial court adopted a blanket rule that there is no common law duty owed by a private landowner whose property obscures the view of motorists on an adjacent highway or intersection.Accordingly, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Williams.For reasons we will now explain, we conclude that the foreseeable zone of risk standard must be applied and that application of this standard to the instant case prohibits the summary judgment entered in favor of Williams.

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).The courts must exercise restraint in granting summary judgments because they deprive a party of his or her right to trial.Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson,873 So.2d 1182(Fla.2003).Accordingly, if the court has any doubts, those doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.Clay Electric.In the instant case, we must review the trial court's ruling granting Williams' motion for summary judgment de novo because it poses a question of law.Id.

Williams contends that decisions rendered prior to McCain apply and that she owed no common law duty of care to Twanda in the instant case.SeePedigo v. Smith,395 So.2d 615, 616(Fla. 5th DCA1981)("[T]he owner of land is under no affirmative duty to remedy conditions...