Davis v. Dotson
| Decision Date | 20 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 8:19-cv-2235-T-36TGW |
| Parties | DONOVAN DAVIS, JR., Plaintiff, v. ROY DOTSON, JR., KARA WICK, and ANDREW BAZEMORE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Kara Wick's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 11), Defendants Roy Dotson, Jr. and Andrew Bazemore's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 17), Plaintiff's responses thereto (Docs. 16, 28), Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (Doc. 26), Defendants' response in opposition (Doc. 32), Plaintiff's Objections to the Magistrate's Order (Doc. 34), and Defendants' response in opposition (Doc. 37). The Court, having considered the motions and being fully advised in the premises will grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, deny Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend, and overrule Plaintiff's objection to the Magistrate Judge's Order.
Plaintiff Donovan Davis, Jr. ("Plaintiff" or "Davis") filed a Verified Complaint ("Complaint") against Defendants Roy Dotson, Jr. ("Dotson"), Kara Wick ("Wick"), and Andrew Bazemore ("Bazemore"). Doc. 1. Dotson and Bazemore are officers of the United States SecretService and Wick is an Assistant United States Attorney. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. Davis filed this action against them in their individual capacities for erasing electronically-stored data contained on a computer hard drive that had been confiscated by Secret Service Agents pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. Id. ¶¶ 8, 36-38. Davis alleges that Dotson destroyed the data, despite knowing that it belonged to Davis, to obstruct justice because Dotson believed the information on the hard drive could prove that Dotson and others deceived a federal district court. Id. ¶¶ 34-36. Davis also alleges that Wick authorized the destruction of the electronic property unrelated to Davis' crime. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
Davis alleges that Dotson deprived Davis of his property without due process and seeks damages for his injuries. Id. ¶¶ 45-55. Davis claims he is entitled to compensation of more than $100,000 from Dotson. Id. ¶¶ 57-60. Davis alleges three claims against Dotson, including a violation of Davis' rights to due process, a claim for compensation, and a claim alleging that Dotson violated his oath to uphold the United States Constitution by allowing Davis' property to be damaged while in his care. Id. ¶¶ 45-66.
Likewise, Davis alleges that Wick violated Davis' due process rights by approving the destruction of his property, raises a claim for compensation in an amount exceeding $100,000, and claims that Wick violated her constitutional duty of care assumed when she took an oath to uphold the Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 67-86.
With respect to Bazemore, Davis alleges that he was responsible for the hard drive with dominion and control over it. Id. ¶¶ 88-89. Davis also alleges that Bazemore erased the hard drive's electronically-stored data without notice to Davis and despite knowing that it contained personal property that was not subject to any forfeiture order. Id. ¶¶ 90-91. Accordingly, based on these allegations, Davis also alleges claims that Bazemore violated Davis' due process rights,that he is entitled to compensation in excess of $100,000, and that Bazemore violated his constitutional duty of care. Id. ¶¶ 88-104.
Wick filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against her in her individual capacity because such claims are not authorized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Doc. 11 at 5-10. Alternatively, Wick argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's claims. Id. at 11-15. Defendants Davis and Bazemore likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss presenting the same arguments. Doc. 17.
Plaintiff opposes Defendants' motions. Docs. 16, 28. Plaintiff argues in response to Wick's Motion to Dismiss that he has an implied cause of action under the United States Constitution and the Bivens doctrine should be expanded to include his claims. Doc. 16. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Wick is not entitled to immunity. Id. Likewise, Plaintiff argues in response to Davis and Bazemore's Motion to Dismiss that his claims are covered by Bivens or, alternatively, that Bivens should be expanded to provide a remedy for his claims. Doc. 28. Plaintiff also argues that Davis and Bazemore are not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
After the Motions to Dismiss were filed, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, together with the proposed amended complaint. Doc. 26. The proposed amended complaint does not address the concerns raised by Defendants in their Motions to Dismiss, but instead adds additional claims. Doc. 26-1. Defendants oppose Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend, arguing that amendment would be futile. Doc. 32.
Further, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to disqualify Defendants' counsel, arguing that a statement contained in a Motion to Dismiss suggests counsel is a fact witness. Doc. 24. Defendants respond that the statement was mere inference based on the allegations of the Complaint and Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing counsel should be disqualified. Doc.27. Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify was referred to the Magistrate Judge, who entered a paperless Order denying Plaintiff's motion for the reasons contained in Defendants' response. Doc. 29. Plaintiff objects to this order. Doc. 34. Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge was not authorized to rule on the motion because Plaintiff did not consent to jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge. Id. at 2. Plaintiff further argues that Defendants' counsel and counsel's office—the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida—must be disqualified because Plaintiff's ex-wife worked for that office. Id. at 4. This conflict of interest resulted in the United States Attorney's Office recusing itself in a different proceeding. Id. Plaintiff also provides various allegations against Defendants' counsel and the United States Attorney's Office as to why they should not be permitted to act as counsel in this case. Id. at 6-13.
Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify is a pre-trial motion that falls within the United States Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction under 28 United States Code Section 636(b) and Local Rule 6.01(c)(18). Motions to disqualify counsel are non-dispositive matters which may be referred to a magistrate judge and reviewed by the district court under the "clearly erroneous standard."2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); United States v. Fla. Cities Water Co., 93-281-CIV-FTM-21, 1995 WL 340980, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 1995); see also Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 6:09-cv-1968-Orl-19KRS, 2010 WL 2243708, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2010). Thus, the Court will reverse the ruling of the Magistrate Judge only if it is "clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading must include a "short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Labels, conclusions and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action are not sufficient. Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere naked assertions, too, are insufficient. Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, would "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). The court, however, is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion stated as a "factual allegation" in the complaint. Id. Therefore, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. (citation omitted).
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court holds the pleading to a less stringent standard and construes the complaint more liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (). Although courts afford liberal construction of pro se litigants' pleadings, litigants appearing pro se must adhere to the procedural requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the Local Rules for the Middle District of Florida. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) () (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff seeks review of the Magistrate Judge's paperless Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Show Cause Order on Whether to Disqualify Defendants' Attorney Lacy Harwell. Docs. 29, 34. In the Motion to Disqualify, Plaintiff contends that Harwell is a material witness who may not represent Defendants. Doc. 24. Plaintiff bases this contention on a statement in the Motion to Dismiss that the hard drive "contained commingled information," which Plaintiff contends Harwell could know only by investigating evidence and becoming a witness to these proceedings. Id. at 2.
Defendants respond that this is nonsense. Doc. 27 at 4. Defendants argue that counsel's statement on which Plaintiff bases his claim is a reasonable interpretation of the Complaint and that even if Defendants' counsel was...
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