Davis v. Dunbar
Decision Date | 22 April 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 21783.,21783. |
Citation | 394 F.2d 754 |
Parties | Rufus Earl DAVIS, Appellant, v. Walter DUNBAR, Director, California Department of Correction, et al., Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Rufus Earl Davis, in pro. per.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen. of State of Cal., Robert R. Granucci, Jerome C. Utz, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.
Before CHAMBERS, MERRILL, and ELY, Circuit Judges.
The appellant is a California state prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence of confinement for a period of six months to ten years. The sentence followed his final conviction, in the California courts, of the offense of assault with a deadly weapon. Cal.Pen.Code § 245. After certain unsuccessful post-conviction proceedings in the state courts, Davis filed his petition for habeas corpus in the court below. The court denied the petition without having conducted an evidentiary hearing, and Davis appeals.1
The petition set forth contentions which had been rejected in post-conviction proceedings in the state courts. It also presented two new claims. In the first of these, appellant contended that since the information charged him only with assault with intent to commit murder under Cal.Pen.Code § 217 and assault with intent to commit rape under Cal. Pen.Code § 220, it was insufficient to support conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. In the second, he contended that he had been deprived of the effective assistance of competent counsel in his appeal to the California appellate courts.
Insofar as the petition in the court below was based upon the two contentions not previously advanced in the state courts, its denial was proper. A state convict must exhaust all available state remedies before he is properly in a position to urge a federal court to interfere with his conviction.2 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963).
The first of the other grounds for the petition — those grounds previously rejected by the state courts — was that the state trial court improperly permitted the introduction into evidence of statements taken from appellant in violation of the rights prescribed by Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). Appellant's trial, however, commenced on June 16, 1964, six days prior to the Supreme Court's issuance of its opinion in Escobedo; hence, the principle of Escobedo is inapplicable. Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966).
Davis next complained of the introduction into evidence of a gun which he alleged to have been unlawfully seized during an illegal search. Three days after his arrest, the police, without a warrant, had searched a room where Davis lodged and had discovered the weapon. It could well be that, had there been an objection, the receiving of the gun into evidence would have been constitutionally forbidden. There was, however, no objection to the introduction of the evidence. In fact, appellant's attorney expressly waived objection.3 See Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965); Nelson v. People of State of California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964, 86 S.Ct. 452, 15 L.Ed.2d 367 (1965).
Based upon the foregoing, the District Court would have been required, except for two factors, to conduct an evidentiary hearing. One consideration which justifies its refusal to have done so is that the prosecution concealed no evidence from the defense, nor did it engage in any deceit whatsoever. Cf. Lee v. United...
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