Davis v. Freeman
| Decision Date | 29 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:15-cv-208,1:15-cv-208 |
| Parties | TIFFANY DAVIS, Petitioner, v. VICKI FREEMAN, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tiffany Davis, an inmate at the Tennessee Prison for Women, is serving a thirty-year sentence after being found guilty by a jury of the Marshall County (Tennessee) Circuit Court of the following crimes involving cocaine: four counts of sale, six counts of delivery, two counts of conspiracy to sell, and one count of the lesser included offense of facilitation of sale. (Doc. No. 38-2, PageID# 327-44; Doc. No. 38-17, PageID# 1447.) Davis initially filed this habeas corpus action pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) This Court appointed counsel for Davis and ordered the submission of an amended petition (Doc. No. 9), which counsel then filed (Doc. No. 16). Respondent has filed an answer to the petition (Doc. No. 40) along with the state court record (Doc. Nos. 38, 49). Davis has also filed a motion to amend her petition (Doc. No. 55) and a motion for discovery (Doc. No. 48). Respondent filed a response in opposition to Davis's motion for discovery (Doc. No. 52) to which Davis filed a reply (Doc. No. 56). Respondent concedes both that the Davis's petition was timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and that it is Davis's first application for federal habeas relief.1 (Doc. No. 40, PageID# 1643.)
Davis has requested that the Court "[h]old an evidentiary hearing on [her] claims" but she has not explained how such a hearing would help her develop those claims. (Doc. No. 16, PageID# 79.) This Court need not hold an evidentiary hearing where "the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). The Court must consider Davis's claims in light of the "deferential standards prescribed by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)]," under which a state court's factual findings are presumed correct subject to rebuttal by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Having reviewed Davis's arguments and the underlying record, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not required. Davis is not entitled to relief under AEDPA's standards. Her petition will be denied, as will the motion to amend (Doc. No. 55) and motion for discovery (Doc. No. 48). This case will be dismissed.
Davis was prosecuted as a result of her connection to eight separate controlled cocaine purchases that were conducted using confidential informants. State v. Davis, No. M2010-01779-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1372078, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2012) (Davis I); (Doc. No. 38-17, PageID# 1447). On November 18, 2009, the Marshall County Grand Jury indicted Davis, charging her with eight counts of the sale of cocaine, eight counts of delivery of cocaine, and two counts of conspiracy to sell cocaine. (Doc. No. 38-1, PageID# 195-214.) From April 12 to April 14, 2010, Davis was tried before a jury in the Marshall County Circuit Court (hereinafter, the trial court), which found her guilty of one count of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine (a Class C felony), three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine (a Class B felony), three counts of delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine (a Class C felony), three counts of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine (a Class B felony), two counts of conspiracy to sell 0.5 grams or more ofcocaine (a Class C felony), and one count of the lesser included offense of facilitation of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine (a Class C felony). Davis I, 2012 WL 1372078, at *1; (Doc. No. 38-2, PageID# 327-44). The jury found Davis not guilty of the remaining five counts. (Doc. No. 38-2, PageID# 330, 333, 335, 341, 343.) Davis was represented at trial by attorney Terry Hernando. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 8.)
On June 2, 2010, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Davis I, 2012 WL 1372078, at *2. The trial court merged alternative theories so that only one conviction remained from each criminal episode. Id. At the sentencing hearing, the State introduced Davis's seven prior Class B felony convictions, which enabled the trial court to find that Davis was a "career offender" and impose a sentence of fifteen years for each Class C felony and thirty years for each Class B felony, all to run concurrently. Id. However, because Davis was serving probation for a prior sixteen-year sentence at the time of the offenses relevant to this action, the trial court ordered that Davis's sentence run consecutive to that sentence. Id.
On July 8, 2010, Davis filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain her convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering that her thirty-year sentence be consecutive to her prior sixteen-year sentence. (Doc. No. 38-3, PageID# 354.) The trial court denied that motion on July 29, 2010, and appointed Hernando to represent Davis on appeal. (Id. at PageID# 356.)
Davis filed her notice of appeal on August 19, 2010 (Doc. No. 38-2, PageID# 347), raising the same issues as in her motion for a new trial. (Doc. No. 38-14, PageID# 1339.) Specifically, she argued that the testimony of the confidential informant witnesses who helped conduct the controlled cocaine transactions was often the only evidence linking her to those transactions and that the testimony was so biased—as a result of deals the informants had struck with the police—that a reasonable jury could not have believed it. (Id. at PageID# 1370-83.) Davis also argued that it was improper for the trial court to consider her prior criminal history in finding her to be a "career offender" and in sentencing her consecutively. (Id. at PageID# 1386.) On April 18, 2012, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the jury's decision to credit the testimony of the informant witnesses was not improper and that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support Davis's convictions. Davis I, 2012 WL 1372078, at *1. The TCCA also held that it has repeatedly affirmed that a defendant's prior record may be considered both to determine the length of her sentence and to impose consecutive sentencing.2 Id. at *20. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on August 15, 2012. (Doc. No. 38-19.)
After losing her direct appeal, Davis made three further attempts to obtain relief from her conviction in state court. On October 29, 2012, Davis filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court (Doc. No. 49-1), which she amended with appointed counsel James Frazier's aid (Doc. No. 49-2). In that petition, Davis argued that she was convicted by a biased jury and that her trial counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) counsel failed to strike Casey Davis (someone Davis knew) from the jury; (2) counsel failed to call Gail Davis as a witness; (3) counsel urged Davis's friends and family to encourage her to accept a plea offer and complained that the case was too difficult for him; (4) counsel failed to interview witnesses and failed to adequately prepare for trial; (5) counsel had a conflict of interest in that he had previously represented confidential informant Pamela Goetz in a previous case; and (6) counsel failed to sufficientlycross-examine Goetz regarding her identification of Davis. (Id. at PageID# 1704-05.) In an order issued on May 6, 2013, the trial court found that trial counsel's failure to challenge juror Corey Davis, failure to call Gail Davis as a witness, and refusal to withdraw from representing Davis did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel; it did not reach Davis's other claims. (Doc. No. 49-4, PageID# 1709-10.) Davis did not appeal that decision (Doc. No. 16, PageID# 67).
On December 31, 2013, Davis, proceeding pro se, initiated a state habeas petition in the trial court in which she claimed that her sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and again argued that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel (although she did not specify on what grounds). Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101; (Doc. No. 38-13, PageID# 1292-95). The trial court rejected those arguments, explaining that the merger of many of Davis's convictions resolved any double jeopardy concerns and that ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be litigated in state habeas corpus proceedings. (Doc. No. 38-20, PageID# 1573-76.) Davis pressed the same arguments on appeal, clarifying that trial counsel had been ineffective by allowing her to be tried on charges for which she was not indicted. (Id. at PageID# 1566.) The TCCA affirmed the trial court, explaining that neither a violation of double jeopardy nor the Sixth Amendment right to counsel provides a basis for state habeas relief. Davis v. Jones, No. M2014-00386-CCA-R3-HC, 2014 WL 3749443, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 30, 2014) (Davis II); (Doc. No. 38-22, PageID# 1607-09.)
Finally, again proceeding pro se, Davis filed a petition in the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis on December 22, 2014, in which she argued that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately explain the charges that had been brought against her and again protested that she had not been indicted on all charges. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-101; (Doc. No. 34-1, PageID# 174-76). In an affidavit attached to her petition, Davis also averred that she was never arraigned.(Doc. No. 49-6, PageID# 1714.) The trial court rejected Davis's petition on several grounds, finding that (1) Davis's petition was based on allegations that were either inaccurate or previously addressed, (2) none of Davis's allegations could constitute the "newly discovered evidence" that forms the basis of a viable coram nobis claim, and (3) her petition appeared to be time-barred. (Id. at PageID# 1716.) Davis did not appeal that decision. (Doc. No. 16, PageID# 68.)
Davis timely...
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