Davis v. Gaines

Decision Date01 October 1881
Citation104 U.S. 386,26 L.Ed. 757
PartiesDAVIS v. GAINES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.

The facts are stated fully in the opinion of the court.

Mr. J. D. Rouse for the appellant.

Mr. John S. Whitaker, contra.

MR. JUSTICE WOODS delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a bill in equity filed by Myra Clark Gaines, the appellee, against Minor Kenner, the intestate of Eliza Davis, the appellant, and a large number of other defendants, to recover real estate, of which she claimed to be the devisee under the will of her father, Daniel Clark. The defendants were alleged to be in possession respectively of distinct parcels of the property sued for.

The facts, so far as they concern the controversy between the appellant and appellee, were as follows: Daniel Clark purchased the real estate in dispute between them from one Stephen Henderson, on Dec. 16, 1812, wholly upon credit. The purchase price was $120,000, to secure which a mortgage was retained in the act of sale. On May 20, 1811, he executed and published what then purported to be his last will and testament, as follows:——

'In the name of God, amen. I, Daniel Clark, of New Orleans, do make this my last will and testament.

'Imprimis. I order that all my just debts be paid.

'Second. I leave and bequeath unto my mother, Mary Clark, now of Germantown, in the State of Pennsylvania, all the estate, whether real or personal, which I may die possessed of.

'Third. I hereby nominate and appoint my friends Richard Relf and Beverly Chew my executors, with power to settle everything relative to my estate.

'DANIEL CLARK.

'NEW ORLEANS, 20 May, 1811.'

He died Aug. 16, 1813, and on the next day the will was proven before the Probate Court for the Parish of Orleans, and on the 27th of that month letters testamentary were issued to Richard Relf as sole executor, Chew being absent from the State.

The appellant claimed title to the plantation under a sale thereof made Nov. 8, 1813, by Thomas Beale, register of wills, at public auction, to Michel Fortier and Omer Fortier, for $120,000, by authority, as she asserted, of an order of the Probate Court. Relf, the executor, in pursuance of the sale, conveyed the property to the purchasers by deed, in which he stipulated to apply the purchase-money, as fast as received, to the discharge of the mortgage of $120,000 placed on it by Daniel Clark.

The purchase-money was so applied, and the entire sum secured by the mortgage, with the interest thereon, was thus discharged.

The property came into the possession of Minor Kenner, whose estate the appellant represents, as owner, by regular chain of conveyances from the vendees of Michel and Omer Fortier.

The title of the appellee was derived under the will of Daniel Clark executed July 13, 1813, which was filed for probate in the Probate Court of the Parish of Orleans on Jan. 18, 1855, and which by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana on Dec. 17, 1855, was recognized as the last will and testament of Daniel Clark, and ordered to be recorded and executed as such.

The second item of this will was as follows: 'Second, I do hereby acknowledge that may beloved Myra, who is now living in the family of Samuel B. Davis, is my legitimate and only daughter, and that I leave and bequeath unto her, the said Myra, all the estate whether real or personal of which I may die possessed, subject only to the payment of certain legacies hereinafter named.'

Both parties, therefore, trace title to Daniel Clark.

Prima facie the title of the appellee to the property in dispute under the provision of this will, which is the later and last will of Daniel Clark, is clear.

The controversy, therefore, depends upon the three defences set up by the appellant.

The record shows that the will of May 20, 1811, was duly admitted to probate by the Probate Court of the Parish of Orleans, and ordered to be executed; that within the year following the order of probate, to wit, on Aug. 27, 1813, upon the petition of the executor, an order for the sale of the real and personal property of the testator was made by the court having jurisdiction thereon; that an inventory was begun by Thomas Beale, register of wills for the Parish of Orleans, on Aug. 28, 1813, und r the direction of said Probate Court, in which the plantation sued for was included as a part of the estate of Daniel Clark; that on Nov. 8, 1813, pursuant to said order, Beale, the register of wills, sold and adjudicated the plantation to Michel Fortier and Omer Fortier for the sum of $120,000; and that on Nov. 11, 1813, Relf, the executor, made an act of sale to the purchasers.

The appellant, therefore, contends, first, that by virtue of said will and its probate, and the order of sale, and the sale and conveyance thereunder, the said Michel and Omer Fortier acquired a good and valid title to said premises, which, by mesne conveyances from them, was vested in her intestate.

The record further shows that the act of sale recited the existence of the mortgage for $120,000 placed upon the property by Daniel Clark in favor of Stephen Henderson, on Dec. 16, 1812, and his executor bound himself to discharge the same out of the purchase-money, as it should be paid by the purchasers, the Fortiers, and that said mortgage was in fact discharged and paid by the application thereto of said purchase-money.

The appellant therefore contends, secondly, that there can be no decree in favor of the appellee for the property until the purchase-money which was applied to the payment of the debts of the testator is repaid or tendered, if it shall turn out that the Fortiers were purchasers in good faith.

The appellant contends, thirdly, that from Nov. 8, 1813, until Jan. 3, 1866, when process was served in this case, she, and those under whom she claims, held continuous, peaceable, and unequivocal possession of said plantation, and that neither said Michel and Omer Fortier, at the time they purchased the plantation, nor any of the parties through whom she claims title, had any knowledge, information, or belief of the making or existence of the last will of Daniel Clark, executed in 1813; that the various persons who claimed title to said property under the sale made to Michel and Omer Fortier possessed the same in good faith and under a just title as owners, and that each of them had the right to acquire the same by prescription; and she pleads the prescription of ten, twenty, and thirty years in bar of the bill of complaint.

The first question for consideration is whether or not the proceedings of Relf, the sale made by the Register of Wills under the order of the Probate Court, and the deed of Relf as executor in pursuance thereof, vested a title to the plantation in the purchasers.

The code of 1808 was in force when the proceedings which resulted in the sale to the Fortiers were taken. Article 169, book 3, tit. 2, of that code declares: 'When of the testator's heirs some are absent or not represented in this territory, the testamentary executor, whether the seisin be granted to him or not, and whether those heirs be forced or voluntary, shall be authorized to take possession of the property of the succession, to cause it to be sold, and to remain in possession of the portion accruing to the absent heir or heirs, deducting the debts and legacies, until those heirs shall have sent their power of attorney, or till the expiration of they year of the testamentary execution.'

By the will of 1811 it appeared that Mary Clark, the mother of testator, who was constituted his universal legatee, and thereby became his heir (Civil Code, art. 880), was absent from the State of Louisiana. Moreover, 'the granting of the license to sell was an adjudication upon all the facts necessary to give jurisdiction, and whether they existed or not is wholly immaterial if no appeal was taken.' Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319.

It is, therefore, not disputed that, upon the ground of the absence from the State of the universal legatee, it was competent for the Probate Court, upon the application of the executor, to make an order for the sale of the testator's property.

The jurisdiction of the Probate Court of the Parish of Orleans to admit to probate and record the wills of deceased persons is unquestio ed.

Its power and authority to order a sale of the property of a testator, by virtue of article 169, book 3, tit. 2, of the code of 1808, is not and cannot be disputed. If the Fortiers purchased in good faith under an order of sale made by the Probate Court, for a valuable consideration, without any knowledge of the later will of Daniel Clark, and while the authority of the executor appointed and qualified under the first will continued and there was no fatal defect in the proceedings antecedent to the sale and conveyance to them, does the fact that such later will, making other dispositions of his property, was discovered and admitted to probate, render void their title?

We think this question must be answered in the negative.

A sale by order of a probate court is a judicial sale. Moore v. Shultz, 13 Pa. St. 98; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319; Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157; Lalanne's Heirs v. Moreau, 13 La. 431; Howard v. Zeyer, 18 La. Ann. 407.

Such sales are, therefore, protected by the rule that a title acquired at a decretal sale of lands, made by a court in the exercise of competent jurisdiction, is not rendered invalid by the reversal of the decree. Ward v. Hollins, 14 Md. 158; Irwin v. Jeffers, 3 Ohio St. 389; Gossom v. Donaldson, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 230; Fergus v. Woodworth, 44 Ill. 374; Gray v. Brignardello, 1 Wall. 627, 634.

In the case last cited this court said: 'Although the judgment or decree may be reversed, yet all rights acquired at a judicial sale, while the decree or judgment was in full force, and which it authorized, will be protected. It is sufficient for the buyer to know...

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