Davis v. Garland
| Decision Date | 22 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-CV-443-LJV |
| Parties | DAMION G.V. DAVIS, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
DECISION & ORDER
Damion G.V. Davis has been detained in the custody of the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), for more than three years. Docket Item 11 at ¶ 13. On June 9, 2022, Davis filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the validity of his detention at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility (“BFDF”) in Batavia, New York, and on August 1, 2022, he filed an amended petition through counsel. Docket Items 1, 11. The respondents moved to dismiss Davis's amended petition on August 26, 2022, arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over many of Davis's claims and that, in any event, the amended petition was moot and an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. Docket Item 12. Davis replied on September 9, 2022. Docket Item 13.
For the following reasons, the respondents' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The respondents shall answer the amended petition as set forth below.
Davis is a native of Jamaica. Docket Item 11 at ¶ 1. He was admitted into the United States as a lawful permanent resident in November 1989, and he has not returned to Jamaica since then. Id. at ¶ 2.
Davis's father became a naturalized United States citizen in November 1994, and Davis claims that he acquired citizenship as a result of his father's naturalization. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 8-9. More specifically, Davis says that he “derived U.S. citizenship from his father under the former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3),” which extended citizenship to the children of a naturalized parent under some circumstances.[1] Id. at ¶ 8. And Davis says that if he did not derive citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) when his father was naturalized in 1994, that statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. Id. at ¶ 9.
On October 17, 2019, ICE officers took Davis into custody “without any prior warning.” Docket Item 11-1 at ¶¶ 5-6. Davis, who “was confused [about] why [he was] caught up in immigration matters[,] expected the officers to release [him] after [they] verif[ied] that [he] was a United States citizen.” Id. at ¶ 7. But Davis was not released from custody; instead, DHS charged that Davis was subject to removal from the United States as a noncitizen under various provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537. Docket Item 11 at ¶ 6; Docket Item 12-2 at 143. More specifically, DHS initially charged that Davis was subject to removal as a noncitizen who had been “enjoined under a protection order and ha[d] been determined to have engaged in conduct in violation of that order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued.” Docket Item 12-2 at 143; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). About a month after Davis was taken into custody, DHS filed additional charges, alleging that he was removable as a noncitizen who had been convicted of a controlled substance offense see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B); as a noncitizen who had been convicted of an aggravated felony, see id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); as a noncitizen who had been convicted of a crime of domestic violence, see id. § 1227(a)(2)(E); and as a noncitizen who had been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude that did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal conduct, see id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). See Docket Item 12-2 at 147.
On February 21, 2020, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) rejected Davis's claim of derivative citizenship and ordered Davis removed to Jamaica. Docket Item 11-3. On June 10, 2021, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the IJ's decision and again rejected Davis's claim of derivative citizenship. Docket Item 11-4. About two weeks later, Davis filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Docket Item 11-5. On December 30, 2021, a Third Circuit panel stayed Davis's removal and appointed counsel for Davis's appeal. See Davis v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 21-2235, Docket Item 34 (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 2021). Davis's petition for review remains pending before the Third Circuit. See Docket Item 11 at ¶ 7; Docket Item 11-5.
In the meantime, Davis, who then was detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility in Pennsylvania, filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See Davis v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 4:21-cv-1260, Docket Item 1 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2021); Davis v. Garland, 4:22-cv-20, Docket Item 1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2022). On June 13, 2022, Davis's first petition was dismissed after he received a bond hearing pursuant to the Third Circuit's decision in Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison, 905 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2018).[2] See Docket Item 12-2 at 219-35. Davis's second petition was dismissed for the same reason about three months later. See Davis v. Warden of Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 2022 WL 4391686 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4389543 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2022).
While those two petitions were pending, Davis was transferred from the Pike County Correctional Facility to the BFDF. Docket Item 11 at ¶ 5. Shortly after arriving at the BFDF-and before the Middle District of Pennsylvania issued a decision on either habeas petition-Davis filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court. Docket Item 1.
A court “properly dismisses an action under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the court ‘lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.'” Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.a.r.l., 790 F.3d 411,416-17 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). “When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction[,] a court must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint.” Jiles v. Rochester Genesee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 317 F.Supp.3d 695, 699 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998)). On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court “may consider affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings to resolve the jurisdictional issue.” J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004).
“Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, ‘when a case becomes moot, the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the action.'” Doyle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 722 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 2013) (alterations omitted) (quoting Fox v. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y., 42 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1994)). “A case is moot, and accordingly the federal courts have no jurisdiction over the litigation, when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Fox, 42 F.3d at 140 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The hallmark of a moot case or controversy is that the relief sought can no longer be given or is no longer needed.” Thomas v. Searls, 515 F.Supp.3d 34, 37 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 1983)).
As an initial matter, the respondents contend that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over some of the claims in Davis's amended petition. Docket Item 12-3 at 11-16. This Court agrees with the respondents that Davis's arguments about his “substantial claim” to citizenship do not belong in this Court.[3] “District courts generally lack jurisdiction to entertain a direct or indirect attack on a removal order.” See Lainez v. McHenry, 809 Fed.Appx. 40, 41 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order). That is because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) provides that “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals” is “the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter.” And 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) further provides that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove [a noncitizen] from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” So when a noncitizen directly or “indirectly challeng[es]” his or her order of removal in district court, “section 1252(a)(5)'s jurisdictional bar . . . preclude[s] such an indirect challenge.” Delgado, 643 F.3d at 55; see also Qiao v. Lynch, 672 Fed.Appx. 134, 135 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) .
Davis maintains that this Court has jurisdiction to evaluate how his “substantial claim” to citizenship affects the validity of his detention because he is not asking this Court to declare that he is in fact a United States citizen.[4] See Docket Item 13 at 8-12. But as noted above, Davis's “substantial claim” to derivative citizenship arose in his removal proceedings, where he claimed that he could not be removed because he acquired citizenship under the former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3). See Docket Item 11 at ¶ 36 (); Docket Item 11-3 at 10 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial