Davis v. Guam, CIVIL CASE NO. 11-00035
| Decision Date | 08 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL CASE NO. 11-00035 |
| Parties | ARNOLD DAVIS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GUAM, GUAM ELECTION COMMISSION, ALICE M. TAIJERON, MARTHA C. RUTH, JOSEPH F. MESA, JOHNNY P. TAITANO, JOSHUA F. RENORIO, DONALD I. WEAKLEY, and LEONARDO M. RAPADAS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Guam |
This court heard the following matters on September 1, 2016: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (see ECF No. 103); and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (see ECF No. 106). Appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff were Mr. J. Christian Adams of Election Law Center, PLLC, and Mr. Mun Su Park of Law Offices of Park and Associates. Appearing on behalf of the Defendants were Attorney General of Guam Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson, Deputy Attorney General Kenneth Orcutt, and Special Assistant Attorney General Julian Aguon. After careful consideration and after having reviewed the parties' briefs, relevant cases and statutes, and having heard argument from counsel on the matter, the court hereby GRANTS the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and finds MOOT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons stated herein.
This is a civil rights action which deals with the topic of self-determination of the political status of the island and who should have the right to vote on a referendum concerning such. The Plaintiff claims that he is prohibited from registering to vote on the referendum, which is a violation of the Voting Rights Act, the Organic Act of Guam, and his Fifth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights.
On November 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In the complaint, he alleges discrimination in the voting process by Guam and the Defendants. Id. Plaintiff alleges that under Guam law, a Political Status Plebiscite ("Plebiscite") is to be held concerning Guam's future relationship with the United States. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff, a white, non-Chamorro, male and resident of Guam, states that he applied to vote for the Plebiscite but was not permitted to do so because he did not meet the definition of "Native Inhabitant of Guam." Id. at ¶¶ 20 and 21. "Native Inhabitants of Guam" is defined as "those persons who became U.S. Citizens by virtue of the authority and enactment of the 1950 Guam Organic Act and descendants of those persons." 3 Guam Code Ann. § 21001(e).
The Plebiscite would ask native inhabitants which of the three political status options they preferred. The three choices are Independence, Free Association with the United States, andStatehood. See Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 8.
Because Plaintiff was denied the right to register for the Plebiscite, he filed the instant complaint, stating three causes of action. In his first cause of action, he alleges that by limiting the right to vote in the Plebiscite to only Native Inhabitants of Guam, the purpose and effect of the act was to exclude him and most non-Chamorros from voting therein, thereby resulting in a denial or abridgment of the rights of citizens of the United States to vote on account of race, color, or national origin, a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
In his second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are preventing him from registering to vote in the Plebiscite because he is not a Native Inhabitant of Guam. Thus, Defendants are engaged in discrimination on the basis of race, color, and/or national origin in violation of various laws of the United States.
Lastly, the Plaintiff's third cause of action alleges that he is being discriminated in relation to his fundamental right to vote in the Plebiscite in violation of the Organic Act of Guam, the U.S. Constitution and other laws of the United States for the reason that he is not a Native Inhabitant of Guam.
In his Prayer for Relief, Plaintiff seeks a judgment: enjoining Defendants from preventing Plaintiff and those similarly situated from registering for and voting in the Plebiscite; enjoining Defendants from using the Guam Decolonization Registry in determining who is eligible to vote in the Plebiscite; enjoining Defendant Leonardo Rapadas from enforcement of the criminal law provisions of the Act that make it a crime to register or allow a person to vote in the Plebiscite who is not a Native Inhabitant of Guam3; and a declaration that Defendants' conduct has beenand would be, if continued, a violation of law.
On November 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed his complaint herein. See Compl., ECF No. 1. On December 2, 2011, the then-Attorney General of Guam, Leonardo M. Rapadas, a named Defendant, on behalf of himself and all named defendants, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to present a case or controversy. See Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 17. On January 9, 2013, the court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss finding that the Plaintiff lacked standing and the case was not ripe for adjudication. See Order, ECF No. 78. The Plaintiff appealed.
On May 8, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision, finding that the Plaintiff has standing to pursue his challenge to Guam's alleged race-based registration classification and that the claim was ripe because the Plaintiff alleged he was currently subjected to unlawful unequal treatment in the ongoing registration process. See Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 2015).
On October 30, 2015, both parties filed their respective motions for summary judgment. See Pl.'s Mot., ECF Nos. 103; and Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 106. The court heard the matter on September 1, 2016, and thereafter took it under advisement.
i. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
The Plaintiff moves the court for a judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), wherein he seeks the enjoinment of the Plebiscite, and (ii) a declaration from the court that the Plebiscite violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, and the Organic Act. See Pl.'s Mot., ECF No. 103.
ii. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants likewise move the court for a judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56,wherein they seek judgment granted in their favor because Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case of impermissible race-based discrimination under the United States Constitution or any federal statutes. See Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 106.
The court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, for Plaintiff's claims under the Voting Rights Act, the Organic Act of Guam, and his Constitutional rights under the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. See also 48 U.S.C. § 1424.
Venue is proper in this judicial district, the District Court of Guam, because Defendants are Guam, the Government of Guam and its officials, and all of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). To demonstrate that a material fact cannot be genuinely disputed, the movant may:
A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "genuine" where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Thus, the evidence presented in opposition to summary judgment must be "enough 'to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth attrial.'" Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)).
A shifting burden of proof governs motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Where, as here, the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, "the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007).
If the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient" and the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 252; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
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