Davis v O'hara

Decision Date31 May 2000
Docket Number99-00066
Citation40 S.W.3d 24
PartiesPATRICIA DAVIS, and JENNIFER ARIC, for themselves and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs/Appellants, AND GINA EUBANKS, Plaintiff, VS. MIKE O'HARA, Acting Director, Child Support Services, Tennessee Department of Human Services, Defendant/Appellee. C.A.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Filed
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

From the Chancery Court of Davidson County at Nashville. No. 92-3314-I

Honorable Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants: Harris A. Gilbert, WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, Nashville, Tennessee, Brian Paddock, Cookeville, Tennessee

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee: Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter,

Stuart F. Wilson-Patton, Assistant Attorney General

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED: FARMER, J., CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S.: (Concurs), HIGHERS, J.: (Concurs)

OPINION FILED:

Plaintiffs Patricia Davis and Jennifer Aric appeal the trial court's judgment dismissing their civil rights claims against Defendant/Appellee Mike O'Hara, Acting Director, Child Support Services, Tennessee Department of Human Services. Relying upon the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs' 19831 claims based upon the court's ruling that the Plaintiffs had failed to assert any enforceable private right of action under the provisions of Title IV_D of the Social Security Act. After reviewing the allegations of the Plaintiffs' amended complaint, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against the Director of Child Support Services, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural History of Plaintiffs' 1983 Claims

This appeal presents the second opportunity for this court to rule on the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff Patricia Davis's 1983 claims against the Director of Child Support Services for the Tennessee Department of Human Services. In her original complaint, Davis and three other plaintiffs alleged that the Director and other state agents had failed to provide them with child support services as required by Title IV_D of the Social Security Act. The trial court dismissed the original plaintiffs' 1983 claims based upon its ruling that the plaintiffs had no private right of action to enforce any rights allegedly arising under Title IV_D, also known as the Child Support Enforcement Act.

On appeal, this court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. In Davis v. McClaran, No. 01A01_9304_CH_00164, 1993 WL 523667, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1993) (Davis I), we held that the plaintiffs had "an enforceable right under Title IV_D to receive services from a Title IV_D program that follows federally required procedures in at least 75 percent of cases." We based this holding, in part, upon Title IV_D's requirement that, in order to receive the full amount of federal funding available, a state must substantially comply with the requirements of Title IV_D. See Davis I, 1993 WL 523667, at *3 (citing 42 U.S.C. 603(h)(1)). The regulations in effect indicated that a state was in substantial compliance if it complied with the requirements of Title IV_D in seventy-five percent (75%) of cases handled. See Davis I, 1993 WL 523667, at *3; see also 45 C.F.R. 305.20 (1993).

The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed our reinstatement of the plaintiffs' 1983 action. See Davis v. McClaran, 909 S.W.2d 412, 420-21 (Tenn. 1995) ( Davis II).2 In doing so, the supreme court agreed with this court's holding that the plaintiffs had enforceable rights to receive Title IV_D benefits from the state. See Davis II, 909 S.W.2d at 416. The supreme court modified our decision, however, by holding that a plaintiff could bring a 1983 action against the state to enforce its direct obligations to the plaintiff under Title IV_D regardless of whether the state was in substantial compliance with Title IV_D's requirements. See id. at 420. Thus, our supreme court recognized that Title IV_D could give rise to enforceable individual rights to receive child support services independent of Title IV_D's substantial compliance provisions. See id. The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently denied the Director's petition for certiorari. See McClaran v. Davis, 517 U.S. 1128 (1996).

After this case was remanded to the trial court, Patricia Davis was the only original plaintiff who continued to participate in this litigation.3 Davis, along with two new plaintiffs, including Appellant Jennifer Aric,4 filed an amended complaint in the trial court in which they alleged that the Director had failed to provide them with child support services in violation of the provisions of Title IV_D. With regard to the Director's failure to provide Title IV_D services to Patricia Davis, the complaint made the following allegations:

46. Plaintiff Patricia Davis gave birth to Latasha Davis on June 30, 1979. Ms. Davis has not been married to Latasha's father, Billy Stewart, and she received AFDC for Latasha after the child was born. Ms. Davis sought assistance from the [District Attorney General (DAG) for the Twentieth Judicial District of Tennessee] in establishing paternity and setting a support obligation while Latasha was still an infant.

47. Eventually, in 1983 or 1984, the DAG's agents assisted Ms. Davis in establishing that Mr. Stewart is Latasha's father. The DAG's child support office agents made no effort to establish a child support obligation until 1991 when they filed a petition to set support in the Juvenile Court of Davidson County. Following a hearing on October 29, 1991, the Juvenile Court for Davidson County entered an order requiring Mr. Stewart to pay support in the amount of $142 per month by income assignment. The Clerk of Court was unable to serve the income assignment order, and Mr. Stewart failed to make any child support payments directly to the Clerk of Court. Despite knowing Mr. Stewart's home address, the DAG's child support program made no efforts to enforce the child support order to the time this action was filed.

48. Ms. Davis has advised the child support agency that Mr. Stewart now receives Social Security Disability payments. Social Security Disability payments are subject to income withholding to pay child support. Ms. Davis now receives only food stamps. Ms. Davis receives no Families First assistance because she cannot work. She must provide constant care for Latasha who has such serious asthma that she is frequently admitted to the hospital. Upon information and belief the [Director] and [his] agents have taken no action to effectuate the income withholding order for support for Ms. Davis and Latasha.

49. Plaintiff Davis has another child, Thaddeus Davis, born on August 23, 1982. Ms. Davis has not been married to the child's father, Thaddeus Kenneth Smyer. She received AFDC benefits for the child after he was born. Ms. Davis provided Mr. Smyer's home address and likely place of employment within Davidson County to the DAG's agents. This information was never acted upon to establish a paternity or support order for Thaddeus Davis.

50. The DAG's agents refused to allow Ms. Davis' then counsel to review the child support file on her or to provide information as to the case status or the actions of the child support agency. On information and belief, [the Director's] agents did nothing to enforce the child support obligations of Mr. Stewart or to establish the child support obligation of Mr. Smyer.

51. In November 1997, Ms. Davis sought the help of a private attorney to obtain child support. The private attorney contacted the child support agency and provided the most recent information concerning Ms. Davis' child support cases, including the Social Security number of Thaddeus Kenneth Smyer. On information and belief, [the Director] and [his] local child support agents have not taken any steps to enforce the child support obligations of Mr. Stewart or to establish the child support obligation of Mr. Smyer.

With regard to the Director's failure to provide Title IV_D services to Jennifer Aric, the amended complaint made the following allegations:

56. Plaintiff Jennifer Aric is the mother of Julia Aric, born July 29, 1993. Ms. Aric was receiving welfare aid at the time Julia was born, but the [Director] failed to establish paternity although the non-custodial parent was in custody and paternity could have been established within the time limits set by federal law. A court order for child support was entered in March 1995 for $80 per month to be paid by the non-custodial parent Anthony Nolley. The non-custodial parent has made only two payments since the entry of the order. Upon information and belief, the [Director] failed to promptly identify the failure of the non-custodial parent to timely pay support and failed to take the enforcement actions required by federal law.

57. In 1996 Ms. Aric repeatedly requested enforcement of the support order over a period of many months. Eventually the [Director's] contract IV_D agency MAXIMUS filed a motion for contempt to enforce the order. Ms. Aric called the MAXIMUS office the day before the hearing, as she had been instructed to do. She was told that the non-custodial parent had been served and so she took time off work to attend the hearing. Ms. Aric appeared at the courthouse for the motion. After several hours delay, she was told that the non-custodial parent had not been served. She was then told by the MAXIMUS representative that it was her duty to locate the non-custodial parent and that she had failed in this duty. Ms. Aric has not had contact with the non-custodial parent since they separated because he had abused Julia. This demand upon her to perform the location activity which federal law requires the [Director] to perform was delivered before other persons assembled for child support case hearings and greatly embarrassed Ms. Aric.

58. The [Direc...

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