Davis v. Hix, 10603

Citation140 W.Va. 398,84 S.E.2d 404
Decision Date16 November 1954
Docket NumberNo. 10603,10603
CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
PartiesHenry DAVIS, C. S. Davis, Director Employment Security et al., v. M. H. HIX, Clerk, Board of Review, Department Employment Security et al.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The first syllabus point in Copen v. Hix, 130 W.Va. 343 , considered and distinguished.

2. The second syllabus point in Copen v. Hix, 130 W.Va. 343 , considered and distinguished.

3. The third syllabus point in Copen v. Hix, 130 W.Va. 343 , considered and distinguished.

4. The second syllabus point in Miners v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637 , considered and distinguished.

5. 'In the absence of any definition of the intended meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they will, in the interpretation of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning in the connection in which they are used.' Miners v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637 .

6. Unemployment compensation statutes, being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed to achieve the benign purposes intended to the full extent thereof.

7. 'New work', as used in Chapter 1, Article 6, Section 6, Acts of the Legislature, Second Extraordinary Session, 1936, as amended, does not envisage only employment in an industry in which the unemployed individual had not theretofore been employed.

8. Where an individual has no employment relationship with, or attachment to, any employer, any work which may be offered to him is 'new work' within the meaning of Chapter 1, Article 6, Section 6, Acts of the Legislature, Second Extraordinary Session, 1936, as amended.

9. Generally, a labor dispute can only exist between the individual workers and their employers.

10. As a matter of law, membership in a trade union by an individual who has no employment relationship with an employer, without more, does not ipso facto disqualify the individual under Chapter 1, Article 6, Section 4(4), Acts of the Legislature, Second Extraordinary Session, 1936, as amended, even though a work stoppage due to a labor duspute exists at the premises where he was last employed, in which the participating employees are members of the same union with which he is affiliated.

11. Where the employer-employee relationship has been severed, prior to the beginning of a work stoppage resulting from a labor dispute at the premises where an applicant for unemployment benefits was last employed, the rule as to the burden of affirmatively showing that he is not disqualified under Chapter 1, Article 6, Section 4(4), Acts of the Legislature, Second Extraordinary Session, 1936, as amended as announced in Copen v. Hix, 130 W.Va. 343 , is inapplicable.

12. The phrase 'due to' as used in Section 4(4), Article 6, Chapter 1, Acts of the Legislature, Second Extraordinary Session, 1936, as amended, disqualifying certain individuals from receiving unemployment benefits for a week in which their unemployment is 'due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute' is synonymous with "caused by', 'resulting from', 'sustained by', 'sustained by means of', and 'sustained in consequence of".

R. L. Theibert, M. E. Boiarsky, Charleston, John G. Fox, Atty. Gen., Leo Loeb, Dean Heironimus, Charleston, for petitioners.

Estep, Chambers & Smith, F. Paul Chambers, Logan, Mahan, White & Higgins, S. C. Higgins, Jr., Fayetteville, for defendants.

BROWNING, Judge.

This Court granted writs of certiorari in these four cases to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County denying claimants unemployment benefits for the period, February 6, 1950 to and including March 5, 1950. The Director of Employment Security joins with the claimants in their petition, and the defendants are: M. H. Hix, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County; the Board of Review, West Virginia Department of Employment Security; and numerous coal companies against whom the charges for unemployment benefits, if allowed, would be made.

The individual claimants, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situate and adversely affected by the decision of the Board of Review, subsequently upheld by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, ask reversal of such judgment. It has been stipulated that the original unemployment of these claimants was not the result of a labor dispute; that the only period involved is that from February 6, 1950-March 5, 1950; and that the individual claimants are typical or representative of numerous others, similarly situate, who were allowed benefits by departmental deputies, but which awards were reversed by the Board of Review. All claimants had been declared ineligible to receive benefits immediately prior to February 6, 1950 on the ground that they were then unavailable for full-time employment, inasmuch as the United Mine Workers of America, of which claimants were members, had directed that their members produce coal only three days a week, and each claimant declined to work more than the designated three days.

Beginning February 6, 1950, work in the coal mines was stopped completely. On February 11, 1950, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, entered a temporary order restraining the United Mine Workers of America, et al., from 'encouraging, causing or engaging in' any work stoppage at any of the defendants' mines. This order continued in effect until March 3, 1950, when a preliminary injunction of the same tenor was granted. Nevertheless, and despite the directives of the union officials, the members of the union refused to work until after a new contract was signed on March 5, 1950.

Claimants assert that they are eligible for unemployment benefits under the provisions of Chapter 1, Article 6, Acts of the Legislature, Second Extraordinary Session, 1936, as amended, hereinafter referred to as Code, 21A-6, which provides:

21A-6-1: 'An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits only if the director finds that:

* * *

* * *

'(3) He is able to work and is available for full time work for which he is fitted by prior training or experience.'

21A-6-6: 'Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied to an individual otherwise eligible, for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:

'(1) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute.

'(2) If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality.

'(3) If as a condition of being employed the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona-fide labor organization.'

On the other hand, the defendant employers contend, and the Board of Review and the Circuit Court of Kanawha County found, that claimants are ineligible under 21A-6-1, and are disqualified under the provisions of 21A-6-4, which provides:

'Upon the determination of the facts by the director, an individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

* * *

* * *

'(4) For a week in which his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he was last employed, unless the director is satisfied that he was not (one) participating, financing, or directly interested in such dispute, and (two) did not belong to a grade or class of workers who were participating, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute which resulted in the stoppage of work. * * *'

The 'sample cases' were heard by the Board of Review, West Virginia Department of Employment Security, in lieu of a trial examiner, upon appeal from the decisions of the departmental deputies, and, at the two hearings before the Board of Review, certain pertinent testimony was adduced as to the four individual 'typical claimants', Henry Davis, William Gray, John Palmer and Walter Humphrey, as well as to circumstances leading up to the cessation of work in the coal industry for the period February 6, 1950-March 5, 1950. The evidence showed that the United Mine Workers of America is an unincorporated labor organization with a membership in excess of 400,000 persons; that all coal miners in the bituminous field, with few exceptions, are members thereof; that the four claimants were, at the time of the disposition of their cases, such members; that for several years prior to the initiation of this litigation, operators of coal mines in the United States, whose production workers belong to the United Mine Workers of America, have operated under industry-wide collective bargaining agreements, negotiated between the collective bargaining representatives of the operating companies on the one side, and the International Union, United Mine Workers of America, on the other; that the last of these agreements, prior to the period here involved, was known as the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1948, which expired by its own terms on June 30, 1949; and that, thereafter, the pattern of work in the industry established by directives of the Union was as follows:

'June 30 to July 5, 1949--Vacation period--no work;

'July 5 to September 14, 1949--Three day week;

'September 15 to November 9, 1949--No work;

'November 9 to November 30, 1949--Six day week;

'December 1, 1949 to Feb. 6, 1950--Three day week;

'February 6 to March 5, 1950--No Work.'

The evidence as to the individual claimants showed that Henry Davis was a coal miner by training and experience, forty-three years of age, and had spent twenty-six years working in and around coal mines; he became unemployed on March 11, 1949, by virtue of quitting his job with the Logan County Coal Corporation. He testified that he was unable to secure employment thereafter, although he sought such employment from several companies, and that during...

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