Davis v. John

• Citation: 485 F.Supp.3d 1207
• Decision Date: 09 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. CV 19-9592-CBM(E),CV 19-9592-CBM(E)
• Parties: E. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. Chaplain JOHN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

485 F.Supp.3d 1207

E. DAVIS, Plaintiff,

v.Chaplain JOHN, Defendant.

No. CV 19-9592-CBM(E)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed September 9, 2020

Eric Davis, Lancaster, CA, pro se.

Neculai Grecea, CAAG - Office of Attorney General California Department of Justice, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

CONSUELO B. MARSHALL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who is confined at the California State Prison, Los Angeles County ("CSP-LAC"), filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. on November 7, 2019. The Complaint consists of two pages of a form Complaint to which is attached a typewritten Complaint and exhibits. Defendant allegedly is both an official of the California Department of Corrections and a chaplain at CSP-LAC. Plaintiff sues Defendant in Defendant's individual capacity and in Defendant's official capacity.

On May 14, 2020, Defendant filed "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, etc." ("Motion to Dismiss"). Plaintiff did not file a timely opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, on June 23, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending dismissal of the action without prejudice.

On July 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed "Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss," constituting Plaintiff's belated opposition ("Opposition"). On August 6, 2020, the Magistrate Judge withdrew the June 23, 2020 Report and Recommendation. On August 11, 2020, Defendant filed a "Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss" ("Reply").

SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges:

Plaintiff is an authorized "Inmate Lead (Representative)" for the Nation of Islam religious program at the CSP-LAC (Typewritten Complaint, p. 2, ¶ 5). Plaintiff's duties include the "maintenance and orderly functioning" of the Nation of Islam Religious Services and Program (id. ). Part of the Nation of Islam's religious practice involves displaying a religious "Symbol/Flag" depicting the Sun, Moon and Star during all religious services (id., ¶ 7). The Nation of Islam's religious flag is distinct and distinguishes the Nation of Islam from all other religious sects (id. ).

On December 20, 2018, while the Nation of Islam service in the multi-use chapel was in session with over twenty inmates in attendance, Defendant Chaplain John entered and began shouting: "You Black Muslims Can't Hang Your Muslim Symbol On the Podium" (id., pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 6, 8). Plaintiff told Defendant that Plaintiff is one of the authorized leads for the Nation of Islam Religious Program, and Plaintiff asked Defendant what the problem was (id., ¶ 7).

Defendant continued aggressively to shout at Plaintiff, saying, "Take That Damn Thing Down!" (referring to the Nation of Islam "Symbol/Flag") (id., pp. 2-3, ¶ 8). Defendant said: "That Podium Is A Christian Podium and This Is A Christian Chapel!" (id. ). To avoid an argument, Plaintiff removed the Nation of Islam "Symbol/Flag" from the multi-use podium (id. ). Plaintiff felt ashamed and deeply humiliated (id. ). On December 20, 2018, Plaintiff submitted an inmate request to Defendant's supervisor (id., p. 3 ¶ 9, Ex. D).

On January 10, 2019, Defendant again disrespectfully interrupted the Nation of Islam service, shouting in the face of an inmate whom Plaintiff had asked to put up the Nation of Islam symbol and aggressively demanding that the Nation of Islam symbol be removed from the multi-use podium (id., p. 3, ¶¶ 9-10). Defendant angrily shouted: "You Black Muslims Can't Hang Your Symbol! This Is A Christian Chapel and A Christian Podium! Take That Shit Down!" (id., p. 3, ¶ 10). Plaintiff informed Defendant that Plaintiff was going to write a "602"¹ inmate appeal (id., p. 3, ¶ 11). Defendant became even more angrily aggressive and said: "I Don't Care! Take That Damn Thing Down Now! Or Get Out Of Here!" (id. ).

The inmates complied and were made, "shamefully," to remove their religious symbol, thus substantially burdening the Nation of Islam "Religious Exercise and Religious Program" by forcing Plaintiff and the other inmates to go on with the service without their religious symbol (id., p. 3, ¶ 12). Defendant blatantly and disrespectfully discriminated against the Nation of Islam (id., p. 4, ¶ 13). Christians are able to put up a cross as their religious symbol (id. ). Others who share the multi-faith chapel and multi-purpose podium can put up their religious symbols (id. ). Defendant specifically targeted and denigrated the Nation of Islam and humiliated its adherents (id. ). Defendant acted under color of law and was motivated by his obvious hatred of the Nation of Islam religion (id. ).

Plaintiff asserts Defendant violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (Typewritten Complaint, p. 5, ¶ 19). Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as a declaration that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff and substantially burdened Plaintiff's religious practice in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments (id., p 5).

Plaintiff attaches various exhibits to the Complaint, including:

1. A "Memorandum" dated June 25, 2016, signed as "approved" by two chaplains, including chaplain "S. John," inter alia identifying Plaintiff as an authorized Nation of Islam inmate assistant (Ex. B);

2. Two declarations from other inmates supporting Plaintiff's allegations concerning the December 20, 2018 and January 10, 2019 incidents (Exs. C, E);

3. An "Inmate/Parolee Appeal" form, Form "CDCR 602," signed by Plaintiff on January 10, 2019, in which Plaintiff complained of the two incidents and contended that inmates of other religions who used the chapel and the podium, including Christians and Catholics, were permitted to display their religious symbols (Ex. F, second document);

4. An "Amended Staff Complaint Response, etc.," dated June 4, 2019 and signed by the Warden: (1) partially granting Plaintiff's appeal "in that an Appeal inquiry into [Plaintiff's] allegation has been conducted"; (2) stating that an inquiry had been conducted and that "[s]taff did violate CDCR policy with respect to the issues raised"; and (3) advising Plaintiff that a request for administrative action or the placement of documentation in a staff member's personnel file was beyond the scope of the staff complaint process (Ex. F, sixth document); and

5. A "Third Level Appeal Decision," dated September 27, 2019, denying Plaintiff's appeal and concurring with the decision of the second level reviewer (Ex. F, first document).

DEFENDANT'S CONTENTIONS

Defendant contends:

1. Plaintiff allegedly cannot sue Defendant for damages or for non-monetary relief in Defendant's official capacity;

2. Defendant allegedly did not act under color of law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ;

3. The Complaint allegedly fails to state a Free Exercise Claim;

4. The Complaint allegedly fails to state an Equal Protection Claim;

5. The Complaint allegedly fails to state a RLUIPA claim;

6. Plaintiff allegedly cannot sue for an asserted violation of state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ;

7. Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief allegedly is insufficient; and

8. Defendant allegedly is entitled to qualified immunity.

STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTION TO DISMISS

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

"Generally, a court may not consider material beyond the complaint in ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion." Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and footnote omitted). The Court may consider "only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice." Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

The Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citations omitted); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (on motion to dismiss, court takes as true all non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff).

The Court may not dismiss a complaint without leave to amend unless "it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (district court should grant leave to amend "unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts") (citation and internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. The Eleventh Amendment Bars Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claims for Damages and Declaratory Relief.

The Court must construe Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendant, allegedly a state prison employee, as claims against the State of California. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). "[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought." Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Section 1983 does...